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Aim and Scope

The Journal of Dialogue Studies is a multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed academic journal published twice a year. Its aim is to study the theory and practice of dialogue, understood provisionally as: meaningful interaction and exchange between people (often of different social, cultural, political, religious or professional groups) who come together through various kinds of conversations or activities with a view to increased understanding. The Journal is published by the Institute for Dialogue Studies, the academic platform of the Dialogue Society.

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Manuscripts submitted to the Journal for publication must be original, meet the standards and conventions of scholarly publication, and must not be simultaneously under consideration by another journal. Manuscripts should be presented in the form and style set out in the Journal’s Style Guide. For further information and Style Guide please visit www.dialoguesociety.org/journal. To get in touch please email journal@dialoguesociety.org.

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The Dialogue Society is a registered charity, established in London in 1999, with the aim of advancing social cohesion by connecting communities, empowering people to engage and contributing to the development of ideas on dialogue. It operates nation-wide with regional branches across the UK. Through discussion forums, courses, capacity building publications and outreach it enables people to venture across boundaries of religion, culture and social class. It provides a platform where people can meet to share narratives and perspectives, discover the values they have in common and be at ease with their differences.

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Editorial Introduction

Paul Weller

Academic Editor

The Journal of Dialogue Studies aims to provide a platform for intellectually rigorous engagement with dialogue from a wide range of academic disciplines, and in relation to dialogue as conducted in a wide variety of contexts. This issue of the journal has a particular emphasis on some of the contexts of dialogue.

This begins with Geoffrey Klempner’s paper on “Philosophy, Ethics and Dialogue”. This may at first appear an unusual paper to open with as it seems to be less contextualised than the others in this edition of the journal. But Klempner roots his broader discussion and critique of the relationship between philosophy, ethics and dialogue by drawing on his 20 years of experience with students taking courses with Pathways to Philosophy, including one who was a prisoner on Death Row in Texas, in the USA. From this experience and the engagement of it with wider theoretical discussions concerning ethics and dialogue, Klempner concludes that learning how to conduct ethical dialogue is somewhat similar to learning how to dance, in that it cannot be taught and learned from a book: one can only learn ethical dialogue by actually and contextually engaging in ethical dialogue.

Andrew Orton’s paper on “The Ethical Dimensions of Dialogue Between Policymakers: Learning Through Interaction Over Migrant Integration Dilemmas” includes a contextual reference to locality: in this instance the dilemmas faced in relation to the integration of migrants within particular localities in different national contexts. But the focus of the paper is on dialogue around these challenges when policymakers from different countries engage with each other, and how such dialogue can contribute towards the generation of shared learning that can improve local outcomes. This includes particular attention to the importance of the ethical dimensions of such dialogues.

Simon Robinson’s paper “Integrity and Dialogue” uses a methodical, clear structure to set out traditional definitions of integrity, into which he weaves conceptions of dialogue. This highlights the challenges of having such fixed perceptions of integrity when examined alongside the diverse and socially engaged field of dialogue. By using both the Mid Staffs Hospital Trust case and Shakespeare’s Henry V as examples, Robinson provides a springboard from which he can scrutinise both theoretical and practical applications (and failures) of the integrity-dialogue relationship. The
author succeeds in coalescing old and new, fictitious and real sources in dialogue to illustrate that such pluralist discourse should be approached with a view to encompass multitudinous perspectives, not to reinforcing rigid definitions.

As with Orton’s paper on “The Ethical Dimensions of Dialogue”, Ronald C. Arnett’s paper on “Civic Dialogue: Attending to Locality and Recovering Monologue” also integrates a contextual reference to locality. It does so through exploring the broader thematic of “civic dialogue” that focuses within such dialogue on the importance of locality and also the importance of what the author, in a word that might initially challenge the reader of a paper about “dialogue”, calls “monologue”. By the latter, he means not a style of communication but the substance of particularity that is brought to a dialogical process, and without which there can be no dialogue. In illustrating this he refers to Scottish Enlightenment and draws upon Adam Ferguson’s historical work on civil society.

Abraham Rudnick, Priya Subramanian, Hazel Meredith and Juna Lea Cizman’s paper on “Involving Disadvantaged People in Dialogue: Arguments and Examples from Mental Health Care” unpacks some of the issues involved in a context for dialogue that involves significant imbalances of power by reference to this particular group of disadvantaged people, in relation to whom issues of informed choice and participation can be posed in quite acute ways. The paper does this via discussion of two clinical scenarios that seek to highlight differences in clinical and personal recovery outcomes when informed by the presence or absence of dialogue within mental health care.

Abdoulaye Gaye paper on “‘Stir It Up’: Contestation and the Dialogue in the Artistic Practice of the Twin of Twins” focuses on the context of Jamaican dancehalls and what is widely acknowledged to be their embodiment of a “resistance culture”. This includes aspects of the local versus the global; of culture versus slackness; of uptown versus downtown; and of popular culture versus high culture. Within this context of a “live” cultural environment and, by connecting it with wider theoretical understandings, the paper illustrates the dialectical relationship between the discourses of the dominant and dominated classes in relation to the artistic practice of the Twin of Twins DJs.

In addition to its normal peer reviewed academic papers, this issue of the journal is also the first also to include a new section of pieces that provide a platform for preliminary reflection on dialogical practice of a kind in which the provisionality of the contributions is acknowledged and dialogical engagement is invited from the readers. The editorial team will keep this new feature under review, but for the moment have decided that this offers an additional dimension to what the journal is able to offer and achieve.
This edition of the journal therefore includes Turan Kayaoglu’s piece on “Dialogue 2.0: A Call for Interfaith Service and Action”. It elaborates on a paper he delivered at the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, and focuses on the debates surrounding the successful promotion of religious tolerance. Drawing together this experience, Kayaoglu emphasises the unity between member states on the necessity for intercultural dialogue, and offers his own solution for dispelling religious intolerance.

Also included is Fred Dallmayr’s piece on “Reflection on Dialogue” which comes out of his experience as Co-Chair of the World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations”, on the basis of which he addresses aspects of the historical, cultural and intellectual background of dialogue; the role of dialogue today in the context of “globalization”; and the purpose and meaning of dialogue.

As usual, the journal concludes with reviews of two new publications relevant to the journal’s focus. In the spirit of that which the journal seeks also to study, we welcome dialogical feedback from our readers on the continuing development of the journal.
Here, I examine the nature of ethical dialogue from the point of view of its foundations in the critique of the dominant, disinterested conception of ethics, relating this to my 20 year experience corresponding with students taking courses with Pathways to Philosophy, including a prisoner on Death Row, Texas, USA. Ethical dialogue, where we seek the best outcome by our collective lights, is contrasted with activity in the business arena, where traders are assumed to be acting from purely self-interested motives. The role of philosophy as an activity of seeking, in the words of the metaphysician F.H. Bradley, ‘bad reasons for what we believe on instinct’ is examined from the point of view of our practical interest in learning how to engage in ethical dialogue, as well as the need to defend the theory of ethical dialogue against rival views. From the standpoint of theory, the ethics of dialogue is the conclusion of a three-part dialectical argument involving the refutation of solipsism and the subsequent refutation of anti-solipsism. Looking at ethical dialogue from the standpoint of praxis, it appears that learning ethical dialogue is more like learning to dance than learning an intellectual game like chess. It can’t be taught from a book. One learns ethical dialogue by engaging in ethical dialogue. One consequence of this radical conception of ethics is a new version of the problem of *akrasia*. You have the knowledge and the will, but fail ethically because of your practical inability to engage the other person in ethical dialogue.

Keywords: philosophical analysis, metaphysics, utilitarianism and deontology, religion, game theory, philosophy of business

**Part I**

On 10th December, 2003, Thomas Bartlett Whitaker, his roommate Chris Brashear, and a neighbour, Steve Champagne, carried out an ingenious plan to murder Thomas Whitaker’s father, mother and younger brother. The Whitaker family had gone out to dinner to celebrate Thomas’s graduation from Houston State College. However, the story about the graduation was a lie. When the Whitakers returned to their home in Sugar Land, Texas, Brashear, who was lying in wait, shot and killed Thomas Whitaker’s mother and brother. He shot, but failed to kill, Thomas Whitaker’s father, Kent. Brashear then shot Thomas Whitaker in the arm. Brashear fled the scene with Champagne, who was waiting outside in a getaway car. (Whitaker, T.B. 2012)
Hospitalised on a morphine drip, Kent Whitaker sensed that he had an important decision to make:

I realized that God was offering me the ability to forgive, if I wanted to take advantage of it. Did I really want to forgive this guy? I know the Bible says we are to forgive those who hurt us. I know God tells us that vengeance is his, if he chooses to dispense it. I have even heard secular health professionals say that forgiveness is the most important thing people can do to heal themselves. But did I really want to forgive, even if God was offering a supernatural ability to do so?

In an instant the answer sprang full-grown into my mind. My heart told me that I wanted whoever was responsible to come to Christ and repent for this awful act. At that moment I felt myself completely forgiving him. This forgiveness astounded me, because earlier I had experienced feelings of incredible sadness and intense anger – even the desire to kill the person responsible with my own hands. Little did I realize just how important my decision to forgive would be in the coming months. It would change everything. (Whitaker, K. 2009)

In 2010, I received an email from Tanya Whitaker, Kent Whitaker’s second wife. She and her husband wished to book the Pathways Moral Philosophy Programme (Klempner 1997) for ‘our son’ Thomas, a prisoner in the Polunsky Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice. I had never heard of Thomas Whitaker. It had been big news in the USA, where Kent was interviewed on the Oprah Winfrey Show. Thomas duly completed his programme over the subsequent months. By this time, I knew the whole story. Thomas Whitaker had quickly come under suspicion from detectives investigating the murder case. On the run in Mexico, Thomas was finally arrested in September, 2005, and was extradited to the USA where he stood trial at Fort Bend County, Texas. He was convicted and sentenced to death for First Degree Murder in March, 2007. Subsequent appeals have so far failed to reverse the Court’s decision.

Thomas’s essays on philosophy were thought-provoking, but also disturbing, in the bleak picture they painted of the Polunsky Unit. This was a young man of considerable intelligence and intellectual curiosity. Yet most young men would not have done what he did: a conundrum which I never came finally to resolve. Thomas finished the programme and was awarded his Pathways Certificate in November, 2010.

Subsequently, I discovered the following page on a blog, ‘Minutes Before Six’, which Thomas shares with several Polunsky inmates:
I mentioned recently that I had found a really great set of philosophy correspondence courses from a site in England. I took the one on Ethics (‘Reason, Values, and Conduct’), because I began to feel that a better understanding of the subject would maybe help me to understand how I allowed myself to fall apart the way I did, and become such a mess and a failure. The course is guided by... Dr Geoffrey Klempner (author of *Naive Metaphysics*), and I cannot recommend this program enough. In it, Dr Klempner espouses the value of an ethics of dialogue, a sort of midway point between the positions of the solipsist and the disinterested. I really liked that his system did not fit into the preconceptions I had about ethics being a field straddling a spectrum with the deontologists on one end, and the utilitarians on the other. One of the central points to an ethics of dialogue is that moral discourse exists between an ‘I and a thou’ (taken from a phrase associated with Martin Buber). In other words, when you and I come together to discuss whether or not I committed a moral wrong... we both have to start from a point of actually respecting the other, of allowing the possibility that our dialectic will change our views. (Whitaker, T. B. 2010)

Whether, as his father Kent had believed, or hoped, Thomas Whitaker became an ethically better person for having undergone the experience of studying Moral Philosophy with me, I am not in a position to judge. His understanding of the theoretical issues was stimulated and, hopefully, deepened. Perhaps, as the blog entry suggests, he also learned new strategies for negotiating the ethical challenges presented by daily life in the Polunsky Unit.

The extract also gives a pretty good overview of what the ethics of dialogue is about. Moral philosophy has been fatally stuck on the alternative of the self-interested and disinterested standpoints. We all know, or are expected to believe, that the ‘right’ decision is the one that ignores subjective or personal preferences in favour of what could be seen as the correct action from the impartial standpoint – whether calculated on the basis of maximum utility, or generated from a deontological principle, such as Kant’s categorical imperative, or derived in some other way. The starting point for an ethics of dialogue is that there is no such impartial view. There is no fixed point for ethics: only the shifting dynamic between individual persons in relation with one another.

It is a truism that one ought to be prepared to change one’s view in response to reasoned argument. Otherwise, you merely have two people talking past one another. The ethics of dialogue isn’t just about making that simple point. The claim goes deeper: it is that there is no ethical truth other than the truth we create by our joint efforts, no objective standard but the one we set, or discover, for ourselves. In the Pathways Moral Philosophy Programme, the case is made for an objective foundation for dialogue ethics in the ‘authority of the other to correct my
judgments’. The other person is not like a thermometer or spyglass, a tool which I use for gathering knowledge. The question of the limits and fallibility of my powers of judgment is not up to me alone to judge. In ethical dialogue, I recognise an authority that objectively exists for me, as my authority exists for you, rather than one that you or I merely grant for this or that purpose. However, objectivity, in this case, does not mean a theory that can be used to decide any ethical question. The only people who can do that are me and you, I and thou.

How do you reach an ethical judgment through ethical dialogue? According to the ethics of dialogue, there is no special class or category of judgments known as ‘ethical judgments’. Every judgment is an ethical judgment: just because it is achieved through a process which is in its aim and practice, inclusive of all those affected. As the ideal of inclusion is open-ended – because also of the sheer fact that people themselves can change, and not just their ‘minds’ – there is no point where you can get to say, ‘this is the ethical truth of the matter.’ The focus of ethical dialogue is on the process, guided by good will and openness, rather than on the outcome. To proponents of traditional ethical theories, this is perhaps the hardest proposition to accept. To believe in the objective necessity for ethical dialogue does not entail belief in the existence of ‘objective moral facts’ – whatever those may be.

For the last 20 years, my intellectual life has largely consisted of meetings and dialogue, through email and postal correspondence, with individuals who share my passion for philosophy. I believe that all dialogue is essentially ethical dialogue; and that dialogue, that is to say ethical dialogue, is fundamentally different from trade or quid pro quo, the activity that defines the business arena. As I state in my conference presentation, ‘Truth in the business arena’,

In ethical dialogue, it is axiomatic that one tells the truth, while all other rules of conduct have to be argued for on their merits. In the business arena, it is axiomatic that one does not steal, while all other rules of conduct have to be argued for on their merits. (Klempner 2014)

In ethical dialogue, the question should not arise whether I am seeking to tell the truth – by my lights. It is implicit in the fact that I have opened myself up to you, as you have to me. By contrast, in a commercial transaction, there is always room for such a question. In the business arena, honesty has a cash value.

Although Kent and Tanya Whitaker paid for Thomas Whitaker’s philosophy programme – a transaction conducted in the business arena – my dialogue with Thomas was an ethical dialogue. It was not trade or negotiation, but a meeting between an ‘I’ and a ‘thou’ in Martin Buber’s sense (Buber 1959). Perhaps one of the most interesting features of ethical dialogue, illustrated in the quote from
Whitaker’s blog, is that when someone has experienced dialogue in this sense and with this intention, they learn to do it with others. The practice of ethical dialogue is contagious. Perhaps this is what the early Christians understood, when they followed their simple rule of brotherly and sisterly love.

**Part II**

As a Jew married to a Roman Catholic, I learned about the ethics of dialogue long before my philosophical inquiries brought me to that point. The catalyst was a Good Friday church service which I attended with my late wife, June. As I recount in the Editor’s Note to Issue 100 of *Philosophy Pathways*, (Klempner 2005) for Jews, Good Friday has particularly bitter associations – historically, it is a time that Jews learned to especially fear, as attacks on the alleged ‘killers of Christ’ rose to a peak.

What did I expect? The service was sombre, moving. There were no words of hatred. Instead, I felt the reverberations of the intense sense of unity of the congregation as they pondered a two thousand year old historical incident which defines their faith. Then the priest delivered a sermon which I shall never forget.

The theme of the sermon was peace and justice. In the Middle East, then as now, all the talk was of ‘peace with justice’. But justice demands that the guilty be punished. And who would there be left, the priest asked rhetorically, who did not have some part in the guilt? Yet how can there be peace without justice? The New Testament teaches that peace can only be achieved through forgiveness and reconciliation. That was Christ’s message to humanity. We cannot, and should not forget. But we can forgive and beg for forgiveness.

That experience was formative for me. Years later, when I wrote ‘The Ethics of Dialogue’ and ‘Ethical Dialogue and the Limits of Tolerance’, (Klempner 1998a, 1998b) it was the spirit of that sermon that I tried to recapture. One cannot be fully human and lack a sense of justice. Yet the ethical demand to open up to this particular other, to strive to grasp how things appear from the other’s perspective, however painful that may be, is higher than blind justice. (Klempner 2005)

F. H. Bradley notes in the Preface to his metaphysical treatise, *Appearance and Reality*, that ‘Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.’ (Bradley 1897) As it seems to me now, it was not so much instinct as experience – sometimes painful, ‘racked and riven by painful adjustments and renunciations on both sides’, as I wrote in ‘The Ethics of Dialogue’ (Klempner 1998a) – that led me to an implicit understanding of the nature of ethical dialogue for which I subsequently sought philosophical justification. The point, however, is that the need to offer such justification is by
no means otiose for the would-be philosopher. It is instinct again – or perhaps experiences that go back to early infancy – that drive the philosopher to seek reasons and justification, where those not gripped by the questions of philosophy are content merely to assess practical benefits and get on with their lives.

In the Pathways Moral Philosophy Programme, I describe the case for an ethics of dialogue as the outcome of a three-stage dialectical progression. The first stage of the dialectic consists in the case for transcendental solipsism: the theory that the ultimate description of my experience, my life, can be given from a single standpoint of the Kantian ‘transcendental ego’. In this view, other persons are merely ‘characters in the story of my world’. The second stage of the dialectic consists in the refutation of solipsism. The attempt to maintain a view of the universe as essentially being ‘my world’ breaks down, because my attempts to attain truth are ultimately no better than trying to use a measuring tape to measure itself. This is the upshot of Wittgenstein’s case against a private language. ‘One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about “right”.’ (Wittgenstein 1972, para 258, 92e)

It’s a point that I have struggled to explain with generations of Pathways students. The transcendental solipsist neatly skips over the obstacle set by Kant’s Refutation of Idealism (Kant 1929). As Kant states, the objects in ‘my world’ are necessarily identified as objects located in space. This is Kant’s ‘empirical realism’. Where the transcendental solipsist diverges from Kant is in dispensing with any notion that there exists anything beyond the world of spatial appearances – a noumenal world, as Kant believed – in effect, reducing the world to a mere story that I make up as I go along, my own dream. The dialectical gap that separates Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language from Kant’s refutation of idealism defines the standpoint of the anti-solipsist. There is no more meaning to the term ‘I’ than ‘an other to others who are other to me’.

However, this is where we reach the third stage in the dialectic. I am not just ‘another person’. Language may not give me the means to state ‘what more I am’ (according to Wittgenstein’s argument, it cannot), but what I cannot state is nevertheless given as a task, as Kant himself would have put it: that task is set by the fact that I am the one asking the question. I am the one asking – not God, not some impartial judge on high – what to do when faced with this particular situation, this particular other who is standing in my way, or who calls out for my help. The starting point for an ethics of dialogue is thus a deepened sense of our own unique subjectivity, not conceived as a Wittgensteinian ‘private object’ but, rather, as an existential given. To be a human being, that is to say, an agent, is to be faced with the question: what must I do?
Although the route taken is somewhat different, I believe that the outcome of the dialectic I have described coincides with the view of Emmanuel Levinas on ‘the other’ (Levinas 1979). The theory of anti-solipsism coincides with what Levinas would describe as the misguided attempt to ‘thematise’ the other, making the other just another entity which one encounters in the world, an attempt which sees, or attempts to see, I and the other as merely ‘two of the same’ – failing to grasp the profound otherness of the other.

On the subject of dialogue, one could write an essay on the various failed attempts – some of them comic – by philosophers working in the analytic and phenomenological traditions to come to a mutual understanding of the different ways in which they approach the central questions of philosophy, or even what they conceive those questions to be. Suffice it to say that Levinas is extraordinarily difficult for a philosopher trained, as I am, in the analytic tradition. I would not like to say, with any great degree of confidence, that my view of the grounding for an ethics of dialogue coincides with Levinas’s view of the other, but it is, at least, close.

Ethical dialogue is something to value, for its own sake and also for its benefits. The challenge for ethics has always been the challenge of the other, even when this was not explicitly recognised: for it is ultimately the challenge of showing that I owe due consideration not just to persons within my narrower or broader circle – my family, or my co-religionists, or my fellow countrymen – but to every human being, every ‘other’. The question, however, is the philosophical basis for this claim. If the basis is not the disinterested view, then that has important consequences. I am not equally bound to every conscious being in the universe. All conscious beings in the universe are equal in respect of their being ‘other’, but some, those with whom I am engaged in ethical dialogue, necessarily have the more immediate claim to my attention.

**Part III**

Philosophical practitioners are fond of quoting Epicurus: ‘Empty is the argument of the philosopher which does not relieve any human suffering.’ The meaning of the quotation is less often really understood. Philosophers are not wise men or women who have some special gift of ethical vision, or the ability to offer useful practical advice. Philosophers argue. That’s what they do, what they are trained to do. Epicurus was a philosopher who understood this. The challenge is to see how sheer argument – as contrasted with empirical investigation of the world, or technological innovation, or merely experience and diligent practice – can ever help anyone do or achieve anything of value.
If all philosophy can do is tell us what we already know, or believe, what use is philosophy? As a philosopher, I have a view about ethical dialogue. That is something I have learned from experience, but it is also something I have reasoned out, defended, honed and refined through a process of dialogue with others who share my interest in foundational questions. Only because that view has been reasoned out does it have any special claim to consideration.

In the second decade of the 21st century, it is by no means accepted that philosophy has any use at all — if it ever had. My baseline defence of philosophy has always been that the sole justification for my doing philosophy is that I need it. The sole justification for our doing philosophy together is that we need it.

Different persons have different kinds of need. There is not just one reason for coming to philosophy, but many:

You can philosophize for sheer enjoyment. Or because you want to change the world. Or to develop and hone your mental powers. Or out of insatiable, childlike curiosity. Or because your very life depends upon it. I have had the privilege to have known students — a few exceptional, but all of them interesting — who have exemplified each of these goals and ideals. And I understood perfectly where they were coming from, because I could see a little bit of me in there too. The joys of philosophy are, or have become, for me the joys of dialogue. If and when I escape back into my solitude, I shall take all of this with me. (Klempner 2003)

If, despite the most thorough soul searching, despite everything I or others can say to kindle your interest in foundational questions, you cannot find that need within yourself, then nothing will persuade you that philosophy is a worthwhile activity. I have heard the opinion expressed that all university departments of philosophy could close down tomorrow without any impact on the intellectual life of the nation. Philosophers are good at inventing rationalisations for beliefs everyone already holds — like the existence of an external world, or the need to uphold ethical values, and when they’re not doing that, they debate problems which no-one understands, whose solutions no-one cares about. As someone who has devoted his life to philosophy, this is a hard thing to accept, but I do accept it. I acknowledge that the words I am writing now are only for those who care about philosophy. Which is not to say that I would not be prepared to make the most determined and earnest attempt to get the sceptic to see the point of philosophy. Dialogue is of little value, if the only time you can engage in dialogue is in conditions that are favourable to mutual understanding and enlightenment.

Re-reading the above quotation, it is interesting to me now that I was prepared to countenance the possibility, even as far back as 2003, that at some point I would
‘escape back into my solitude’. Four years earlier, I had stated:

You can do philosophy in solitude, as Descartes amply demonstrated. You can carry on a lively dialogue with yourself. Yet in soliloquy one vital ingredient of the philosophical enterprise is missing. For all our best attempts to communicate, philosophical vision is always something essentially idiosyncratic, peculiar to each and every individual. Perhaps because philosophy is so much a struggle with language, or against language, you always seem to see more than you can say.

In philosophical dialogue, we can never get completely clear about our disagreements and differences, because we never get to the point of being about to state what precisely it is that each of us believes, or the difference between our respective standpoints. There is always more, in the background, that one struggles to articulate. Yet in the search for a meeting point, something new is created that is neither yours nor mine – something neither of us could have created by our own unaided efforts – the dialogue itself as it takes on an independent life of its own. (Klempner 1999)

To those persons who don’t get what philosophy is about, it is difficult to explain how there can be positive value in not knowing one’s way about, in ‘seeing’ things that despite one’s best efforts one fails to ‘say’. I’m not just talking about the person of ‘plain common sense’ as he or she used to be called, but notable figures like the celebrated physicist Stephen Hawking, in his recent intemperate attack on the philosophy of science (Norris 2011). Then again, so many academic philosophers from the English-speaking analytic tradition seem to betray the very same prejudice. The value of philosophy is precisely in the way it achieves clarity, they would say. There’s no disagreement about the value of seeking clarity. However, to quote the title of a notable philosophy collection from the 1960s, edited by H.D. Lewis, ‘Clarity is not enough’ (Lewis 1963).

As I am a philosopher, I would still want to achieve clarity about the underpinnings of ethical dialogue, even if it were universally agreed that this is the correct way to characterise ethical relations. As it turns out, in the world of the 21st century we know that the reverse is the case. Hypocrisy, bigotry and fanaticism are the rule, and genuine ethical dialogue the rare exception. I would like to understand why, and perhaps, by my efforts, potentially reduce the human suffering that this causes, but I also recognise that this is a process without a final destination. One understands more, one understands ever more deeply, but the task of philosophical understanding can never be completed.
Part IV

How do you practice ethical dialogue? There is no ‘how to’ or recipe, but there is something that philosophy can say about its nature, which illuminates *what it is we are trying to do*. I hinted at this at the end of ‘Ethical Dialogue and the Limits of Tolerance’:

...two strangers when they first meet might pause before launching into conversation, weighing one another up, deciding through the mutual reading of expressions and postures who is to risk the first move. I cannot simply blurt out what is on my mind until I am reasonably confident that it will be taken in the right way. The principles at work here are not principles of philosophy, or any rational process of assessing ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’. They are the principles of game theory. (Klempner 1998b)

Here, game theory describes a practical ability that one can’t simply learn by learning the theory. In this sense, ethical dialogue differs sharply from an intellectual game like chess. It is perfectly possible to become an excellent chess player without playing a single actual game of chess. You do this by studying books on chess theory, playing through the games of chess grandmasters. Of course, however good a chess player you are, you can get better by playing actual games. One of the things one learns is the psychological dimension; you play the player and not just the board. A good chess player knows, for example, when their opponent is beaten, even if the position is theoretically drawn, but no-one has, or ever will, become proficient in ethical dialogue by reading a book. You learn ethical dialogue by doing ethical dialogue with someone who is proficient in ethical dialogue.

A better comparison would be dancing. No-one would ever think of learning to dance by following diagrams describing where one places one’s feet. Dance is something you have to feel your way into, a way of letting go which involves a different part of the self from the ratiocinating, intellectualising part. This is not to deny that once you have learned to dance, once you have that proprioceptive, ecstatic sense of how to move your body in that way, then you can without too much difficulty learn to read symbols on a page as actual bodily movements – as in the system of Labanotation, developed by Rudolf Laban in the 1920s.

However, certain consequences follow from this; consequences that will not necessarily be welcome. The most important consequence – which is suggested by the analogy with learning to dance – is that some persons will never be able to engage properly in ethical dialogue. Following through the analogy, they may simply suffer the mental equivalent of ‘two left feet’. However, apart from the psychological hang-ups that affect a few random individuals, there is a more serious and more widespread obstacle: the obstacle of belief.
It is no accident that Western philosophy has championed the ethics of the disinterested view. It is characteristic of those who possess – or, rather, are possessed by – a strong system of beliefs, that they are all too willing to impose their belief system on others in the name of the disinterested view. One analytic philosopher who has seen this clearly is R.M. Hare. (Hare 1976) A ‘fanatic’, in Hare’s sense, is not necessarily a potential terrorist or suicide bomber; it is anyone who has a belief about any value, which they wish to impose on others. Sadly, according to Hare, the only ethical theory which is consistent with the rejection of ‘fanaticism’ is preference utilitarianism, which Hare admits would have the theoretical consequence that, 

...if the Nazi’s desire not to have Jews around is intense enough to outweigh all the sufferings caused to Jews by arranging not to have them around, then, on this version of utilitarianism, as on any theory with the same formal structure, it ought to be satisfied. (Hare 1976)

In mitigation, Hare pleads that ‘fanatics of this heroic stature are never likely to be encountered... [and] cases that are never likely to be encountered do not need to be squared with the thinking of the ordinary man.’

What leads Hare, a distinguished analytical philosopher, into this mess is his unquestioning loyalty to the principle of the disinterested view. My response to Hare’s ‘heroic’ Nazi is my response, as I happily admit: ‘You can go to Hell and I will do my utmost to send you there!’ Deciding rights and wrongs from the imaginary view from nowhere isn’t ethics but is an intellectual game that has no connection to the real world of persons engaged in ethical dialogue.

How do you dialogue with the ‘heroic’ Nazi? You don’t. You reach for the nearest gun, or bomb, and that is the most important philosophical lesson concerning the ethics of dialogue. There are persons you can do ethical dialogue with. There are persons that it is worth trying, ever so hard, to do ethical dialogue with, but, if you fail despite your most earnest efforts, you are not under any ethical obligation to continue talking. Does that mean that every Nazi or would-be Nazi, or murderer, or rapist is beyond ethical dialogue? Not at all. The question of whom I, or we, can dialogue with, and when, is always a practical question that has to take into account our best judgment about the implications of doing so, for each of us individually, or together, or for society at large. And that judgment can change – or be changed.

The same problem arises with the ‘true believer’, the religious fanatic. It is perfectly possible to be devout, to be serious about one’s religious belief, without being a fanatic (Bayfield 2012). The fanatic, however, will not allow you to have beliefs that differ from theirs. They see it as an affront, a challenge which must be overcome before any meaningful dialogue is possible. There is no solution except practical
expediency: if you can’t engage in ethical dialogue you can still negotiate on the basis of quid pro quo. That is to say, you can do business together. If you can’t do business together, and you can’t find a way to avoid one another, then the only remaining option is war. Annihilation of one’s opponent, as the Nazis well understood, is the permanent possibility which underlies all other forms of human negotiation.

As a consequence of our ethical dialogue, we have ethical obligations towards conscious beings with whom we are unable to engage in ethical dialogue. Human infants and non-human animals have a claim on our attention that they are unable to argue for themselves. I owe it to you, my partner in dialogue, to continue to practise those virtues of attention and concern through whose mutual resonance dialogue is made possible, in the respect that I give to those temporarily or permanently excluded from the circle of human dialogue.

Part V

Whatever the reason – whether it be a psychological problem with relating to others, or the problem of fanaticism – an inability to practice ethical dialogue, according to the theory we have described, means that you cannot be ethical, period. In terms of logical structure, the point is the same as the one that was first acknowledged by a doctrine, ‘Virtue is knowledge’ (Aristotle 1953). The akratic person knows what is the right thing to do, but cannot bring him/herself to do it. In the case of the ethics of dialogue, you can know what ought to be done, you can have the strength of will to act on your decision, but – perhaps through overpowering resentment, or fear, or aversion, or disgust – fail precisely at the point where it is necessary to engage the other in ethical dialogue.

Just as Aristotle grappled with the problem of akrasia as a serious challenge to a cognitivist view of ethics – the view that there is something in which, objectively, the possession of ethical knowledge consists – so the most serious challenge for an ethics of dialogue is the realisation that the persons who can engage in ethical dialogue are a proper subset of humanity in general. It may well be the case, that a limited form of ethical dialogue is possible within a community of fanatics. Perhaps those who practise it are not beyond ‘saving’. If they can do ethical dialogue with each other, then there is a chance we can do ethical dialogue with them, but ethical dialogue can only exist in this limited form so long as its nature is not subjected to philosophical examination.

Is it possible to renounce all belief? As an atheist, albeit a Jewish atheist, I most certainly have beliefs. If God did exist, and I had a big enough gun – I would kill Him. If God exists, then He ought not to exist. That’s what I believe. Human beings do not need God, or gods, meddling in our affairs. There is no reason,
supposing a Creator does, or did, exist, to be grateful for being created, or for any of the other supposed ‘benefits’ that such a Creator has imposed on humankind. Here, I follow Bertrand Russell’s famous essay, ‘A Free Man’s Worship’ (Russell 1917). In describing his ‘tragic’ vision, Russell, in turn, appeals to Nietzsche – a man of very strong belief, on my reading, who saw nihilism as the greatest threat to human civilisation.

Could I engage Tanya and Kent Whitaker in ethical dialogue? Of course. We could start by exploring the different meanings of ‘love’. Christians profess to love all of humanity, but ethical dialogue teaches that an effort has to be made on both sides. Christian _agape_ seems to me too general and unspecific, too closely associated with the metaphysics of the disinterested view; ultimately nihilistic. However, I could be wrong in my interpretation. Perhaps saying that every human being deserves ‘love’ is merely a colourful way of stating one’s ethical commitment to be open to the other, so far as that is practically possible.

So the problem isn’t really about belief, as such. It is a problem that anyone who engages in philosophical thought understands very well: the permanent possibility of being wrong, of having one’s view of oneself, or of the world, overturned by considerations that you had not thought of and perhaps, on your own, were incapable of thinking of. That’s why philosophers read the history of philosophy, which teaches over and over again the same lesson: If you think you understand, consider the possibility that what you seem to grasp is in reality a misunderstanding. If you think you know, remember all the times you ‘knew’, but what you knew was false.

It is possible, as a solitary thinker and researcher, as I stated above, to do all this for oneself, but much the better alternative is to do philosophy with others, not least because nothing is more conducive to preparing the mind – and the psyche – for true ethical encounter.
Bibliography


The Ethical Dimensions of Dialogue Between Policymakers: Learning Through Interaction Over Migrant Integration Dilemmas

Andrew Orton

This article explores how dialogue between policymakers from different countries can help generate learning which responds to the dilemmas they face when seeking to integrate migrants more fully within local communities. These dilemmas include reducing prejudice and discrimination between those who don’t want to interact, and building collective belonging whilst valuing the complexity of diverse individual identities. The article highlights ways in which the ethical dimensions of the dialogue process can interact with the ethical dimensions of the issues under discussion within such policymakers’ dialogues. In the process, the article demonstrates how research which adopts dialogical approaches, whilst being critically aware of these ethical dimensions, can help to address the gaps and limitations in existing policymakers’ understandings, by generating improved exchanges of learning.

Key words: Dialogue ethics, policy, learning integration dilemmas

Introduction

Dialogue is frequently promoted as a way to enable learning to take place among a wide range of participants from different backgrounds, who bring diverse understandings with them to the dialogic encounter. This article begins from Bohm et al’s (1991) premise that:

Dialogue, as we are choosing to use the word, is a way of exploring the roots of the many crises that face humanity today. It enables inquiry into, and understanding of, the sorts of processes that fragment and interfere with real communication between individuals, nations and even different parts of the same organization.

This article explores the potential of dialogue to enhance the learning generated in exchanges between policymakers from different local and national contexts over prominent issues and ‘crises’, drawing on a case study example involving the controversial field of migrant integration policies. Various kinds of exchanges between policymakers have long formed a common feature of international

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networks established to enable the transfer of policy learning on such issues across different contexts, with exchanges between these contexts often facilitated by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who support the learning process involved (Stone 2001). However, as Stone and many others have highlighted, critical questions can be asked about this learning process, including the power dynamics involved and the transferability of particular policies and practice interventions between such diverse contexts. This is particularly true in policy fields such as migrant integration, where responses within any particular context are highly debated, even without contextual and cultural differences to consider, and are complicated by the emotive and political nature of much public debate. This has led leading researchers, such as Penninx and Scholten (2009, 4), to describe migration policy as an ‘intractable policy controversy’, whilst calling for research that provokes critical reflection among policy actors which:

… fully recognises the multiplicity of knowledge claims in this policy field and the difficulties for policymaking in such contested settings. The role of social research can reach beyond that of speaking truth to power. It can promote a ‘making sense together’ by helping policymakers reflect critically on policy alternatives and their possible consequences.

In this context, this article begins by considering the existing contributions made by various forms of international exchanges between policymakers concerning migrant integration. It goes on to highlight the importance of generating deeper exchanges that incorporate more critical mutual reflection by using dialogical approaches which can contribute to this ‘making sense together’. One particular series of dialogical events that were facilitated by the author, which involved European policymakers exploring migrant integration policies together, is then used as a case study to explore the potential of dialogical approaches to generate collaborative learning as part of wider research. In engaging with policymakers as active agents within the policymaking process, this article follows Freeman et al (2011) in considering the way that policymakers’ everyday practice involves interacting actions, norms, knowledge and rationales as they engage with the messiness of the policymaking process. As a result, I argue that deeper critical reflection and learning can be created by proactively facilitating learning spaces in which policymakers engage in dialogue over their practice and explore the everyday ethical issues that they face, especially in those situations where they face dilemmas. Like all action-oriented research, research that involves creating opportunities for and the facilitation of such deeper dialogical learning processes inherently involves moral, political and ethical dimensions (McNiff and Whitehead, 2002). In this case, these dimensions include how those involved come to determine what a ‘good’ policy response to the issues raised by migration may be, and the impact of any dialogue on participants’ future actions. These dimensions are also present in the way that the dialogue itself is carried out, including the ways in which the process is facilitated and that diverse
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perspectives from different contexts are brought together.

The particular dialogues considered in this article involved policymakers from a range of different countries, including the UK, where widespread continuing attempts have been made to develop policies which support the integration of migrants within them. These developments in integration policies have occurred in response to complex trends, including significant rises in the numbers of people moving across state boundaries, debates over the effectiveness of border controls, and concerns about the impact of migration on existing local communities, as well as on the welfare of those moving (Spencer 2011). Particular concerns have arisen from an increased awareness of diversity within state boundaries, and the potential fragmentation of patterns of social relationships among groups and individuals within particular contexts (Cantle 2005). However, migrant integration policies have often proved controversial. They have been criticised (from a range of different perspectives) in terms of their principles, underlying policy aims and understandings, and their effectiveness in practice (Sales 2007; Spencer 2011). This is arguably because policies relating to migration bring to the surface a range of broader underlying transnational tensions about changing understandings of citizenship, national identity and belonging in an increasingly globalised world. In the process, they also embody significant wider controversies about how diverse individuals and groups might live together justly and peacefully within shared local communities (Sacks 2002; O’Neill 2010). Such debates are inherently ethical in nature, involving the consideration of values and social norms, both in themselves and in how different perspectives concerning them might be discussed (Parekh 2006, especially 264-294).

The Existing Contribution of Learning Exchanges to European Migration Policy, and Related Challenges

Deliberation between diverse perspectives is at the heart of a range of political processes within democratic societies, and deliberative exchanges between different politicians and civil servants who play key roles in shaping public policy are part of this broader picture (Escobar 2011). The particular policy field of migrant integration is no exception to this, with exchanges between policy-makers both within and between different countries having contributed significantly to previous collective learning and policy development in this field. The particular series of dialogue events that will be introduced in this article took place in a wider international and historic context in which policy attempts to manage migration have proliferated at many levels (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). Migrants’ rights have developed increased recognition (at least in principle) building on foundational international frameworks, such as various United Nations’ declarations and the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2010). Such
frameworks are profoundly ethical in themselves, of course, as they state explicitly (in the language of ‘rights’) those values on which these international agreements have been reached about both ‘what is right’ and ‘how different ‘rights’ might relate together’. These agreements are not static, but are the subject of ongoing discussions, as the contexts and agendas of related political actors change. For example, as Geddes (2008) extensively documents, ongoing European integration processes have continued to raise controversies on migration and integration issues for member states. Existing responses to these issues have been tested by the pressures of migration from outside the European Union, perceived differential patterns of dealing with migration between existing member states, and the joining of each new state. This has led to a complex Europe-wide structural developmental process (Rosenow 2009), in which multilateral political discussions have continued to play a significant part (Mendez 2012), resulting in further common policy statements and shared principles being carefully agreed (e.g. Commission of the European Communities 2005; Taran 2008). However, underlying these practical developments and common statements on rights, there remain substantial cultural, political and philosophical differences between the responses of different states, not least concerning their understandings of citizenship and how difference is managed within their polities. There also remain substantial differences in terms of the degree to which rights and related understandings have been implemented at national and local levels, as a range of related indices show; for example, see data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Migration Policy Group 2013), which shows widespread disparities between different areas and polities.

These developments have led to a substantial growth in multi-national networks of initiatives that are sharing related local and national experiences across Europe and more widely. Examples of such networks include the ‘European Network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants’ (European Commission 2013a) and, more globally, the ‘Cities of Migration’ network (Maytree 2013). Other networks have collaboratively sought to develop new conceptual and practical approaches that are based on members’ experiences, such as the ‘Intercultural Cities’ network (Council of Europe 2013). Some networks have developed shared resources which have been made more widely available, such as the ‘European Website on Integration’, developed by the ‘National Contact Points on Integration’ network (European Commission 2013b). Another example is the European Commission’s *Handbook on Integration for Policy–Makers and Practitioners*, now in its third edition (Niessen and Huddleston 2010). This handbook contains mutual learning on the support that policymakers can provide for the processes of migrant transition, such as language support, introductory information and welcoming, access to employment and education, and the co-ordination of services at local, national and European levels. Such resources seek to embody the collective outcomes of learning
from previous dialogues between policymakers on key practical policy areas that have been identified as being important.

In this context of an increased sharing of experiences, a key challenge has been how to deepen the learning exchanges between those involved in substantially-different contexts. Despite policymakers and practitioners promoting their own examples of ‘best practice’ initiatives to build positive relationships between different individuals and groups within local communities, robust comparative evaluations of such initiatives and their wider effects have not always been available (e.g. see Stephan and Stephan 2005). Furthermore, even when evidence of an approach’s success in one context does become available, there can be substantial difficulties in transferring the insights which made this successful to alternative contexts. These potential difficulties and limitations of more superficial exchanges highlight the continued need for the more systematic and deeper comparisons of initiatives from abroad, including why they work or don’t work in particular places, as well as more integrated ways to combine examples with other systemic evidence (Ettelt et al. 2012).

In this article, I will argue that these limitations also highlight the need for a more dialogical approach, in which those involved in different contexts can critically and comparatively explore their learning in the context of deeper dialogue and relationships with each other. This is important because attempts that focus on sharing particular project ideas or policy measures as the primary means to promote improved integration can miss the everyday practical learning of policymakers and practitioners about how and why these ideas or policy measures work in particular contexts. Furthermore, in merely attempting to share examples of ‘good practice’, there is a risk that valuable learning is lost from those initiatives which were perceived to have less positive effects, and/or why approaches that work in one context may be more problematic in others. Engaging in improved critically-comparative dialogue over controversial policy arenas within migrant integration may help policymakers to become more aware of how their own context and cultural/political assumptions are influencing (and perhaps limiting) the options available to them in responding to these difficult policy challenges. This dialogue may also point to improved approaches which take the complexity and inter-related nature of the challenges for policy-makers in this field more seriously. These include significant research challenges concerning how systematic comparison of data and interventions are engaged, how different levels of analysis and action on these issues (from interpersonal/local to global) are integrated, and how interdisciplinary learning to support this process is bought together (Penninx et al. 2008).

Furthermore, these challenges take place within complex and highly political processes in which the relationship between policy and research evidence is particularly
contested and fraught with ethical difficulties. Despite the continued use of political rhetoric that claims ‘evidence-based policy-making’, the relationship between research evidence and migrant integration policy is complex and far from clear (Penninx and Scholten 2009). Indeed, some commentators have questioned whether the process is more akin to ‘policy-based evidence-making’, in which policy-makers use their power to sponsor research to generate findings that support their pre-determined policy positions (European Commission 2009, 35). Such debates form part of a broader set of ‘boundary troubles’ at the academic-policy interface, where research seeks to contribute to policy debates as part of a complex governance landscape in which the use of research ‘evidence’ by policymakers is itself part of debates about power and whose voices are heard (Newman 2011; Stevens 2011). In politically-charged public debates about migration, mass media also play an influential role in integration. This includes not only affecting public opinion and everyday interactions (Niessen and Huddleston 2010, 25-47), but also shaping policies developed in response to public or media owners’ opinions in ways that can be biased and are not necessarily evidence-based (European Commission 2009, 35-36). Given all of these challenges, developing a critical process that both problematises the ways in which power may be affecting these relationships and creates opportunities for deeper dialogue at multiple levels is particularly important.

This Case Study: Introducing the Participants and Process

It was in response to these persistent challenges that the participative dialogical process of this particular research case study was designed. It aimed to address a common desire amongst the participants to generate deeper mutual learning that would help them to address continuing inequalities and divisions among migrants and others across the local and national levels. The collaborative process began with the European Committee on Migration (‘CDMG’) of the Council of Europe in 2009, when this Committee engaged the author to explore innovative ways of improving policy approaches to migrant integration. A process was subsequently designed in collaboration with this Committee which was initially carried out between 2009-2010 (Orton 2010). This included a participative conference held over 2 days in Barcelona in September, 2009, which drew together 35 experts with experience of the policy-making process from different countries across Europe and sought to engage them in dialogue with each other. The policymakers involved in this particular dialogue process came from countries with diverse experiences of migration, including Armenia, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK.

The process critically explored the experiences of these policymakers in designing and implementing effective integration policies within their own policy contexts. It did this by proactively creating space for dialogue in which individual perspectives
could be shared with others engaged in similar roles in a comparative European context and in the context of wider interdisciplinary research. Facilitated participatory approaches (described in more detail below) created opportunities for interactions between participants that stimulated deeper dialogue by drawing on their experiences in different contexts and understandings from different disciplinary approaches.

The understanding of dialogue used within this process recognised the diversity of theoretical and practical approaches to dialogue and deliberation that have been proposed, not seeking to exclusively follow any one particular model, but seeking to draw them together pragmatically in a similar manner to that subsequently outlined by Escobar (2011). The process involved elements of both dialogue and deliberation, with a focus on dialogue, but with an awareness that each participant, as a policymaker, was in the position of having to make concrete practical, evaluative and ethical decisions in their daily jobs. Hence, the process included a shared endeavour to critically evaluate their diverse experiences and policy approaches that were located within particular contexts which could then be discussed in the light of wider experience and research. Participants also sought to consider what tentative recommendations they might helpfully make based on their experience of this dialogue for others who had not been part of this process to consider.

The resulting process centred around a process of collaborative inquiry, in which participants sought, through the dialogical process, to learn and create new understandings together in response to their own struggles, whilst seeking to be responsible for their own learning and the actions arising from it (Bray et al. 2000). The role of the researcher within this process, working collaboratively with the participants, was to design and facilitate the conference and other related discussions as learning spaces that enabled shared learning to take place through individual and collective critical reflection on experience, whilst building relationships of understanding between participants across diversity. The facilitation approach taken sought to embody Palmer’s (1998, 74-77) paradoxes of designing and facilitating learning processes in such spaces; for example:

1. by being both bounded (by shared concerns/questions) and open (to new learning, which may challenge the assumptions behind our questions and lead us to better frames of understanding);

2. by being hospitable (welcoming, with appropriate safeguards, such as the ground rules agreed at the start of the process about how any information shared would be used) and ‘charged’ (with the risk of change inherent in any learning process);

3. by respecting the integrity of participants’ own learning journeys, whilst
setting them within a community through ‘a dialogical exchange in which our ignorance can be aired, our ideas tested, our biases challenged, and our knowledge expanded, an exchange in which we are not simply left alone to think our own thoughts’ (Palmer 1998, 76);

4. by inviting the voice of the individual (from their own perspectives/experience) and the group, seeking to bring these individual voices into dialogue with each other and making time within the process to ‘listen for what the group voice is saying and to play that voice back from time to time so that the group can hear and even change its collective mind’ (Palmer 1998, 76);

5. by honouring the ‘little’ stories of the individual and the ‘big’ stories of the disciplines’ (Palmer 1998, 76), by critically and reflectively considering together what the relationships might be between individual experience and academic bodies of research on related topics (such as identity and inter-group relations, for example).

Prior to the conference, participants had sent in initial contributions relating to their experiences that had helped to shape the agenda and process. Practically, the conference began with participative exercises that encouraged participants to share their diverse experiences of how their contexts were affecting migrant integration, before discussing the similarities and differences between their contexts and responses with each other. A range of questions and activities were then used to stimulate deeper sharing of individual experiences and understandings. For example, in one activity, participants were initially asked to describe practical actions that had positive effects and those that had hindered the integration of migrants in their context, and to note these on sticky notes. Participants were then asked to: (i) group similar contributions together; (ii) ask for further information on any written contributions which were not clear; and (iii) consider whether they thought the ideas suggested would have the same effect in their local context, and if so, why? If not, why not? The resulting small group discussions were carefully facilitated using open questions to enable comparative learning from the different contributions made. Where disagreement was encountered, this presented an opportunity for the facilitator to encourage participants to ask further questions of each other in order to explore the reasons for this, helping to build deeper relationships and understanding of contributory factors, and hence to generate deeper learning. Detailed notes concerning the dialogue from small group discussions were taken. These were supported by other contributions written directly by the participants during the participative exercises as ways to record the dialogue process. Translators assisted in selected sessions to support the dialogue processes where necessary. The findings from individual exercises and small group discussions were then tested
against the experiences of the whole group of participants to explore whether they resonated with this wider experience or whether any points made needed further discussion. Short presentations summarising related academic theory and evidence from a range of related disciplines, as well as the experience of particular case study cities, were interwoven between these interactive discussions, to encourage critical engagement with wider theory and learning. The process was designed to engage with the issues at progressively deeper levels, moving on to tackle questions of how belonging might be developed, before considering the dilemmas policymakers faced within their work on these issues.

At the end of this process, participants developed a wide range of practical actions which they proposed to undertake for themselves as a result of their learning (see the full report; Orton 2010, 85-87). In addition, the collective recommendations which arose from this process led to a recommendation to all member states of the Council of Europe being adopted (Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 2011). Subsequently, further presentations and discussions were held at various related European conferences and meetings in 2011-12 and a guide for policy-makers and practitioners was developed to assist others in engaging with these findings (Orton 2012). Together, these illustrate (through the experience of this particular case) the potential of this dialogue-based approach to generate findings useful to the wider policy development process.

**Exploring Dilemmas as a Way of Deepening Dialogue**

As noted above, a key feature of the approach adopted within this dialogue process (which was instrumental in leading to this range of impact) was asking policymakers to consider their *challenges and dilemmas* in implementing policies to build migrants’ belonging in their respective countries. During the two day workshop, this element was designed to emerge gradually from the dialogue process, as tensions between different contributions were collectively identified. Towards the middle of the second day, participants were invited to share their own personal dilemmas, once their relationships with each other had started to become more established. This approach of using challenges and dilemmas to stimulate dialogue drew on developed literature that explores dilemmas for practitioners (e.g. social workers and community workers) which deliberately seeks to engage with the ethical dimensions of their work (e.g., Banks 2004, 2013; Hoggett et al 2009). It was also founded on the author’s earlier research that explored how such practitioners deal with everyday challenges and dilemmas in relation to cultural and religious diversity (e.g. Orton 2007, 2008).

Within this broader literature, dilemmas have often been understood as being ‘a choice between two equally unwelcome alternatives – when it seems that “whatever
I do will be wrong” (Banks 2013). Within the dilemmatic spaces created by being in this position (and the related everyday decision-making practices that people adopt to respond to them), ‘values can provide a crucial resource for navigating a terrain that is ambiguous, shifting and contested’, as Hoggett et al (2009, 9) argue. Such spaces thus open up a moral and ethical landscape in which participants have to develop responses for ‘handling the everyday dilemmas that policy does not provide the solution for’, as Hagelund (2010, 79) describes in related research with local practitioners in Norway.

By focusing dialogue on areas of policy and practice where all responses appear to be problematic to those involved, the reasons why current policy frameworks and responses are understood to be limited, inadequate or compromised in their implementation can be explored by those directly involved in the policymaking process. In the context of comparative dialogue, many ‘blind-spots’ in participants’ understandings were revealed as their previously-hidden assumptions and cultural biases in their approaches to these issues became more self-apparent, enabling alternatives to be seen and discussed. However, this potential learning can only be fully realised by creating safe spaces within which policymakers can acknowledge and reflect together on these ethical and dilemmatic dimensions and how they relate to the policymaking process, whilst doing so in light of wider evidence and in dialogue with other important voices (including those most affected by the policies concerned).

The potential for the wider applicability of this approach was also illustrated by the use of this process in several other workshops and discussions with policymakers and/or practitioners that have been held across Europe since 2009 as part of different events attended by the author. These have included a workshop co-organised by the author with Daniel de Torres from Barcelona, Spain, and Helena Rojas from Botkyrka, Sweden, at the Intercultural Cities Milestone Event in Dublin, 2013. A related strategy for using dilemmas to develop learning more locally had also been independently developed in Botkyrka, further illustrating the potential transferability and contribution of this type of approach into different situations and with different participants.

To further explore and illustrate the potential for learning from dialogue over dilemmas, I will now consider two key examples of dilemmas that face policy-makers which arose in the research. In exploring the ethical dimensions of these further, I will show how the dialogical approach taken in relation to both comparative experience and multi-level inter-disciplinary research helped to deepen understandings about potential responses to them. They also both reflect areas where dialogue studies can contribute to ongoing development of practice. The particular dilemmas discussed relate to ways to reduce prejudice and discrimination where people do not wish
to be involved in activities designed to achieve this, and how feelings of common belonging can be built across diverse populations whilst recognising the complexity of people’s multiple identities in contemporary society.

Dilemma 1: How Can Prejudice and Discrimination Be Reduced If People Don’t Want to Be Involved in Interaction with Each Other?

A significant concern underlying many of the policy and research developments noted above has been how to encourage good social relations between diverse people, especially including migrants. A frequently-stated key policy aim within these developments, building on the various international frameworks cited above, has often been the promotion of community cohesion (Cantle 2005) and the reduction of any discrimination among migrants and others that may pose challenges to migrants’ integration.

Much of the related theory and practice that addresses these aims has been influenced by variants on Allport’s (1954) ‘contact hypothesis’, namely that the prejudice which underlies discriminatory behaviour can be addressed through equal status contact between different groups, and that it is enhanced when this process is lent wider institutional support. This theory has continued to have an impact after nearly 60 years of empirical testing, albeit with continued debates over aspects of its application and effectiveness (e.g. see Dovidio and Glick’s 2005 review of the first 50 years’ evidence). Moreover, under certain conditions, such positive contact experiences can be generalised more widely in ways that can change interpersonal bias not just for the individuals directly involved, but also for others perceived as belonging to the same groups (Gaertner and Dovidio 2005). However, this depends on there being opportunities for positive contact to take place, and people being willing to engage in it. Even where policies or local projects proactively sought to create appropriate spaces or activities within which this contact could take place, the policymakers in this research recognised that considerable challenges remained in terms of whom actually then became involved in them; for example, one policymaker stated:

When projects or activities try to bring in the local host society into their activities, they recruit volunteers. These volunteers are mostly informed citizens of the local community that already have the understanding of issues related to integration and migration. Projects (and/or activities) rarely have access to the larger population of the host community that have limited or no information about the migrants living in their communities. Not only that, but [this wider population] might not be interested in the interaction with those migrants. So the issue often times is how to inform and activate a group that is not interested in engagement.
Indeed, it is arguably precisely those people with the least existing contact with migrants who might learn most from new opportunities for positive forms of contact with them (and vice versa). Policymakers in this research also noted that not all contact between individuals or groups is necessarily positive in building improved social relationships, tackling prejudice and reducing discrimination; indeed, some interactions may reinforce division. Furthermore, the impact of stereotyping, prejudice, racism and fear, and their effects on patterns of social relationships, can further exacerbate separation between diverse individuals in ways which limit the potential for positive forms of contact to develop naturally. Broader social, economic and political factors were also recognised to contribute to the context of this limited likelihood of developing more positive interactions between diverse individuals and groups where such interactions do not previously exist, or where they are limited/problematic.

In the face of these social dynamics, the policy-makers described how they faced the dilemma of deciding what (if anything) to do in response to the resulting situation. If they did nothing, they perceived this as a negative outcome because they saw the status quo of unintegrated communities as divisive and problematic for the wider society, and prone to periodic outbreaks of tension, and even violence, between different groups. However, in democratic societies, some were also reluctant to intervene more directly, as any intervention was seen as being a form of ‘social engineering’ that may be perceived as interfering with the rights to the freedom of association of individuals and groups within those communities. Despite this, some policymaker participants had fewer qualms about imposing requirements for engagement on migrants, who are often subject to compulsory integration activities of various kinds as conditions for their remaining in the new country. However, many of the other policy-makers found this compulsory nature itself problematic, not least because adopting compulsion fundamentally undermined the equality of status required by Allport’s (1954) theory in order to tackle prejudice effectively. In addition, the sorts of activities shared by the policymakers that had been made compulsory in many European states tended to focus on one-sided integration courses focusing on the migrants’ acquisition of the host country’s language and of basic cultural knowledge. These often just involved migrants, hence removing broader opportunities for interaction with the wider public in these spaces. Examples of programmes which involved the wider public were generally seen as being better practice by the policymakers for this reason. However, in participants’ experiences, many of the general public may themselves be reluctant to become involved in such activities, whether because of explicit bias, or simply for fear of offending or of stigma if they showed their ignorance or expressed views which were not considered ‘politically correct’. In this politically-charged arena of policy, the discourses available for use in dialogue form part of the dilemma of wider
engagement; as one policymakers stated:

In my opinion, the main challenge of our time is to find a way of addressing social problems [associated with migration], which doesn’t conceal or deny specific situations, but at the same time, doesn’t exclude anybody from the debate. And to find a tone in the discussion that doesn’t hinder anyone to play a role in finding the solution by the way issues are formulated.

In response to this challenge, many policymakers and practitioners sought more indirect ways to create and/or support spaces and processes which help to bring people together across their diversity of migration status, without focusing initially on discussing problems. Many suggested that initiatives began by recognising things that those involved may have in common, enabling learning and relationship-building with each other to begin to happen. A wide range of creative projects were cited by the policymakers that did this through shared interests (e.g., sport, music, etc.) and/or aspects of their identities (whether through living in a particular area, being a parent, or some other characteristic). Often this activity had been promoted through supporting voluntary organisations and other selected aspects of civil society activity. This had provided a way for some policy-makers to resolve their initial dilemma by choosing to support those organisations that invited in those from a wide range of backgrounds and enabled them to interact on a voluntary basis. Such support could be offered in a range of ways, including through direct financial support (grants, etc.), training and free/low-cost use of public buildings, etc.

However, not all of the voluntary organisations known to participants aimed to build bridges between diverse groups; indeed, many were centred on single issues or identities. Even those voluntary organisations which did explicitly aim to build bridges between different individuals and groups in some way were considered by the research participants to have their limitations, not least in often only attracting a limited range of individuals and groups. These concerns connect with findings in other research, such as Acheson’s (2011) conclusion, in the context of Northern Ireland, that the existence of such voluntary associations does not necessarily lead to shared identities being held by their diverse participants beyond the particular space of encounter within them. Drawing on wider research, Acheson also concludes that such organisations can often avoid fully recognising diversity and tackling difficult issues in their attempts to prioritise recognition of similarities, and he problematises the notion that this will necessarily lead to a stronger shared civic identity. This also points to the need for deeper dialogue at the local level, and leads us on to a second key dilemma that was identified by the research participants. This concerned how to move beyond these limitations by considering what forms of interaction help to build a common sense of belonging, and whether policy-makers can do anything to specifically encourage these forms of interaction.
Dilemma 2: How Can Policy-Makers Build Collective Social Belonging Whilst Valuing the Complexity of Individual Identities?

Through the dialogue process, the policymakers collectively recognised that a key limitation of many existing activities was that (as one participant put it) they may ‘create knowledge [about different cultures and groups], but this does not necessarily change attitudes and behaviour’. This led one working group of policymakers at the conference to ask ‘How can we develop approaches that positively affect attitudes and mutual recognition across communities?’. Others then built on this issue of mutual recognition, going further to discuss how they could encourage people to build a common identity and sense of belonging, whilst also recognising and exploring differences. However, for some, this combination of building a common identity/sense of belonging among people whilst recognising and valuing the variety and complexity of their identities was experienced as a dilemma. Those who saw this as a dilemma considered at least some aspects of diversity as being inimical to having a common shared identity. Ethical dimensions of these debates included the extent to which migrants should be expected to change any divergent aspects of their own identities to become ‘more like’ receiving communities. These debates reflect wider research discussions about the need to recognise the complexity of identity (e.g. Westin 2008) and work towards what Bosswick and Heckmann (2006, 10) call ‘identificational integration’ for migrants. However, these identity issues necessarily extend beyond migrants, with the national self-identities of existing residents also having undergone sustained challenges in receiving countries, as these countries have experienced increased migration and increased awareness of difference in a globalised world (Papastergiadis, 2000). As a result, the idea of a homogenous pre-existing ‘local community’ was problematised by some of the participants, many of whom pointed to previous waves of migration during their own histories in doing this.

Some of the policymakers in this research who felt that they had been more successful in building a common sense of belonging had found creating a revised common identity, a ‘new us’, through the dialogue enabled by such initiatives was central to this process. This involved reforming the self-perceptions of all those involved in ways which included a more positive embracing of difference, by proactively seeking to place ‘diversity at the core of [a] new identity’, as a ‘resource’ and an ‘asset’. Publically acknowledging the pre-existing diversity present in all European nations, even before the latest waves of migration, was a common part of these strategies. The policymakers using them started with the recognition that, as one policymaker stated:

We all have different and complex identities – [it is] important to recognise
and value this, whilst trying to develop a sense of appreciation of the variety of identities.

Theoretical concepts relating to the ways in which individuals deal with multiple identifications were found by the policymakers to be helpful in exploring these issues further. The possibility of individual migrants combining multiple ‘hyphenated’ or ‘hybrid’ identities (relating to both their countries of origin and the receiving country) is something that has long been recognised in research (e.g. see European Forum for Migration Studies 2001; Modood et al 1994). These hybrid identities can extend for considerable periods of time, including over more than one generation of migrants and their descendants. For some policymakers, gaining an understanding that old identities did not always have to be completely given up for new identifications with the receiving country to be made was particularly helpful in understanding longer-term processes of transition for migrants. Even those policymakers who felt less comfortable with these notions responded more positively to the theoretical ideas presented about how people sometimes had ‘overlapping’ or ‘nesting’ identities (Peters 2003). Seeing citizens as simultaneously belonging to local, regional, national and European identities was a helpful example for these policymakers, when presented from wider literature (Westin 2008). However, some policymakers felt that ‘how the differences are manifested is important’; in particular, it mattered whether there was ‘internal conflict of identities’, as ‘there is a limit to the number of identities a person can sustain’. The key condition here, as Westin (2008) also recognised, is whether affiliations were seen as mutually supportive rather than as being in competition with each other. The importance of this distinction was also supported by wider research on group relationships; as Gaertner and Dovidio (2005, 84) note:

…a key element determining the impact of a dual identity on intergroup relationship is likely [to be] what a dual identity signals – whether it is perceived as a sign of progress towards a desired goal, or a threat.

Hence, a key aspect that these policymakers considered to be required for successful integration strategies was ‘political leadership’ that supported and affirmed a more diverse national identity, whilst setting out a clear framework of values which enabled diverse groups to live together. Devising such a framework presented further ethical aspects of the dilemma for the policymakers, in what Westin (2008, 3) has called: ‘the fuzzy relationship between promoting national values and identities, on the one hand, and seeking to promote acceptance for diversity, on the other’. Whilst the policymakers in this research were quick to point to agreed wording within European and sometimes national policy frameworks about how such matters should be handled, they also shared numerous examples where policy implementation nevertheless differed considerably between their different contexts.
Commonly shared examples of this diversity included the extent of accommodation of migrants’ religious practices, where these differed from mainstream secular or established religious practices, especially in contexts where the state perceived itself to be secular. Within these discussions, policymakers frequently operated within their own socio-political and cultural framework for handling practical situations arising from these differences of religion, belief and practice, and were surprised when others’ frameworks differed considerably from theirs. This frequently led to intense discussions about why the other policymakers thought their approach was right, or at least why a particular position about what was right was held by the government in their country. By exploring comparatively together, the perceived ways in which these different positions in different contexts contributed to different patterns of relationships in local communities, the participants were able to consider what (if any) general principles should be recommended. Based on this, for example, they concluded that to promote integration, it was generally important to ‘avoid activities that require people to make [unnecessary] choices between identities; e.g. conflict between religious beliefs and secular society’.

More positively than this, the policymakers recognised that in many of the successful integration activities that had been shared, the multiple dimensions of an individual’s identity were potentially a significant asset for building a shared sense of belonging. These activities typically built a shared sense of belonging by enabling participants in them to realise those aspects of their identity that were shared with the other, on grounds other than their migration status. For example, as noted above, well-designed activities which enabled people to come together through their common identity as parents were seen as helping all those involved to feel they belonged together, as they recognised their common concerns with caring for their children, irrespective of differences in country of origin. Many of the initiatives that policymakers claimed to be successful in local areas used alternative shared characteristics, or shared social interests (sports, arts, handicraft, etc.) or convictions (e.g. politics, religion) as bases on which to build initial interactions between migrants and others. Moreover, wider research (e.g. Zappone 2003) also notes the importance of recognising how different aspects of an individual’s identity (such as gender, being a parent, living in poverty, or being disabled) may relate together in influencing their social position and relationships with others.

Of course, such characteristics and convictions can separate people on as many grounds as they bring people together – the most important factor proposed overall in building integration was the pattern of relationships formed. The suggestion agreed here by the policymakers was that the greater the number of different bases on which cross-connections were made between diverse individuals, the less likely any single factor may be to become the fault line down which groups become
entirely divided. However, activities which support such cross-connecting patterns of relationship do not necessarily ‘just happen’. Indeed, there are often significant practical, cultural, social and psychological barriers to their occurring. As a result, they often require, or at least benefit from, the proactive efforts of local ‘bridge-builders’, such as voluntary activists, community workers etc., who are committed to building these relationships across diversity and who seek to develop common belonging in an area. The difference made by these ‘bridge-builders’ was the way they encouraged the development of strong equal relationships across different individuals, groups and communities. Within these, they connected together what wider research has (somewhat controversially) referred to as bonding, bridging and linking forms of social capital (Woolcock 2001; Zetter et al. 2006; Putnam 2007). When these different forms of social capital became linked together in ‘bridge-building’ activities, a stronger sense of common belonging and inclusion could be built between those taking part which was more inclusive and accepting of diversity. Due to the diverse bases and foci of such activities (building on different layers of interests and aspects of identity that were important to those involved), participants considered them much more likely to attract people from diverse backgrounds, including those who were both migrants and those who were existing local residents. In addition, because of the ‘bridge-builders’ focus on intentionally building relationships across diversity when organising the activities, support was available to help overcome any challenges in doing so.

It is important to note that this is different from claiming that all voluntary/community groups or activities necessarily increase senses of belonging. The focus here is specifically on those groups or activities which hold the potential to build relationships across individuals and groups in ways that enable wider networks to form on multiple different grounds. These can then become a basis for building more complex and diverse webs of interaction. Proactively seeking to build such connections between diverse communities was recognised as often a difficult and even sometimes dangerous job, in which the activists themselves (and those who become involved) can be targeted for transgressing established social boundaries. Hence, it was considered important to provide committed support to these activists and to build connections between them so that they can build their own wider links, access mutual support and training, and develop their skills and understanding of this work collectively. This work was also recognised as raising difficult ethical questions for the activists as they tried to build bridges with others where there had been a history of conflict. For example, the dialogue between policymakers included considerable debate over whether discussion which sought to create a vision of ‘shared futures’ also required open recognition of (and public apologies for) past injustices.
Moreover, in considering the relationships between different levels of action, the participants recognised that wider social and political contexts also had a huge impact in setting the context for local interactions, particularly in terms of the extent of inequalities between different groups. As a result, policy initiatives which sought to create a supportive context by ensuring that migrants were given equal status, as far as possible, to support their integration were recognised as important (in line with Allport’s original 1954 theory). As part of addressing this wider context, many of the policymakers pointed to the need for local and national political leadership to open up debates over identities, practices and belonging and to enable these to be explored in an open way at a wider level. Wider research also suggests that such dilemmas may also benefit from wider cultural policies which help explore these themes in the public domain, to help contribute to dialogue about how such tensions might be addressed (Xuereb 2011). All of this complexity of individual identity and belonging thus highlights the need to see migrant integration in the context of broader social relationships of inclusion/exclusion and in/equality in wider society (e.g. Carrera 2005).

Other Dilemmas

Each of the example dilemmas summarised above is complex and would bear much further scrutiny in light of research and practice than it has been possible to do here. In so doing, other related challenges and dilemmas would also emerge. The critical summaries provided are not designed to oversimplify and resolve such dilemmas entirely, as if that were possible. Instead, they have sought to show how dialogically exploring some of their ethical dimensions can be helpful in understanding these dilemmas better, and hence improve policy responses by taking into account wider experience, theory and research.

There are many other dilemmas facing policymakers and practitioners in relation to migrant integration (and the broader relationship between policy and diversity) which also have ethical dimensions, with several further dilemmas considered more fully in the full report from this event. These included those relating to how best to resource related activities, how best to gain migrant participation and representation in public decision-making that affects their lives, and whether services for migrants should be provided separately or should be integrated into services for the wider population. Emerging from the dialogue over these dilemmas was an emphasis on the importance of listening to migrants’ and other residents’ voices, and on generating diverse opportunities for collective participation. Policymakers in this research suggested it involved going beyond a ‘one size fits all’ approach, avoiding the domination of any process by a limited range of individuals or groups, and involving a wider range of people in designing opportunities for participation at a much earlier stage. This involves being much clearer about the different types of
participation available, and how these relate to each other (Huddleston 2009). It includes recognising that participation in decision-making structures is different from participation in everyday interactions, and that both can contribute towards the improved integration of migrants.

**Conclusion**

The dilemmas discussed in this article, and the issues of identity, belonging, citizenship and interaction on which they are based, provoke numerous ethical and practical challenges for policymakers as they seek to address them within particular socio-political contexts. Whatever response results, each set of dilemmas highlights the need to combine micro-, meso- and macro-level actions which promote improved dialogue within any proposed interventions if they are to successfully address these issues. They also illustrate the need to combine different disciplines and theories that operate at these different levels, and to think about the relationships and interactions between them.

Whilst there are no simple solutions to complex dilemmas facing policymakers such as these, this article has demonstrated that there is much to be learnt from critically and dialogically engaging with them, drawing on understandings from different contexts. Cultural and policy blind-spots in relation to integration policy can easily arise within any particular policy context, but they become more apparent in a comparative dialogical context. Improved international dialogue and learning that integrates ethical dimensions can hence play an important role in supporting policy-makers in recognising and responding to these. These responses are further strengthened when developed through dialogue which incorporates and shapes wider research, including that which listens and learns from the experiences of migrants and others within local communities. Most importantly, this article has demonstrated that engaging directly with the ethical dimensions of these dilemmas can be an important way to stimulate deeper dialogue about the issues concerned, and hence to generate improved learning and action as a result.
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The Ethical Dimensions of Dialogue Between Policymakers


Integrity and Dialogue

Simon Robinson

This paper explores the relationship of dialogue to integrity. It sets out a traditional philosophical view of integrity, noting that these are predominantly assertive, holding certain principles or values against others, and therefore they do not involve dialogue. Based on more recent views on integrity, which stress agency, the paper then develops a view of integrity based on a three-fold view of responsibility. This view is based on dialogue, and with that a greater engagement with plural values and a complex social environment. The paper looks at the nature of that dialogue, and then goes on to examine implications for the practice and theory of dialogue itself. The paper uses illustrations from the Mid Staffs Hospital Trust case and from fiction, with the example of Shakespeare’s Henry V.

The Importance of Integrity

There is a consensus amongst academics and practitioners on the importance of integrity. A survey by the Council for Industry and Higher Education (Archer and Davidson 2008), for instance, suggests that the third most important quality that employers want in new employees, behind teamwork and communication skills, is integrity. This theme is taken up by the Institute of Chartered Accountancy in England and Wales (ICAEW) in Reporting with Integrity (2009), which aims to establish the utility of integrity. Integrity, it is argued, provides the basis for the establishment of trust, both in leadership and in the wider profession. This is true at both the individual and institutional levels (cf. Solomon 2007) and is embodied in corporation or individual practice, or in the commitment of the wider profession. Hence, the engineering professions (Armstrong et al 1999), for instance, can write of the need to maintain the integrity of the profession. By extension, it is argued, this leads to the reliability of information and judgement, upon which the future of markets, financial systems and even financial policies depend. The absence of this was exemplified in the credit crisis (Lanchester 2010).

Defining Integrity

Pinning down the actual meaning of the term integrity is less easy. The ICAEW report acknowledges that promoting integrity is difficult, not least because it seems to be a relative concept. Hence, four different major philosophical approaches to integrity are reviewed: self-integration; identity; moral purpose; and commitment.

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Self-integration

This account of integrity suggests that it is about the integration of what Frankfurt refers to as higher order and lower order volitions (Frankfurt 1961). Higher order volitions are about long term desires, and lower order volitions immediate desires. He distinguishes the high order volition of the drug addict to be a drug free person, and the lower order volition to take drugs. Integrity, and with that free will, argues Frankfurt, is achieved when the lower order volitions cohere with the higher order volitions, bringing together volition and action. This can also be seen in terms of developing a holistic integration of the self that brings together the cognitive, affective and physical aspects of the person (Solomon 2007).

Identity

Williams (1973) argues for a view of integrity that is based on the identity of the person. This is part of his argument against a simple, utilitarian approach. One example that he offers is of the dignitary who is the guest of a foreign nation. He is taken to a town square, where 20 people are about to be killed in reprisal for recent armed protests. As a significant guest, the man is offered the opportunity to kill one of the 20, allowing the other 19 to live. The utilitarian response would be straightforward, that by killing the one man he saves 19, and therefore he should do it. Williams, however, argues that this is more than a simple calculation. It involves going against the moral identity of the person, going against the core moral beliefs that make up the identity of the person.

Whilst this is an important part of integrity, one that demands careful reflection on what the basic values are, it is not clear that it is sufficient. Like self-integration, it suffers from the problem that the morality at the base of identity may itself be flawed or questionable. The recent film In Bruges (2009) is a good example of this. The leader of a criminal gang has strong belief on the wrongness of killing children. To allow one of his ‘hit-men’ to live after he has killed a child, albeit by mistake, would go against this belief, which he takes to be part of his identity. However, the moral context of the practice is itself questionable, because his very business is based on killing. This is ultimately tested for him when he believes that he too has killed a child and, without further thought, he kills himself. Hence, he remains a man of integrity but only within a flawed moral boundary.

Moral Purpose

In the light of this, writers like Rawls (1972) and Halfon (1989) argue that integrity must include an acceptable moral purpose at its basis. For Rawls, this would involve some clear conception of justice, defined in terms of fairness. Halfon is more circumspect and careful. He argues that integrity involves the person setting out
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an ethical perspective that is conceptually clear, logically consistent, appraised or relevant empirical evidence, and careful about acknowledging, as well as weighing the relevant moral considerations. In effect, Halfon argues that the person of integrity will give a clear account of their moral purpose as part of following a rigorous moral decision making process.

Such arguments provide a view of integrity that is descriptive, but not a normative view, and hence they are still not sufficient. Tested by the example of the SS guard, the guard may well be able to give an account of moral purpose which he claims is coherent, based on a world view which was quasi-religious. The SS guard lacks two things, and both are needed for any account of integrity. The first involves openness to the critical questioning of different perspectives, including competing values, raising the possibility that the leadership and the core values of the group can be challenged. The second demands a normative stance, recognising that some things are wrong in themselves. Underlying the Williams case is precisely the normative view that it is wrong to kill another person, whatever the consequences. Underlying the self-justification of the SS guard is the lack of a normative stance, such as respect for human dignity.

Commitment

Calhoun (1995) argues for a sense of commitment which is about ‘standing for something’. He argues that this involves more than simply standing for an individual moral purpose but, rather, standing for a purpose that is recognised by the community. Hence, the basis for integrity is recognised. Here, integrity is associated explicitly with something for which it is worth striving, and it assumes a degree of courage and perseverance that will enable the person and the group to stand up against internal and societal pressures that impose obstacles to the purpose. However, much like the other arguments this has limitations, not least because it may involve standing up for something that means much to one group or community, but which is actually seen as problematic by communities outside. The point about normativity, above, is that it looks to a moral view which is not determined by the group but, rather, that transcends it (Mason 2001).

None of these approaches, then, are sufficient in themselves. Hence, the ICAEW report suggests that these partial approaches contain elements that can come together in a more coherent description of integrity, with five core aspects:

- **Moral values.** This demands clear thinking about what they are.

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1 Despite this, Cohen (2001) notes the lengths to which some Nazi officials went to articulate a perverted view of respect for the dignity of their victims, e.g., that children should not be shot, whilst holding them by their hair.
• **Motives.** These demand an awareness of motives and the capacity to test them in the self and others.

• **Commitments.** This involves sustaining commitment to others, and to values, over a long period.

• **Qualities.** These involve the virtues necessary to maintain integrity.

• **Achievements.** The need to integrate moral purpose with practice, walking the walk.

In turn, they argue that these elements lead to the key behavioural characteristics of integrity. Being honest and truthful are behaviours that emerge from moral values. Fairness and compliance with the law are behaviours that emerge from motives. Commitment involves the promotion of community interests. Qualities include being open and adaptable, and the capacity to take corrective action. The behaviour of consistency arises from achievements.

**Integrity, Identity and Dialogue**

The attempt to develop a comprehensive view of integrity begins to deal with some of the issues, but it leaves other tensions unresolved. Integrating different aspects of the self, for instance, pays little attention to how the person, and their underlying view of the self, deals with difference. Even the idea of the self that is largely implicit in Williams’ account (1973), is hard to pin down. Polonius's advice to his son to be true to the self, for instance, presumes a settled self to which one can relate in a consistent way (Hamlet 1, 3). In turn, this presumes that one can know the self. However, research on ethics and pedagogy (Robinson and Dowson 2011) suggests that it is hard for people to determine if one has integrity, precisely because such a judgement cannot be made purely by the self. There are many aspects of the self that one does not know, and which can only be discovered through relating to others, and by hearing their views (Luft 1969). Fawkes (2014), in examining professional ethics in Jungian terms, argues that it is important for professions to develop reflexivity which takes in the ‘shadow side’. This is not necessarily a malign aspect of the self, or of the identity of the organisation, but simply of aspects of the self which are not examined and which require the help of others to see them.

This thinking suggests that integrity is less an individual and more of a social virtue, to do with how individuals and organisations view their identity and present their identity. Mason (2001) suggests that this begins to focus on the development of critical reflexivity (Giddens 1991, Bauman 1989) and thus on moral agency. This removes us from the idea that integrity is somehow quantifiable, or about a claim to some sort of moral perfection, and moves us to a dynamic, relational and

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2 Shakespeare, of course, sees Polonius’s comment as a sententious maxim.
Integrity, in traditional views, is very much about the assertion of a moral perspective over/against another, often leading to a moral perspective which is itself adversarial. Pattison and Edgar (2011) argue that an extreme example of this is whistle-blowing, and that the identity of the whistle-blower often precisely avoids the complexity of an institutional situation, and seeks to polarise relations. There is little here about dialogue with different narratives. Often, for instance, the narrative of institutional sustainability is seen as either being value neutral, or against moral values, something that is reinforced by MacIntyre’s view of institutional values as being secondary to the core values of the community of practice (MacIntyre 1981). However, without both it is hard to see how the core values and their community or practice can be sustained (Robinson and Smith 2014).

This moves integrity beyond individual reflexivity and responsiveness, towards a more social view, and thus demands a more complex view that is focused on the practice of dialogue, which engages all the value narratives in the social environment, both individual and social. Critically engaging different value narratives in dialogue does not necessarily lead to the loss of moral meaning, but rather to a more complex view of responsibility than simply agency, one that involves ongoing multiple dialogues, and dialogues that engage both affective and cognitive meaning.

**Responsibility**

I have suggested (2009) three interrelated modes of responsibility, the first two of which originate in Aristotle’s thinking: imputability, accountability and liability.

**Imputability**

This is about moral agency, being able to attribute ideas, values and actions to a person or group. The strongest version of this suggests a rational decision making process. Taylor (1989) argues that this decision-making constitutes a strong valuation that connects action to deep decision making. This owning of the thoughts, and the related decision making, is what constitutes the moral agency of the person or group. Hence, this process of decision making becomes key to the development of a sense of identity. In effect, this involves part of the constitution of the self (Korsgaard 2009).

Closely connected to this is the concept of moral or retrospective responsibility that focuses on blame for actions. This seeks to identify the person or persons who are responsible for actions. Key to this are either intentionality or role. The first determines whether an action was intended, and thus who was responsible. The second, role responsibility, suggests that certain roles are focused in purpose
(notably leadership, professional, or family roles), and thus may apportion blame, even if consequences were not intended. A medical practitioner, for instance, may be deemed to be responsible for a patient’s death, even if he did not intend it.

Key to the development of this agency is the development of responsibility for ideas, values, worth and practice, all of which take moral agency into a relational and holistic context:

- **Ideas.** This demands clarity about the concepts that are used, and the capacity to justify them rationally. We can hardly be said to be responsible for our thoughts if we cannot provide some account of, and justification for, them. Core to this is an understanding of purpose. Any account and justification of thoughts and actions also demands openness to critical intellectual challenge. In the 2008 credit crisis, this was illustrated by the use of CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) involving the repackaging of mortgage debts and selling them on. As Lanchester (2010) notes, those who pursued this policy based it on a mathematical formula that none of them understood. Their focus was purely on the profits that this action would make. This, in turn, was based on values which radically affected how they saw the world.

- **Values.** This demands the capacity to appreciate values underlying thoughts and action. It is not just that they are coherent, it is also that they have distinct meaning and value, such that one prefers one practice to others. Even at this stage, responsibility involves a comparison with other practices and their values (Taylor 1989). Hence, deciding upon one’s own values, or the values of the organisation, does not take place in social isolation, or apart from the core relationships to the social and physical environment.

- **Worth.** Underlying any idea of values is the idea of worth. The worth of a professional organisation, for instance, is expressed centrally in what Airaksinen (1994) refers to as the pre-moral values, such as health (medical profession), justice (legal profession) or learning (education profession). These are all values which can be connected back to a vision of what it means to be human, and thus to any idea of human flourishing. By definition, this takes such organisations beyond the narrow interests of their group and sets the value of the profession, and their members, in shared values, and in the ways they relate to wider social and physical environments.

Critically, this strong sense of worth is central to identity and is directly focused on feelings and emotions. Hence, taking responsibility for the
affective aspects of the self is also key to agency. In terms of the affective self, Rowan Williams (1989) makes the distinction between emotions and feeling. Emotion involves feeling, which intrudes and controls the person. Anxiety or shame, for instance, can be felt so intensely that the person responds to them without understanding their genesis or how they are influencing her. Inevitably, with such emotion, the boundaries of the self are felt as being indistinct and insecure. This is contrasted with dispassionate feeling, which involves an engagement with feelings which allows an exposure of the self, ‘freed from all compulsions to keep itself safe or keep itself under control’ (Williams 1989, 11). It involves learning about those feelings and accepting them, hence, as Williams puts it, learning a positive form of detachment. This links both to personal and professional integrity.

Narrow views of self-worth, focused on closed groups, tend to be dominated by emotion and by the impulse to distinguish the worth of the groups from that of those outside the group (Cohen 2001), losing any sense of service to the wider society. Energies are thus focused on location (demonstrating one’s place), rather than on engagement with the wider world (Markham 2003). This affective aspect of agency is central to identity and thus to any view of integrity. Hence, greater focus is required on the psychological aspects of integrity than was previously seen in philosophy. This provides ways to examine integrity in relation to self and other deception, intentional or unconscious, and to mechanisms of denial (Cohen 2001). It also suggests that any descriptive view of integrity requires the capacity not simply to challenge values, but also the wider and deeper personal and organisational visions of relationships to society. This applies as much to those who perceive themselves to be morally upright as to those who argue for a more instrumental identity (Pattison and Edgar 2011). It also suggests that the perspectives of the wider society will be affected by the individual or group sense of worth, partly because of the danger of polarised thinking.

• Practice: At the heart of this focus is the awareness of one’s actions and the effects of those actions on the social and environmental context. In business, for instance, if you are a board member, do you fully understand the practice of an organisation and the effect that this might have on the wider social and physical environment? None of this prescribes a particular response. What it does demand is an awareness of what one is doing; how that fits into the purpose of the organisation, and how that effects the internal and external environments. The physicality of practice is also value laden, not least because, as David Ford notes,
all action involves communication (Ford 1999). Somatic awareness is found at the base of the earliest stages of human development (Stern 1985, 129).

This first mode of responsibility, which is basically moral agency, sounds very simple but in practice it is difficult and complex. The ongoing dialogue applies to the individual and the organisation. The self, suggests Taylor (1989, see also Cooper-White 2007), is neither uniform nor singular, but is made up of plural narratives, focused on different relationships over time: familial, cultural, educational, and so on. Often these narratives control the perspective and practice of the individual precisely because no practice of internal dialogue has been developed, and with that, there is little self-awareness.

In this view of integrity, the nature of dialogue does not involve an ‘easy fit’ of values. On the contrary, as I suggest, it demands critical reflection, the engagement of complexity, and the awareness of, and the capacity to respond to, the relationships which constitute our social and environmental context and worth. This is messy and about ongoing dialogue, focused on mutual support and challenge. This ongoing dialogue cannot simply be contained in ‘internal dialogue’, precisely because the plural person is focused on relationships that are developed over time, and that therefore require dialogue beyond the person and the organisation. This leads into the explicit dialogue of accountability.

**Accountability**

In one sense, accountability is the public face of agency. A lot of the stress in moral agency is about making sense to oneself. Accountability is about making sense to others. Focused on answerability and judgement, the term is often seen as being narrow and pressed into frameworks of power. Hence, many debates either want to focus accountability on the immediate context of management, or to rail against it as a means to control individuals (Sternberg 2000). Typically, however, there are different kinds of accountability which relate to the different strands of the social and physical environment. In the work place there is accountability to superiors, customers, colleagues, which is focused on value narratives, which include competency but also human rights at work. This suggests that accountability is key to how we operate in the world and respond to the demands of the social and physical environments. It also suggests that, at this point, integrity is focused on multiple accountability, and how that is fulfilled. Perhaps the best example of this is the professional ‘model’ of accountability (cf. Armstrong et al), which is minimally based on accountability to clients, the profession (including foundational pre-moral goods, such as health and well-being), related professions (critical to the on-going
work of one’s profession, such as nursing to medicine), the particular institution/organisation in which one is based, wider society (in relation to provision which is focused on service, such as the law or medicine), and future generations (who may use the bridge you have built). In many cases this will also include the government.

Giving such an account inevitably involves engagement in ongoing plural, critical and mutual dialogue. The very fact that a profession may be accountable to many different stakeholders sets up this dynamic of mutuality. Hence, architects and engineers, doctors and nurses, are all mutually accountable, and in different ways, to clients (who may be complex), regulatory bodies, and so on. Often, integrity, and with that any trust, is seen as being based on transparency, defined largely in terms of reporting mechanisms. However, as O’Neill (2000) argues, such transparency is not sufficient to enable trust. Rather critical dialogue is demanded precisely to test the veracity of the reporting and to guard against intentional or unintentional deception. Without that, the reporting involves a presentation of self and organisational identity which lacks rigour and which negatively affects practice. Critical and mutual dialogue is precisely what was missing in the great crises of governance and leadership over the past two decades.

The Mid Staffs Hospital Case (Robinson and Smith 2014) showed governance that was focused on a narrow view of accountability, focused on targets and, ultimately, on a narrative and associated sense of worth and identity that focused on hierarchy, eventually with accountability to the government. The result was an inability to see multiple accountabilities, even to the extent of affecting how the professions saw their work relationships, obscuring the particular needs of patients, and leading to the unnecessary deaths of over two hundred. Professional relationships were strongly hierarchical and dominated by a culture of fear, which caused a lack of focus on core social values, a lack of awareness of the surrounding needs, and a limited sense of self-worth, which amounted to worth based on the capacity to fulfil targets. There was a virtual absence of critical dialogue between the professions and the clients, and between the professions and the managerial hierarchy. The dynamic of fear precisely meant that the different groups could not be genuinely held to account through openness to critical dialogue, leading to an absence of integrity. Nonetheless, a narrow view of accountability was claimed by many players in terms of their achieving targets for better financial status, and reporting related to that.

An inability to critically engage with all the different narratives of care led to practice in nursing, for example, which was antithetical to their core professional identity as carers, something about which the nurses were shocked. In effect, by focusing on giving an account of targets, this led to a lack of accountability, both to the profession and to the patient. Hence, the Chief Nurse of the UK felt obliged to explicitly revisit the narratives of care and compassion (see Robinson and
Accountability focused on dialogue, then, is also key to the development of identity and, with that, to integrity. The same problems were there in the so-called regulatory bodies, who were unable to account for why they did not make their suspicions about the Mid Staffs Hospital clearer (Robinson and Smith 2014). They saw the problems but had no sense of mutual accountability.

Accountability, then, is essentially focused on ongoing dialogue and communication. This is partly because relationships and related purpose focus on action, which itself acts as a means of integration, and partly because critical dialogue enables better, more responsive, integrated thinking and action. Where accountability is focused primarily on representation, with little reference to critical dialogue, internal or external, or on narrow relationships, we run the danger of unthinking report, and of the inability to actually perceive the wider social and environmental context.

**Liability for**

Moral liability (as distinct from legal liability) goes beyond accountability, into the idea of wider responsibility for projects, people or place. Each person or group has to work these out in context, without necessarily an explicit contract. Working that out demands awareness of the limitations of the person or organisation, avoiding taking on too much responsibility, and a capacity to work together with others and to negotiate and share responsibility. Most relationships involve a mixture of accountability and liability. A good example is a doctor, who is both accountable for and to the patient. Once again this can have a strictly legal sense, or a wider moral one, encompassing the broadest possible view of stakeholders, from those directly affected by any business or project to the social and natural environment in which these operate. Like accountability, this often involves multiple responsibilities, which have to be held together.

This is the most difficult of all the modes of responsibility, partly because of the difficulty in determining just what we are responsible for. At one extreme of this responsibility lies the constant denier, always finding ways to avoid responsibility. At the other extreme sits the person or organisation who tries to take responsibility for everything. Aristotle’s stress on the mean suggests that disaster lies in both those extremes. In the middle lies a view of liability where responsibility is negotiated. The negotiation of responsibility itself is also key to the articulation and development of identity, as Finch and Mason (1994) found in researching the negotiation of responsibility in families. They noted that the single parent families they worked with did not determine their ethical identity through reference to values or principles, but through negotiating how responsibility could be shared.

This moves to the idea of shared responsibility for people, project and planet, focusing
Integrity and Dialogue

on shared creativity and responsiveness. This acts as a basis for integrative thinking and action, which once more acts as a means of account. Like accountability, it has to link to moral agency if it is to make sense - in this case, shared sense. Once again, this aspect of responsibility does not allow us to sit back uncritically. There will always be healthy questions about how responsibility might have been better fulfilled (as distinct from neurotic questions that allow no rest). Some of the great post-Holocaust thinkers, such as Arendt, Levinas, Bauman, and Ricoeur, argue from this for a sense of universal responsibility - shared responsibility for everything. Jonas (1984) takes this further, arguing for a sense of ultimate accountability to, and responsibility for, future generations and the environment, a secular analogue of the ultimate accountability to God and for His creation. The idea of universal responsibility does not involve literal individual moral responsibility for everyone and every act, but its power is in engaging the moral imagination, focusing back on our ideas, actions and values, with questions on how these might best be fulfilled. For instance, do we take full responsibility for what we say? One Turkish thinker, Fethullah Gülen (see Yavuz 2013), argues that whatever is said individually, or in the role of leader or board, may have unintended consequences, if not immediately, then over time. It may influence the tone of a corporation, or the aspirations of a community, either negatively or positively. Gülen's point is that the sense of wider responsibility forces us back to the immediate responsibility for the way in which we perceive the world and communicate the associated values and ideas. Integrity, in the light of this mode of responsibility, is critically about always going the extra mile. If the mode of accountability involves responsibility which is 'both/and', accountable in different ways to different relationships, the idea of universal responsibility takes on an inclusive sense of responsibility. In Judaeo-Christian terms, this is *agape*, a view of care which includes even the enemy (Author 2001). Mason (2001) argues that such inclusive respect for the dignity of the person is implicit in such responsibility.

**Complex Integrity and Dialogue**

These interconnected modes of responsibility provide a far more complex view of integrity, one which holds together: agency; relational awareness and responsiveness; plural narratives, and the values and awareness of a good which transcends narrow boundaries. Consistency associated with integrity is found in the consistent practice of reflexivity, accountability and creative practice, and in engagement with the holistic aspects of the different relationships. The interconnectivity of the three modes is vital, not least because if any of the modes is used exclusively it can lead to polarisation. The Mid Staffs case exemplifies how a focus on accountability, without consideration of the core values, worth and purpose, or of wider responsibility, leads to reporting which is focused on narrow value narratives and which involves a
lack of awareness of the wider social environment.³ Dialogue is central to this view of responsibility and thus to any view of integrity. The nature of dialogue focused on complex integrity, has, however, implications for dialogue theory in general, and I will outline these now.

First, this suggests that dialogue does not simply involve different parties sharing their particular views with each other. Rather, integrity involves the capacity to reflect, to evaluate practice, to be able to cope with criticism and to maintain, develop or alter practice appropriately. Hence, integrity is best viewed in terms of a continual learning process (Author 2011) with the person discovering more about the different aspects of the self and others and how these connect. This links closely to Jung’s idea of the shadow side (Fawkes 2014). Integrity involves reflection on that shadow side, and thus providing space and time for that. Dialogue, in this light, involves hearing different voices, and through engaging those different narratives, finding one’s own voice (cf. Oakshott 1989, Freire 1996). Far from dialogue that simply involves finding common perspectives or values (so often stressed in interfaith dialogue), this view stresses the importance of hearing and interrogating difference, thus enabling mutual challenge and development. As Bauman (1989) argues, in this context, learning requires external perspectives, something that applies to the development of agency in the individual and the organisation. Agency, in this sense, thrives on difference and dissonance. Lederach (2005), in the context of peace building, argues for the systematic scepticism of the other and of possible projects, precisely to enable difference to emerge and so the reality of the particular other. Acceptance of the other, and an awareness of how the other connects to the wider social web, is, of course, equally important in enabling the other to emerge. However, acceptance of the other does not a priori demand that all values are held in common.

Second, such learning is therefore distinct from the Habermasian (1992) or Kantian dialogue project, which seek to come to agreement on values and ideas. Rather, integrity demands a more complex dynamic, involving: holding different values together, often linking values associated with core purpose, such as pre-moral values; and an awareness of key moral values which transcend project or profession, and which need to be prioritised. In the first of these, the value of care, for instance, has to be held in tension with organisational sustainability, amongst many other factors. This was exemplified in the Mid Staffs case. We cannot afford to lose either justice or organisational sustainability. In the second, values and principles

³ This is often referred to as ‘instrumental rationality’ (Bauman 1989), a focus on the management of ends rather than core values. Elsewhere, I argue that, in fact, there is still not an absence of value involved, but rather a narrow value base, unaware of the many different values in the situation (Author 2013).
Integrity and Dialogue are focused on views of humanity and, ultimately, are founded in respect for the dignity of the person (Mason 2001). Integrity, in this case, demands that anything which goes against such dignity demands that the person or organisation stand out against it. A good example of the absence of this is the Abu Ghraib case, where several army doctors worked with torturers to examine victims and pass them fit for further interrogation (Author 2011).

Third, integrity focuses on holistic engagement. This leads to holistic thinking that takes account of how the feelings, thoughts and physicality affect each other, enabling thinking that is affective and feeling that is cognitive, both of which can be challenged, and are challenged by exposure to the diverse social environment, and the different narratives of that environment. None of this is holism in the sense of smooth integration or wholeness. On the contrary, it involves continued struggle, not least because, as Pianalto (2012 cf. Cottingham 2010) argues, different value narratives are held in place by affect, sometimes providing strong motivation to avoid even critical reflection on the different narratives. This moves away from Habermas’s (1992) stress on rationality in dialogue. The framework of holism rather suggests that rationality cannot be viewed or developed apart from engagement with the affect. Solomon (2007) argues that this is not simply about controlling the affect, but also about understanding feelings, such as anger, so that they can be appropriately articulated.

A good example of this is found in dialogue in Shakespeare’s *Henry V*. Henry begins his dialogue with the Lord Chief Justice (Henry IV pt. 2, 5.2) aware that the Chief Justice is afraid of what the new king will do to the man who took Falstaff and Henry, as Prince of Wales, to task. Instead, Henry addresses the anxiety and does it in such a way that he demonstrates his respect for the Justice and the need for good governance, but also establishes core boundaries of governance. ‘My voice’, says Henry, ‘shall sound as you do prompt my ear / And I will stoop and humble my intents / To your well-practiced wise decision’ (5.2.4). All of this skilfully links into previous narratives, disputes and dialogues by using the term ‘father’ in reference to the Lord Chief Justice: ‘You will be as a father to my youth’. At once, this links to Henry’s final dialogue with his father. That dialogue had begun to resolve a relationship between father and son that had been made difficult by the additional power relationship of king and heir (Henry IV pt. 2). It could only focus on the succession by first focusing on the effect of the crown upon Henry’s father. The resolution of that relationship was focused both on empathy (expressed by the prince for his father) and on the practice of kingship. Such a resolution now

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4 One UK medical practitioner was later struck off the medical register by the UK General Medical Council for lack of moral courage in not reporting abuse in this context (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-20809692).
enables the new king to establish another fatherly relationship, and to put away the associations with Falstaff (who is himself seen by some as a negative father figure).

Fourth, the issue of holism leads to a focus on virtues in dialogue. The practice of open and critical dialogue precisely leads to the development of responsibility. It enables the development of agency, demanding the articulation of ideas, values and practice, which clarifies both what we think and do. Articulation, and the development of narrative, becomes essential for reflection and learning, involving ongoing hermeneutics. It also enables a fuller awareness of the social environment, and better appreciation of the worth in relation to the self and others. Dialogue also demands the development of commitment to the self and the other. It is not possible to pursue dialogue without giving space and time for it to develop, and this, in turn, demands a non-judgmental attitude. Commitment to the self and others is also essential if the potential critique of values and practice is to emerge from articulation and reflection. Dialogue itself also sets up a continued accountability with those involved. This is partly because it sets up a contract, formal or informal, that establishes expectations that are, in turn, continually tested by that dialogue. It also involves being open to plural voices and how they relate to core meaning.

The practice of such responsibility also involves the practice of virtues, intellectual and moral. Reflection on ideas, values, worth and practice, for instance, involves a deepening of the intellectual virtue of *phronesis*, practical wisdom that focuses on how the good can be embodied, but also on what the good actually is in relation to the social context. Listening to the different narratives, in the self and others, and working through worth, as well as values, demands the exercise of empathy. Developing creative responsibility demands several different virtues, from patience, to enable dialogue with different groups and persons; to care, enabling commitment to people and projects over time. Creative response also demands the practice of the virtue of hope. Hope, as a virtue, involves the capacity to envision the future in a positive and creative way. Snyder (2000) suggests that this involves the development of pathways (in practice involving negotiation of shared resource), achievable targets, and agency. Agency, of course, links us back to responsibility. It provides hope in the sense of both people and organisations owning their own ideas and values, and also in the sense that it connects to creative action; the agent gets things done. Such hope is not based simply on what can be done, but on the unconditional worth of the person or organisation. Respect for agency says that you are not hopeless (i.e. worthless).

The practice of such virtues through dialogue then precisely enables the development of responsibility, both individual and shared. This also suggests a more complex view of dialogue, focusing not simply on the development of ideas, values or principles but on the practice of virtue and the development of character.
Consistent character is key to evidence of integrity. The development of such virtues requires the development of a community of dialogue which enables their practise (MacIntyre 1981); also important in providing evidence of integrity.

The focus on virtues once more moves dialogue beyond Habermas’s principle-centred approach. It is the development of character which enables individuals and organisations to handle the ambiguity of social environments, and to hold together the different relationships.

Fifth, this also suggests dialogue that is ongoing and linking plural dialogues. Even the core community has internal differences, and dialogue occurs beyond the core community. In turn, this suggests that dialogue may occur, pace Habermas, beyond ordered frameworks of dialogue, or according to rules. Once more, the example of Henry V serves to illustrate this. In the evening before the battle of Agincourt (Henry V, 4), Henry (in disguise) locks into dialogue which has been developing amongst the troops, dialogue focused on their relationship with the king, and suggesting that it was not clear whether the king could be trusted not to give himself to ransom, thereby not respecting the sacrifice of the troops in previous battles. Henry continues the dialogue in his Crispin’s Day speech, this time in role (Henry V, 4.3). He focuses on developing a sense of value, worth and mutuality to prepare the troops for the battle against the odds, and then continues the dialogue, but now with the French herald, beyond the community. Whilst this dialogue is ostensibly about the key practical matter at hand, it also links to the dialogue about trust with his troops. He refuses the call for ransom from the herald, with his troops as audience and thus still part of that dialogue, thereby reinforcing his commitment to them. This suggests that Henry’s continuing accountability is located in ongoing dialogue that engages different narratives, and which is focused on vision and worth. For Shakespeare, the back drop is a continuing set of dialogues, into which the Crispin’s Day speech drops, on honour. Honour is precisely connected to worth, and Henry V, and the Henriad as a whole, focus on and create dialogue around different views of the basis of honour - from Hotspur (honour as personal reputation), Falstaff (honour as being without worth to the ordinary man), and Henry V (honour as focused on shared worth and purpose). The last of these is precisely what emerges in the Crispin’s Day speech, and is key to the motivation of the troops. The dialogue comes to a head in practice and in decision making, in this case in battle. However, this is not the result of a systematic framework of dialogue, but of leadership which is firstly aware of the different dialogues and, secondly, that enables the engagement of the different stakeholders in shared dialogues and, thirdly, that enables the different dialogues to focus on practice. This requires dynamic and responsive leadership and, in Henry’s case, directly addresses purpose, competence (in this case in battle), values and worth.
(honour), relationships (between the leader and his troops), and the significance of the practice in which they are involved.

This also suggests that dialogue is always with many voices, and that a key part of the practice is identifying those voices. Such dialogue is also not simply a tool of communication, separate from the identity, meaning and relationships. Sidorkin (1999), building on Bakhtin (1981), argues that it is ontological, focused in the very being of the person and relationships, enabling the plural identity of the person and the organisation to be held together. Moving beyond Levinas (1998), this suggests that all dialogue is polyphonic (many voiced), even that with the self. This also goes beyond Buber (1942), who argued for the primacy of being present in dialogue rather than for rational articulation. It suggests that the articulation of rational concepts and arguments, including specific reference to meaning and value, are as important to dialogue as any affective understanding. Epley (2014) refers to recent research which supports this view, arguing that knowledge of the other requires holistic dialogue.

Buber (cf. Anderson 1997), in his critique of Carl Rogers and dialogue in therapy, argues that, because there is power imbalance in the therapeutic relationship, this cannot lead to a dialogue which is mutual. However, the argument thus far suggests that most, if not all relationships, involve an imbalance of power, perceived or actual, and that this is a function of difference. Critical dialogue focused on agency, accountability and shared liability precisely works through these aspects of power, because its holistic engagement has to critically address the power of ideas (intellectual power), the power of feeling (affective power), and the power of culture. Again, this is exemplified in Shakespeare’s view of Henry V. The St Crispin’s Day speech focuses on mutuality, and re-engagement with core culture, in the context of the huge difference in power and status. This was all in the context of responding to plural narratives in relation to the nation, to community, the enemy, the future, the family, and so on. Pace Buber, power is addressed precisely in dialogue.

The means of addressing that power, and of enabling the development of mutuality, are both by good dialogue being modelled and also by the development of formal and informal contract. The first of these is focused, for Rogers, on the modelling of empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard, and this would apply equally to the leaders of institutions or organisations. The second involves the

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5 All of which can be abused.

6 Central to this, for Henry, was God-centred kingship, something that left him uncertain, given that his father took the throne from Richard II. Hence, dialogues include one with God.
development of community, which gives permission to question and develop dialogue. For Henry V, this involves informal contracts where the king gives permission to characters to articulate advice or to challenge, and even to give critical input.\textsuperscript{7} His dialogue with the Lord Chief Justice sets this out, as does his treatment of Williams (Henry V. 4.4, and 4.8), where he rewards the earlier challenge of the soldier with money. As I have suggested elsewhere (Author 2001) in the context of teaching and therapy, contract, in the sense of setting out aims, objectives, expectations and procedures, is a key aspect of dialogue. This is empowering because it enables the person to explicitly articulate and test his or her voice. It provides a framework of meaning and behaviour which allows mutual challenge. This, in turn, enables the development of critical agency, taking responsibility for how the person views their life and worth, and how this life might be developed. The other then emerges through the development of their agency, and thus leads to learning in all the different levels of responsibility. In this light the development of agency is precisely empowerment.

This also enables the development of shared responsibility, not simply the recognition of shared interests or shared values, \textit{pace} Porter and Kramer (2011). The working through of responsibility is also in itself a development of power, focused on creative action and hence on the embodiment of responsibility. Far from a continual journey towards the other (as in Levinas), this suggests a shared journey on which the other is discovered through intentional action. It is the imperative of action that moves dialogue forward. The stress on action and dialogue once more takes this beyond Levinas and Buber, addressing the embodiment of the different relationships through creative practice. The parallels with Habermas and his rules of dialogue that are focused in action are, at this stage, close, the major difference being once more his focus on rationality, a lack of systematic focus on holistic dynamics, and a lack of focus on multiple and ongoing dialogue. There are also questions about the nature of the learning experience in the Habermas framework, and how the development of virtues relates to this.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Solomon (1992) suggests that integrity is not one virtue but a collection of several virtues, which come together to help form a coherent character and identity. This paper argues that integrity is, rather, focused in the practice of responsibility and its three interrelated modes. This requires relating to a complex environment, finding the means of relating to different values, but is also focused on a wider sense of

\textsuperscript{7}Such contracts can also be formal and also can involves the establishment of boundaries. Hence, Henry newly crowned in Henry IV part 2, firmly places Falstaff’s outside the boundary of dialogue (reflecting Falstaff’s nihilistic perspective).
common good, expressed through shared action. Integrity relates to the different virtues precisely through the practice of the virtues, enabling the development of the three modes of responsibility. Central to this is dialogue, focused on four elements of holism and relating to the plural narratives of the social environment over time and in relation to practice and identity. I argue that this provides the basis for a view of dialogue which deepens and develops the theories of Habermas and others.
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Civic Dialogue: Attending to Locality and Recovering Monologue

Ronald C. Arnett

This essay examines civic dialogue that is connected to local roots. The conceptual emphasis suggests that locality often houses what one might term monologic tendencies. The conviction of this essay is that without acknowledgment and understanding of what matters to another, that is, of the importance of monologue, the possibility of maintaining a vital public sphere that is open to a multiplicity of ideas and positions is minimal. In this essay, the term monologue is not to be confused with a particular style of communication, but IS the ground of the conviction that one takes into a given discourse. Monologue houses the ground of the conviction that shapes what we seek to protect and promote in a given communicative exchange. Monologue is the creative engine of conviction that shapes the uniqueness of our participation and contribution to any potential dialogic interaction. To illustrate this point, I turn to the Scottish Enlightenment and the insights of Adam Ferguson as he wrote them in An Essay on the History of Civil Society. The essay explicates a series of implications that arise from Ferguson’s work and have relevancy to an understanding of civic dialogue that accounts for the local. Ferguson’s distinct contribution was his refusal to dismiss the monologic sentiments of places of particularity.

Keywords: dialogue, monologue, civic, Ferguson, Scottish Enlightenment, locality

Dialogue, as a communicative counter to telling and imposition, shapes my conviction that there is still a communicative ‘hope for this hour,’ that continues long after Martin Buber penned this phrase in 1952 (Buber 1957, 220–229). This essay rests on the assumption that one should eschew the dangers of incisive discourse that borders on domination. This essential dialogic orientation requires interrogation from a postmodern reading of dialogue that is attentive to Jean Baudrillard’s emphasis on ‘irony’ (Baudrillard 1996). If one demands that dialogue is triumphant in a given communicative encounter, is it not ironical that the mandate or demand for dialogue can morph into a moral communicative self-righteousness? Imposed ‘dialogue’ culminates in a communicative posture of telling, undercutting the mutual communicative possibilities between and among partners. Buber

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1 An earlier version of this essay was presented as a plenary address at the Civic Dialogue and Leadership Conference held at Texas A&M University, April 3–6, 2014.

2 See ‘The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement,’ by the author for a further understanding of monologue.
gestured toward this awareness as he separated dialogue from the act of ultimatum, which, ironically, results in dialogue morphing into a monologic mandate. What happens when I no longer understand listening as my principal obligation and shift this responsibility to others, with the demand that they accommodate my approved manner of communicative meeting? Buber’s conception of dialogue would reject this unintended consequence of turning listening and attending to the other into an ideological stance of communicative adherence. Dialogue, like any good, then assumes an ideological status.

I desire to recover the importance of monologue as the pragmatic fulcrum upon which the potential for dialogue itself pivots. This presentation of dialogue yields the following question about civic dialogue: What does civic dialogue resemble when it pragmatically acknowledges the importance of telling, and reconfigures the everyday relevance of monologue in civic life? Additionally, this essay situates the notion of civic life within another pragmatic assertion: there is no single conception of civic participation. I ground ‘civic’ in Jean-François Lyotard’s admission that we dwell within a multiplicity of petit récits or ‘little narratives’ (Lyotard 1984, 60). Such multiple narratives locate civic dialogue in difference, within an era of narrative and virtue contention. This perspective on civic dialogue is framed within a hypertextual/postmodern position. I conceptualise postmodernity not as a sequential evolution after modernity, but as a recognition that multiple and, at times, contending conceptions of existence are co-present. Postmodernity acknowledges a loss of narrative and virtue that form a common ground, making the recognition of the monologic conviction from which another commences communication as a pragmatic starting point for the invitation of dialogue. This essay privileges difference, assuming a multiplicity of opinion in civic space and the vibrant importance of monologic conviction as the performative beginning of dialogue.

**Dialogic Coordinates and Confession**

The background assumptions that propel this essay, ‘Civic Dialogue: Attending to Locality and Recovering Monologue’, are twofold: What are the ironical unintended consequences of the demand for dialogue and the limitation of the notion of civic to a single conception? What happens when one refuses to understand the monologic convictions of self and other in the supposed act of civic dialogue? Communicative background constitutes the meaning or communicative bias that one takes to any

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3 The conception of a hypertextual moment emerges from Umberto Eco’s notion of hypertextuality, which points towards multiple moments that occur simultaneously and inform the contemporary moment. See Umberto Eco, ‘Books, Texts, and Hypertexts,’ in The Power of Words: Literature and Society in Late Modernity 135, no. 23 (2005): 23–34.
dialogic encounter (Arnett and Holba 2012). This position of interpretive bias contrasts with that of modernity, which languishes in the assumptions of objectivity that foster the illusion of standing above the historical moment. Modernity discounts the restraints of situated, embedded, and localised perspectives, minimising the vitality of provinciality (Arnett 2013). In *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*, modernity is defined as a secular trinity that emphasises 1) efficiency, 2) individual autonomy, and 3) progress (Arnett 2013). Dialogue, understood within an era of narrative and virtue contention, rejects these assumptions, turning towards: 1) the invitational and the revelatory, 2) embedded and situated agency, and 3) the recognition of difference, refusing to conflate the new with progress.

The narrative of modernity discounts the ground upon which a communicator dwells, acting as if social and historical constraints, limits and questions are delusions. Modernity offers us a garden of promises via processes and procedures that seek to bypass local soil that is cultivated through individual and collective labour that necessitates burden and toil. My contention is that civic dialogue, understood within the mythology of modernity, places the communicative agent above the human condition, missing the existential fulcrum of decision-making, and this orientation dismisses the power of the local communicative environment. Asserting that one is engaged in dialogue does not equate with the performative reality of dialogue. This is the reason Paulo Freire (1970) rejected the use of the term ‘dialogue’ when communication between a dominant class and a class with less power occurred. As the aristocracy depended upon bloodline and wealth in order to avoid identification with the poor and oppressed, modernity offers us process and procedure with a similar objective — an evasion of the messy nature of attentiveness to the other and the distinctiveness of communicative environments. This essay revisits an ideology that turns attentive listening into a requirement for the other that seeks to lessen one’s own responsibility. It situates civic dialogue within the public arena, within a field of possibilities — prior, during, and after a given exchange — that requires the rolling up of sleeves, getting one’s hands dirty, and recognising that the dialogic task has no concluding timer as we rub shoulders with local customs and bias. Acknowledgement of the local does not assume approval, but it does require attentive engagement.

This essay follows a conceptual journey that is unconventional, moving from the importance of dialogic listening to a refashioning of the importance of monologic convictions. This undertaking investigates what Karl Jaspers called the ‘boundary limits’ or ‘limit-situation’ of my own privileged assumptions about dialogue
Jaspers sought to emphasise the existential realities of human life, recognising and focusing upon boundaries and limits to life itself (Bornemark, 2006). The boundary limit of death is an obvious existential coordinate of life. In the case of dialogue, a fundamental boundary limit is met at the moment a dialogic invitation morphs into a demand for dialogue without acknowledging what is of narrative importance to another. I engage Jaspers's conception in two ways. First, I re-examine the vitality that comes from telling and its value within a dialogic perspective, arguing that monologue itself is an essential aspect of dialogue. Second, I follow Jaspers's existential attentiveness, turning to Adam Ferguson's conception of existence, one he fashioned in his famous essay on civic society. Ferguson, as one of the major representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment, engaged with 'conjectural history,' which, I contend, has dialogic qualities (Stewart 1854, 384). Dugald Stewart coined this term in 1790 in order to explicate history in a conversation with existence that yields future implications, suggesting possibilities and potential repercussions. This view of history was not a conjectured fantasy but, rather, a conjectured imagination that yields learning and instruction. Immanuel Kant's differentiation between imagination and fantasy (Kant 1798, 60–78) lives within this construct of conjectural history, which two other luminaries of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Adam Smith, also employed. Adam Ferguson's civic project is the central text of this essay, which offers conjectural implications for civic dialogue in this historical moment that are based on Ferguson's eighteenth-century perspective.

I confess to situating an understanding of dialogue that explicates the hermeneutic objective of this essay, stressing the communicative background, which will necessitate a recovery of the importance of monologue, the existential ground of conviction that one takes into communicative engagement. This essay, in Gestalt terms, primarily concentrates on the communicative ‘background’ that discloses bias and prejudice in order to illuminate ‘foreground’ application (Gadamer 1975). Hans-Georg Gadamer frames this orientation with this assertion: ‘The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings’ (Gadamer 1975, 238). My postulation, which aligns with Gadamer’s well-argued position, is that background assumptions shape the interpretation of what we discern and understand. What we bring to an event matters; this position rejects the modern myth of objectivity that asserts that we can stand above the human condition and render purity of judgment as a form of Sartrian ‘bad faith’ (Arnett 2013; Sartre 1953, 86–116).

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An embedded and situated communicator who understands the significance of the local in dialogue with a cosmopolitan posture rejects intervention from above, whether in the form of blind adherence to authority or objective process and procedure, and a conception of oneself as a sovereign being untangled from all social constraints. An embedded postmodern communicator disavows belief in a modernist version of *deus ex machina*, a Greek theatrical gesture in which God comes down from the heavens and intervenes in a given drama: the fanciful assertion that a human being can discover an objective platform from which to discover Truth. Both *deus ex machina* and objectivity seek height above the human condition; they offer a communicator a false warrant to impose ‘Truth’ upon others. Dialogic confession, as previously framed in the Bonhoeffer project (Arnett 2005), rejects such blind faith. In performative terms, dialogic confession demands that we assume responsibility, as we knowingly speak from the ‘tainted ground’ of position, standpoint, and bias (Arnett 2008). One’s contribution to the other, at a minimum, is the disclosure of the presuppositions that guide one’s understanding of existence itself. Dialogic confession is performed in the written, oral, and action realms of communicative life. The performative nature of dialogic confession moves it from the confines of authorial intent to the admission of bias and prejudice (Arnett 2005). Dialogic confession commences with an articulation of the limits of modernity and the countering of the abstract notion of individual autonomy. It situates communicative engagement within an environmental, historical, and social narrative.

Both Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault stated that the author is dead (Barthes 1977; Foucault 1984). Their statements cannot, however, be understood within a natural attitude of conventional modern thought. Barthes and Foucault did not reject the notion of the author; they disavowed a modernist rendition of authorship. Their argument was that the author does not control, possess, or manage the intentional meaning of a text. The author is situated within an environment, history, and narratives that both limit and extend what is said and understood. The author is necessary, but insufficient, for communicative meaning. Postmodern critiques of the author or communicative agent acknowledge the embedded, situated, and relational nature of communicative engagement. This assumption unmasks a taken-for-granted assumption about modernity, where the communicative environment of the local and anything other than convention are disavowed. This rejection is not propelled by authorial intent, but by what Hannah Arendt considered to be the conceptual fuel of a ‘banality of evil’: thoughtlessness (Arendt 1965, 287). In this historical moment, communicative background assumptions necessitate attention; they guide foreground action. Of course, both background and foreground are important. However, the temporal energy that directs a communicative agent comes from communicative background
and focuses the clarity of responsiveness. Modernity assumes that processes and methods of objectivity give rise to pristine Truth. For Arendt, during modernity the emphasis on pristine Truth occurred alongside the diminishing importance of traditions and background, in which traditions wore ‘thinner and thinner [until their threads]…finally broke.’ (1954/2006, 14). The emphasis on communicative background, on the other hand, demands attentive regard for ‘tainted ground’ that impacts on the communicators, both those present and those not at the table of conversation (Arnett 2008).

Tying dialogue to the notion of the civic moves conversation to the public sphere. Arendt’s conception of the ‘public domain’ assists the conversation; she understood the public domain as a dwelling for a ‘multiplicity of opinions’ that, additionally, includes ‘interspaces’ between ideas and persons (Arendt 1968, 31; Arendt 1977). Arendt’s view of the public domain naturally shifts the discussion from a singular telling about one public to a discourse that stumbles towards a multiplicity of opinions in what we can term a civic dialogue. Modernity, propelled by a ‘secular trinity of efficiency, individual autonomy, and progress,’ protects and promotes a singular supreme good, the universal (Arnett 2013, 4). This supreme good may be seen in the notion of ‘the One’, a pervasive concept that can be traced back to Thales (c. 625–547 B.C.), whom Aristotle (c. 384–322 B.C.) considered to be the founder of philosophy. The notion of ‘the One,’ correlated with the notion of civic dialogue, presupposes the reality of a single truth that subsumes all other truths, burying the local under the edifice of the universal.

The conception of ‘the One’ assumes that all things have one origin and one underlying nature. Thales offers a picture of the One as water. Water takes multiple forms, but it is the essence of water that unites, offering the One. The stress on the One continues with Anaximander (c. 610–546 B.C.), who offers us a view of the One as the place of origin that we cannot see or touch. Anaximander details a space before the concrete, the ‘boundless,’ which is akin to what we might term the infinite. The boundless is the place of origin for Anaximander (Melchert 2007, 11–14).

The pursuit of the One does not die with the early Greeks; it continues to define the West. In fact, it is central to the very identity of the West. The idea of the One has numerous tributaries, or what might better be termed humanly constructed canals. One witnesses throughout history the struggle for the One from clan to nation state to monotheism. The pursuit of a singular god, a singular direction for social and economic development, and the modern expression of individualism are examples of this pursuit of one unifying truth that is presumed to serve humanity. In each case, the larger communicative environment goes unattended.
I now turn to Ferguson’s *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. My rationale for including Ferguson is twofold. First, he models conjectural history, which I contend is both dialogic and riddled with bias. I suggest that Ferguson’s conversation is not possible without the specific historical circumstances of the local soil and the unique historical moment that is termed the Scottish Enlightenment. Second, the implications of his work suggest the vitality of the old, the primitive, and the barbaric; he turns toward an energetic heart of conviction. Throughout his book, Ferguson presents the acts of what he calls a ‘primitive nation,’ with America as the prime example. Then he moves to detail what he called a ‘polished nation,’ only to loop back dialectically to retrieve the values of the primitive nation that yield the reason for sacrifice in protecting convictions, relations, and locality. I do not defend Ferguson’s language; however, his position on the rude, the primitive, and the passionate are central themes in his essay on civil society and return this conversation to the ground of monologic conviction and a form of civic dialogue that resonates with the local, as suggested by Ferguson’s essay.

**Ferguson’s Continual Return**

To place in context the importance of Adam Ferguson’s *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, I situate the historical moment and the life of the author and then turn to his *Essay*. Ferguson’s contribution cannot be separated from his responsive engagement with his historical circumstances. The Cambridge 1995 edition of this classic volume begins with an important sketch of the author’s life. Ferguson was born on the border between the Scottish lowlands and highlands in 1723. His father was a Presbyterian minister. The lowlands had closer ties to England; the highlands were noted for their fierce loyalty to Scotland, worship in the Catholic Church, and a well-defined clan structure (Minahan 2003, 1687–1689). Ferguson, from the time of his youth, encountered Gaelic-speaking clansmen of the north who met existence with a frontier spirit, while the more refined lowlanders aligned more with England and emerging commercialisation.

Ferguson, as a student, was immersed in ancient texts; he had exceptional skill in Greek and Latin. He attended the University of St. Andrews at the age of sixteen. Upon completing his degree, Ferguson headed to the University of Edinburgh, which was also attended by other future clergy and contributors to the Scottish Enlightenment, such as Hugh Blair (minister and professor, 1718–1800), John Home (minister and playwright, 1722–1808), and William Robertson (minister and eventual principal of the University of Edinburgh, 1721–1793). In the 1740s,
Edinburgh was at a crossroads. It was a place of tension that debated contrasting conceptions of political and national identity. Only sixteen years prior to the birth of Ferguson, in 1707, Scotland joined England in the Union of Parliaments (Oz-Salzberger 1965, vii). From 1707 on, there was no Edinburgh Parliament; this action eclipsed Scottish independence. This political decision was made possible by the 1701 Act of Settlement, which exempted any Roman Catholic from succession to the throne.\(^6\) Scotland and England had shared the same monarch since 1603.\(^7\)

The tension between the lowlands and the highlands continued over issues of political identity. The highlands supported the last of the Catholic monarchies, the Stuarts. The political wing of this support rested within Jacobitism, a political movement that sought to place a Catholic Stuart on the Scottish throne. The last Catholic King was James II, deposed in 1688. The Jacobite movement founded its name on the Latin for James, Jacobus (Black 1993, 11). This struggle continued and was at its peak in the mid-1740s. In 1745, Prince Charles Edward Stuart came from France and attempted an armed rebellion. His campaign failed miserably due to the fact that many in the lowlands had much to lose; their futures were now tied to an ongoing relationship between England and Scotland. Even some of the highlanders were ambivalent and were clearly not well organised in their military opposition to England. The Union of the Crowns in 1603, the Act of 1701, and the collective parliament of 1707 had placed in motion a movement within history that seemed unstoppable, particularly as Scots found increasing economic benefits tied to England (Panton 2011, 485–86). The events of the 1745 rebellion found increasing life in the fictional ‘nostalgic narrations’ of Sir Walter Scott, with others connected to Enlightenment thinking as examples of universal themes of advancement within the human condition (Ol-Salzberger 1965, ix). Yet this sentiment of Enlightenment progress did not totally dominate the Scottish landscape; even the best Enlightenment minds were ‘haunted’ by a ‘particular cultural sensitivity’ that laws, agreements, and Acts between Scotland and England could not eradicate (Ol-Salzberger 1965, ix). The notion of ‘sentiment’ was a central action metaphor in the Scottish Enlightenment, witnessed in the importance of

\(^6\) The Stuart dynasty came to the throne after the Tudor Elizabeth I. The first Stuart King, James I, ruled from 1603 to 1625, and the last, Charles I, reigned from 1625 until 1649. The Stuarts supported Catholicism, engendering strong resistance to ‘the designs of Stuart kings’ that resulted in a rebellion that began in 1640 and ended with the execution of Charles I in 1649. John Barber, *Modern European History* New York: Harper Collins, 2011, 11.

\(^7\) In the early morning of March 24th, 1603, Queen Elizabeth I of England died. Following her death, James VI, King of Scotland, was proclaimed King James I of England, resulting in a union of crowns on March 31st, 1603. See Jenny Wormald, ‘O Brave New World? The Union of England and Scotland in 1603,’ in *Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900*, T. C. Smout (ed.) (2005) New York: Oxford University Press, 14.
their attachment to local soil and Scottish traditions. Ferguson’s initial steps into professional life kept him exceptionally familiar with the power of sentiment.

Concluding his education in 1745 (the year of the rebellion), Ferguson was quickly ordained, which led to his appointment as chaplain of the highland regiment, the Black Watch, who aligned with the British and fought the French at the battle of Fontenoy in Flanders. There is debate as to whether or not Ferguson was actually at this battle, but the sentiment of his appreciation for the military and his recognition of where the future of Scotland rested is registered in the stories of his military escapades. Ferguson remained in the military for nine years; without question, he understood ‘military valour as a cornerstone of civic virtue’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, x). Additionally, his knowledge of ancient Greek life placed him in greater agreement with Sparta than with Athens.

After Ferguson resigned his post, he remained on the continent for more than a year. Ferguson considered the Saxon nobility ‘pompous’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, x). He returned to Scotland in 1746. He then became friends with David Hume and Adam Smith and understood their Scottish Enlightenment thinking as being distinctive from that of France. However, Ferguson dismissed some of the lowlander criticism of Hume and Smith and contended that the highlanders had a sentiment that could not and should not be obliterated — they brought something important to the world that was being ignored. Even though Ferguson’s essay on civic society addresses the limits of clan structure, ‘[his] experience began to suggest that the rude clans had effectively preserved values which modern society had, to its detriment, lost’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xi). Ferguson was one of the few who defended the play Douglas, which was written by John Home in 1757. The play was considered provincial primitivism; critics offered open statements that the drama fell eternally

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8 The Battle of Fontenoy (May 11th, 1745) was a battle fought in Flanders during the War of Austrian Succession. The Franco-Irish brigade won a notable victory over the British and Dutch such that the battle has been celebrated historically for its success. The role of the Irish Brigade ‘has been regarded as the greatest of Irish battle honours.’ See Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds.) (1997), A Military History of Ireland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 299.

9 The term ‘Saxon’ describes Germanic peoples in ancient times who migrated extensively through northern Germany and Britain. The term Saxony was particularly used as a name for the north of Germany. The Saxons are thought to have originated in the area of the modern Schleswig-Holstein as far as the Rivers Warnow and Elbe and on the Baltic coast. They were eventually absorbed into the Frankish Empire under the policies of Charlemagne. D. H. Green, Introduction to The Continental Saxons from the Migration Period to the Tenth Century, Dennis Howard Green and Frank Siegmund (eds.) (2003), Martlesham, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1–12; J. H. Hines, ‘The Conversion of the Old Saxons,) Ibid., 299.
short of a Shakespearean production. Ferguson, on the other hand, stated that too many in Scotland worked from an inferiority complex, when, ironically, Scotland was one of the best-educated countries in Europe. Ferguson went further with this local sentiment in his defence of James McPherson, who asserted that he was the discoverer and translator of the poetry of a ‘mythical Celtic bard, Ossian’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xi). McPherson’s work was later termed fraudulent.

Ferguson’s sentiment for the local soil was present in his insistence that Scotland have its own military. However, after the 1745 rebellion, this possibility was no longer considered feasible from the perspective of England. There was too much suspicion that Jacobitism lay dormant, waiting to rise once again. Ferguson continued to pursue the importance of a Scottish military. He founded the ‘Poker Club’ in 1762, which pushed the military question that he framed in Reflections Previous in the Establishment of a Militia (1756), which connected military service to public civil commitments. Ferguson, unlike Hume and Smith, did not accept that ‘economic progress, social refinement, and a well-balanced constitution’ could substitute for ‘virtuous citizen soldiers’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xiv). Ferguson refused to ignore the creative importance of local conviction. He was considered by some to be the most Machiavellian of the Scottish thinkers (Pocock 1975, 498–501). Marco Geuna contends that, although Ferguson was described by George Davie and John Pocock as having Machiavellian tendencies due to ‘conceptual distinctions typical of natural jurisprudence’ (as seen in his political pamphlets), his thought belongs to ‘the republican tradition’ (Geuna 2002, 181). His perspective was not that of science, but of the protection of the civic centre of power and influence. He was practically and philosophically indebted to the classical republicanism of Rome and Cicero. In his own historical moment, Ferguson used the language of Andrew Fletcher, who

10 Rab Houston stated in his analysis of Scottish literacy (which covers 1630–1760) that Scotland could claim to be one of the best educated countries at the time among its contemporaries, probably on a par with Holland and northern England. The literacy rate was notably high among landowners and professional men and in urban areas. Rab Houston, ‘The Literacy Myth? Illiteracy in Scotland, 1630–1760,’ in Graff, H.J. (ed.) (2007) Literacy and Historical Development: A Reader, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 183–204.

11 James MacPherson (1736–1796) was thought to have discovered and translated the poetry of Ossian, although it was later shown that the poems were MacPherson’s compositions. The poetry caught the ‘imagination of all of Europe.’ MacLean, Charles, and Sykes, Christopher Symon, (1992) Scottish Country, New York: Clarkson Potter. 93.

12 Andrew Fletcher (1653–1716) of Saltoun is credited with leading ‘Scottish political debate in the 1690s, just as the crisis which was to culminate in the union broke upon the country.’ He is described as a ‘militant republican’ who alarmed his countrymen and garnered their respect by his ‘passionate intelligence for Scotland’s predicament.’ Robertson, John, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition,’ in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (eds.) (1983) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 141–43.
fought tirelessly against the Union of the Parliaments in 1707. Ferguson was not opposed to the union, but he also appreciated the language of civic duty that was connected to local soil. Ferguson had an affinity with the Stoics and with Sparta. He was drawn to their austerity and discipline. Ferguson’s Essay was applauded by many, including Voltaire, and was used in universities throughout the world. Hume, a significant friend of Ferguson, on the other hand, disapproved of the manuscript; perhaps considering Ferguson’s thinking ‘too ‘Scottish’ both in spirit and terminology’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xvii). Ferguson’s Essay was a form of dissent that moved away from the scientific spirit of Hume and Smith. He wanted to reclaim the republican tradition of local civic life.

Unlike his Scottish Enlightenment thinker contemporaries, Ferguson contended that developing countries were consistently in ‘clear and near danger of retreating into barbarian despotism’; Ferguson was not a blind and unbashful proponent of progress — his position was indeterminate (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xx). Ferguson contended that changes and shifts could occur at any moment. His conception of civic life and history resisted the mantra of the inevitable march toward progress. Ferguson had little appreciation for ‘historical determinism.’ Life and historical directions change quickly, requiring citizens to be ever vigilant — one cannot assume uninterrupted success. He recognised that the emerging emphasis on division of labour had both benefits and liabilities and understood its development within commerce. However, he did not want to separate the roles of the citizen and the military; such a division of labour puts at risk the performative heart and soul of a people. Ferguson was enamored with the importance of ‘responsible amateurs’ in all aspects of civic life (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xxii).

Ferguson supported a modern economy as long as classical republicanism was grounded in everyday civic life. He understood the importance of small groups, working in responsive engagement with, and for, a larger common good. In the Essay, Ferguson’s engagement of conjectural history acts as a hermeneutic orientation that guides his discussion of civic society. The term is now primarily associated with Ferguson, who brought a populist sentiment to his conception of civic life. Ferguson included all people, with his appreciation resting most prominently on those who produce labour and effort to assist the common good. He understood the emerging reliance on a division of labour, which he embraced with considerable

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13 Some scholars cite Ferguson as having a populist sentiment, but Iain McDaniel (2013, 40) says: ‘Ferguson feared that the politics of the 1760s disguised an underlying tendency toward a centralised, but populist, model of commercial monarchy. From this perspective, Ferguson attached the dangerous ‘Athenian’ combination of commerce, empire, and the democratic politics of Britain, which he may have associated with the populist vision of patriotic monarchy set out in Lord Bolingbroke’s Patriot King.’
scepticism. ‘As Karl Marx was quick to note, Ferguson (along with Adam Smith) was also one of the first authors to recognise the benefits and dangers of the division of labour’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xxi). Ferguson met the world before him, recognising its existential importance without falling victim to claims masked under the guise of progress.

Ferguson’s writing style was considered to be Scottish, moral, and reflective of the stoic image of a ‘Scottish Cato’ (Oz-Salzberger 1965, xxiv). He did not write from a pillar of objectivity, but from a passionate commitment to a classical republican world of civic life that was demanded of a citizen. I understand An Essay on the History of Civic Society as an explication of change that does not ignore the monologic narratives that historically guided the Scottish people in their participation in a commercial society. Ferguson considered the monologic ground of the local as the substance that offered a corrective to commercialisation.

**The Essay**

Ferguson (1965) distinguishes his project from that of a natural historian. He openly details the importance of conjectural history. Progress and the goal of improvement are reset as he describes the move from animal instincts to an increasing commitment to sociality; the doing of conjectural history permits one to enter into conversation about such change and social movements — engaging history from a stance of considered implications for future developments and concerns. Ferguson’s conception of conjectural history presupposed that the aspirations of a people/society are only possible when one seeks to meet and understand current conditions and abides by a standard of evaluation beyond one’s immediate impulses, which he ties to what he termed the common good. Ferguson suggests that the clan clings and fights together, but the modern commercial person has little of such loyalty, resulting in a ‘solitary’ and ‘detached’ person (Ibid, 24). Ferguson reminds the reader of the vitality within places and persons of conviction. The unity of persons in society often emerges as a byproduct of a response to hostility from an outside force, or from a loyalty to local soil. He wants to lessen the limits of the clan and simultaneously acknowledge the importance of loyalty in sociality.

There is the possibility of genius in persons and nations. However, as one makes such an evaluation, one must consider the ‘fortune’ within which another functions before offering that person undue ‘respect.’ One must attend to the circumstances in which thought transpires and for genuine creativity to occur, one must understand and assemble the ‘particulars’ before rendering judgment (Ferguson 1965, 30–31). For Ferguson (1965), judgment of another’s exertion and personal effort is often a better indicator than success that is propelled by fortunate circumstances; one cannot confuse the good work of another with good fortune at a given moment.
[In] the admired precincts of a court, where we may learn to smile without being pleased, to caress without affection, to wound with the secret weapons of envy and jealousy, and to rest our personal importance on circumstances which we cannot always with honour command? No: but in a situation where the great sentiments of the heart are awakened; where the characters of men, not their situations and fortunes, are the principal distinction; where the anxieties of interest, or vanity, perish in the blaze of more vigorous emotions; and where the human soul....[cannot] leave its talents and its force unemployed. (Ibid, 42–43)

Danger comes to civic life when one sells one’s freedom for career or political advancement that results in the sociality of a smile that actually masks the practice of meanness of heart. Happiness that is propelled by ‘animal instincts’ alone seeks immediate gratification. Yet, the construction of anything worthwhile requires considerable time and effort. In building, one finds happiness, which seems to arise more from ‘pursuit’ than from ‘repose’ (Ibid, 46–47). Additionally, happiness derives from a community, as one practices living together with a suppressed pettiness towards the other. Jealousy and envy put communities at risk. The Greeks and Romans privileged the public over the individual, requiring one to find a sense of happiness within the public domain (Ibid, 57). Ferguson, like the Greeks and Romans, did not equate creativity and public happiness with individual amusement and lack of demand; happiness emerges from toil that pursues the public good and the enrichment of the community. His vision of community includes the Spartan legislator, who never shied away from the interplay of loyalty and ‘dissent’ (Ibid, 57).

The good rests in what is best for the public and the community, not in or for an individual self. For Ferguson, the ideal legislator does not rise from the ‘multitudes’ or function as a ‘tyrant,’ but rather advances as a citizen who speaks with candour in the hope of assisting the good of ‘his fellow creatures’ (Ibid, 73).

Ferguson (1965) contended that one had to understand past nations and people in order to comprehend the significance of the present. The value of fables and stories about the past, as well as the insights of historians such as Thucydides, is their framing of events capable of illuminating one’s own era. In his contemporary moment of the mid-eighteenth century, Ferguson referred to America as a ‘rude’ territory where ‘fortitude’ did not equate with meeting the enemy face to face in battle. It was a place where engaging in acts of trickery and abuse met with success (Ibid, 73). He did not conceive of these acts as civilised, but cautioned his readers that such actions are ignored at one’s own peril; such behaviour emanates from such a people’s passion and energy. Ferguson discussed how rude nations have little disparity in rank; their warriors are willing to die rather than to be captured. Their property is protected in a web of relations and friendship, not by the abstraction of public law. Ferguson asserted that rude nations are governed more by sentiment.
than abstract logic. Ferguson suggested that civilised nations require a shore with water and natural boundaries; mountain ranges protect them from invasion. Additionally, a civil society can flourish in severe climates and with adversaries who mandate engagement and creative adaptation. Adversity sustains passion and creativity from necessity.

The passion of what he termed a barbarian is directed by, or ‘subordinated’ to the community. Following the stress on passion, the origin of a civil society cannot rest with the power of a single person; such influence emerges from agreements generated by, and negotiated between and among those who coordinate public life together. A civil society cannot rest with the power of one; a public commitment requires a unified, pragmatic desire to cooperate for mutual gain. Yet, it is ironical that civil groups are, at times, defended by the passion of a single person who is willing to sacrifice for the communal good. Ferguson asserted that people have a greater or lesser interest in the affairs of the State, depending on their ‘proportion’ of involvement and their ‘share’ in the direction of a government, which nourishes the development of a civil society and its charge to protect both the self and the other. Rude nations work in small bands to preserve one another. As population and wealth increase, concern for the individual begins to triumph. If we forget our obligation to one another, we ‘cut off the roots’ that extend the likelihood of collective prosperity (Ibid, 141). Rude nations define themselves by war. A civil society, on the other hand, must prepare for war without ignoring the safety of its neighbours, which lessens the likelihood of war. The interests of a people reasonably require concern for its neighbours (Ibid, 149). Ferguson framed a pragmatic rationale that testifies to a pragmatic concern for the other; the safety of the other ultimately ensures one’s own safety. At the same time, one must be willing to struggle if the expansive interests of another threaten one’s own sovereignty.

With the reality of constant war, one puts at risk the long term interests of a people and a nation; short term successes hasten decline (Ferguson 1965, 148). The power of civic liberty rests with transparency and is diametrically opposed to secrets that curtail long-term interests. Ferguson’s conception of the history of the arts has a similar concern for the neighbour and a desire to limit the secrets between the self and the other as one attends to the generations of civilisations, not simply to one’s own. Ferguson (1965, 171) stated that the Romans were able to listen to the insights of the Greeks because they were open to future implications, not just to the commemoration of antiquity. Creativity builds upon that which we know, permitting us to continue the conversation in multiple ways. Creativity, literature, and art emerge from the inspiration that arises from an active life with others and with nature and in response to previous writings that reflect the sentiment of another people that must be met with ‘fortitude and public affection’. 
With increasing reliance upon commercial exchange, one finds productive skills with the land and animals giving way to those that produce and consume commercial goods. Ferguson (1965, 175) stated that if one engages in inappropriate nostalgic reflections, one will dismiss those who are more ‘idle’ and apparently less ‘busy’. One cannot confuse the constant frenzy of activity with communal health. Unrestrained commercial striving separates persons from one another, moving people far from the impulses of a rude nation, where one still knows the genuine value of a friend and one embraces zeal in one’s heart for the ‘public interest’ (Ibid, 178). In what Ferguson called rude states, there is a singular pursuit of the public interest. However, in what he termed ‘civilised’ states, there are increasing numbers of diverse concentrations. The stress on individuality without shared sacrifice in a ‘civilised’ country invites weakness within a heart. It is the infusion of love for the neighbour and the ‘ferocity of spirit’ for the common good that brings health to a community; romantic visions that assert politeness and manners constitute a fable that cannot actually protect a people (Ibid, 192). Fables about individual interest alone accompany the decline of nations. An individual focus invites ‘the sources of internal decay, and the ruinous corruptions to which nations are liable, in the supposed condition of accomplished civility’ (Ibid, 199).

Participation in the public development of a place and of a people is essential if one seeks to encourage sentiment that is attentive to local public interests. Ferguson (1965, 213) called for institutions that generated courage through the fortitude of the mind and a commitment to national good. He contended that such characteristics ‘can never tend to national ruin’. Nations cannot live by reason and individual concern alone. At times, sacrifice is demanded for the public interest.

The public key to communal strength is a commitment to public interest and a courage that dissuades one from becoming lost in commercial interests alone. Returns on foreign involvement should contribute to the public interest and not weaken a given people; otherwise, they lead to ‘national ruin’ (Ferguson 1965, 223). Courage tied to public interest requires resistance to war, unless such action is the last option available for the protection of public interests.

Additionally, political corruption diminishes the scope of the public domain when one asserts that only those who contribute directly to commercial success are valuable contributors. Such a perspective misses the vital importance of music, art, and leisure in the formation of a healthy public domain. Corruption also emerges in milieus of extreme ‘luxury’ (Ferguson 1965, 235). Luxury becomes yet another form of monarchical subordination that can weaken democracies, lessening the emphasis on personal qualities. Ferguson states that sloth, unchecked pleasure, and abundant leisure lead to communal decline and also to personal disappointment. For ‘polished nations,’ commercialism ultimately leads to a return to ‘despotism’.
Ferguson ends by stating that nations fall into ruin when ‘internal vice’ is greater than the fortitude of persons (Ibid, 257). Civic society requires sacrifice for the greater good, for the public interest, understood within a public domain that is composed of differing perspectives and opinions.

**Implications for Civic Dialogue**

I conclude with the implications of Ferguson’s project for civic dialogue and thereby the inclusion of monologue as the narrative ground that shapes one’s identity. For clarity, I will enumerate five points from Ferguson, connecting each to research on dialogue.

1. **Public.** Ferguson framed a conception of the public that embraced the vitality of disagreement and dissent. His perspective was akin to Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the public domain: as a dwelling composed of multiple opinions with ‘interspaces’ of distance that maintain the integrity of ideas and persons (Arendt 1958, 31).

2. **Public Interest.** Ferguson stressed the common good and the dangers of rampant individualism and commercialism. His view of the public interest is akin to Martin Buber’s (1958) definition of community that is nourished by a common centre, not simply by relational ties. Emmanuel Levinas (1982, 85) stated that one must care for another without attending to the colour of his or her eyes. Something more penultimate than likeability and friendship must drive an ethic of public interest. Ferguson’s conception of the public interest included a common centre that does not require uniform agreement; dissent matters in acts of concern for others. It is a view that goes against the pursuit of individualism that is so evident in our modern society.

3. **Limits of Commercial Life.** Ferguson understood the growing significance of commercial exchange. He emphasised, however, that only at one’s own peril does one forget the world of persons, loyalties, and local soil. Such goods cannot be eclipsed through social advocacy that highlights only individual progress and success while eclipsing the thought that a community is actually worthy of sacrifice. A community of solitary commercial success moves life in a horizontal direction, missing the vertical depth of family and friends. Not all communities are worthy of support, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer stated: “The sooner this shock of disillusionment comes to an individual and to a community the better for both…Sooner or later it [a community not worth supporting] will collapse’ (1954, 27). Sacrifice and concern for the community emerges from local soil and known persons, but when a community is torn
asunder by commercial greed, support must naturally cease.

4. **A Call for a Citizen-Military.** Ferguson worried that a professional army would lose two important features: first, the performative characteristics of shared sacrifice and, second, the communal sentiment that arises from common suffering that can challenge unneeded military ventures. Hannah Arendt’s classic contention is that ‘thoughtlessness’ is consistent with Ferguson’s argument. Arendt, in *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, argued repeatedly that thoughtless engagement with existence culminates in a banality of evil: ‘He [Eichmann] was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness — something by no means identical with stupidity … This ‘banal’ … Seemingly more complicated … than examining the strange interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil, is the question of what kind of crime is actually involved here — a crime, moreover, which all agree is unprecedented’ (1965, 288). Ferguson called for military participation as a direct counter to thoughtlessness. People die in war. Families must hold governments accountable for decisions that result in military ventures. The risks are personal, keeping the thoughtful critique of governmental action at the forefront of discussion. The reality of family and friends under the threat of war and death can shift one’s critical assessment of military engagement. A critical consciousness often emerges when there is something we consider worthy of our sacrifice. Ferguson demanded a citizen-military that is naturally attentive to sacrifices called forth by the state. He wanted reflective deliberation on all demands from the state. A professional military can de-privilege a critical consciousness that questions the need for such sacrifice when the risk is assumed by a distant and unknown other. Ferguson called for a citizen military in order to hold the government accountable.

5. **Limits of a Smile.** Ferguson was enamoured with the ‘rude’ as a tempering factor for the ‘civilised.’ He lamented the smile that cloaks an evil heart. The veneer of manners can lead to unexpected social damage. The problematic nature of such a person is considered in *Dialogic Education* with a critique of the ‘managed smile’ (Arnett 1992). Ferguson might suggest that we follow the performative actions of others, not their efforts at self-presentation.

The Scottish Enlightenment finds its most tenacious spokesperson for the local and the provincial in the voice of Adam Ferguson. Civic dialogue is not abstract, but is fundamental to the people in a real town, city, or in the countryside. Such dialogue walks within the sentiments of a given people; their convictions matter — the monologic character of their lives matters. Civic dialogue understands the
importance of monologic conviction. We must seek to learn about one another; such initial knowledge invites a communicative environment where change and reconsideration are possible.

Monologue does not clench truth in its fist, but it houses sentiment that shapes our identity and demands attention from another. Civic dialogue begins with a respectful honouring of what matters to another. Ferguson points to six dialogic reminders that have implications for understanding monologue as the creative fulcrum of dialogic invitation. First, Ferguson recognises the performativity of the public domain, which involves one’s own opinion and that of contrasting voices. Multiple opinions, as understood by Arendt, constitute the public domain. Opinions of conviction are monologic markers that must be taken seriously via understanding, not necessarily via agreement. Second, Ferguson suggests that the public domain requires that we work with those whom we do not like, acknowledging a public common centre that is larger than oneself. Civic dialogue requires an understanding of the monologic ground of conviction that matters to another, whether or not we like a given person. Understanding must trump affinity. Third, commercial life necessitates supporting, within the public domain, art, music, and literature as elements of a tempering communal hope. Annette Holba’s recent books on leisure explicate this position well (Holba 2007; 2013). Ferguson and Holba suggest the pragmatic importance of the arts in sustaining the human spirit and keeping the hope of civic dialogue viable. Fourth, Ferguson’s call for committed amateurs extends well beyond the military complex, reminding us that the division of labour offers efficiency at a high price. The differentiation of roles in professional life is akin to an industrial era foreman (Ginsberg 2011). Fifth, Ferguson’s suggestion that smiling that is tied to self-presentation cannot be confused with the spontaneous welcome of good will, and the delight of discovery, suggests that civic dialogue begins not with nice people, but with people willing to learn about what matters to the other. Finally, Ferguson suggested that there is a creative power associated with the rude, the raw, and the unsophisticated person who cares about the importance of friendship and others and is willing to sacrifice for them.

Civic dialogue demands that we understand what matters to another. Respecting persons of conviction can bind us together, even during times of dispute. If you have ever known such a person, you understand Ferguson’s cry to honour the values of the highlands. In his historical moment, Ferguson understood the importance of such commitments to the soul of a Scot, which were and are a necessary tempering of a commercial society. In a commercial society, where the depth of friendship and family wanes and one is suddenly awaked in a stupor, a state between sleep and wakefulness, one is seemingly invaded by an existential question, ‘Is this all there is?’ The answer for Ferguson was ‘no.’ When civic dialogue embraces a depth of
conviction, persons and practices matter; from a monologic home of conviction, one finds a ‘why’ for service to the public domain that trumps the modern mantra of commercial and individual success alone. People and human faces matter. Success that pivots away from the depth of human commitments moves communities into decline and individual life into commercial despair. Ferguson’s role was to offer heart to a commercial world void of commitments that keep meaning at the centre of the human condition. Civic dialogue begins with acknowledgment of the monologic conviction of another. Dialogue commences with what matters to one another.
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Involving Disadvantaged People in Dialogue: Arguments and Examples from Mental Health Care

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This paper examines the theoretical and practical basis for engaging in dialogue with very disadvantaged people. Using a selective literature review, conceptual analysis, and clinical examples, we explore the reasonable limits of dialogue with disadvantaged populations in order to better understand dialogue, as well as to explore ways to effectively involve disadvantaged people in dialogue. Although people with serious mental illness represent only one very disadvantaged population, we suggest that examining dialogue with this population can serve as a test case for dialogue with disadvantaged people more generally. A recovery-oriented approach can support dialogue processes with people who have mental illness, as their recovery may require, or at least benefit from, dialogue. The inclusion of two clinical scenarios serves to highlight differences in clinical and personal recovery outcomes when dialogue is and is not present in mental health care. Furthermore, although it is not required from a standard principles-based bioethical approach, involving people with mental health issues in dialogue can complement a standard bioethics approach, through dialogical bioethics. A dialogical approach goes beyond the standard principles of bioethics by means of a process that allows relevant bioethical principles to be prioritised, based in part on the person’s informed choice. Overall, our findings suggest that involving very disadvantaged people in dialogue – in this case, people with serious mental illness – is not only possible, it is plausible and can be constructive in relation to a variety of dialogical aims that range from informing to supporting to decision-making processes.

Key words: dialogue, disadvantage/discrimination, ethics, mental health care/recovery, serious mental illness, stigma

Introduction

Dialogue is an elusive notion and a complex phenomenon. It is required for the accomplishment of a variety of outcomes, yet it is difficult to achieve. Indeed,
human history suggests that dialogue, particularly sustained dialogue, is the exception rather than the rule in social interaction. In terms of resolving differences, it seems that people have usually, at best, engaged in compromise and, at worst, in combat, yet it neither is, nor does it include, much dialogue. So what is dialogue?

For the purposes of this paper, the characterisation of dialogue that we will illustrate aligns with this journal’s definition of it as: “meaningful interaction and exchange between people (often of different social, cultural, political, religious or professional groups) who come together through various kinds of conversations or activities with a view to increased understanding” (Journal of Dialogue Studies, 2013). This characterisation refers to an end (increased understanding) and means (meaningful interaction and exchange, coming together, and conversations or activities), and agents or parties (people), the relationship between which illustrates the complexity of dialogue, as it involves the interaction of various agents and processes.

Dialogue is sometimes assumed to occur among equals, at least in principle. That is, even if some participants (agents, i.e., reasoning individuals, or parties, reasoning groups of individuals) are not on a par with each other at the moment – for example, with regards to the political power to influence the dialogue or the emotional ability to participate in dialogue – there is sometimes an expectation that they can, and perhaps even will, be on a par in the foreseeable future. This expectation can sometimes allow the dialogue to proceed. As, more importantly, dialogue assumes or requires collaboration or cooperation among the participants, at least in relation to the aim that the dialogue is expected to advance (Sennett 2012 p. 275). These assumptions may not hold when people who are very disadvantaged – socially and/or otherwise, to the extent that some of their basic needs such as food and shelter may not be met without considerable support – are called to participate in dialogue, as they may never be on a par with the other participants. Consequently, disadvantaged participants and/or the other participants may not be collaborative or cooperate with each other, due to significant power differentials, stigma, and/or other factors.

This paper examines the theory and practice of engaging in dialogue with very disadvantaged people, in order to explore the plausible limits of dialogue and thus to better understand dialogue generally, as well as to explore ways to more effectively involve very disadvantaged people in dialogue in order to uphold their rights as much as possible. Our inquiry – particularly in relation to dialogical bioethics (Author 2002, Author 2007) – is informed by argumentation theory/informal logic, which has addressed dialogue in detail (Walton 1998), among other relevant theories; argumentation theory/informal logic describes, analyses and suggests various communication strategies, both empirically and normatively (Ibid). We use a selective literature review with conceptual analysis, which can be
viewed as addressing the internal consistency of relevant concepts, i.e., to examine whether or not they are significantly self-contradictory, and the coherence between them, i.e., to examine whether they do not contradict each other (Yehezkel 2005). We also use clinical illustration, i.e., hypothetically relevant but reality grounded examples from mental health care, based on our knowledge of the clinical literature and our practical experiences in Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel. Such illustration cannot be confirmatory, and may even be viewed by some as being biased, considering that it serves the purpose of highlighting our arguments, but it is suggestive and provides concrete – hence useful – grounding for arguments that may be fairly abstract and therefore sometimes difficult to grasp. People with mental health challenges, particularly with serious mental illness(es), such as schizophrenia, are often very disadvantaged, sometimes due to severe and persistent impairments, such as significant cognitive (memory and other) deficits (Hoertnagl and Hofer 2014; Lin, Reniers and Wood 2013), and sometimes due to discrimination against them (Arboleda-Florez and Sartorious 2008). Dialogue with people with serious mental illness can thus serve as a test case for dialogue with disadvantaged people more generally. Furthermore, people with mental health challenges are very disadvantaged, not only as individuals but also as a group, due to the considerable stigma they collectively still suffer in most societies. Dialogue with people who have mental illness can thus address dialogue with individuals as well as with groups (or representatives of those groups).

**Serious Mental Illness and Recovery**

Mental health challenges, similarly to other health challenges, consist of impairments, disabilities, and disruption in participation in various environments, the latter previously being considered to be handicaps (World Health Organisation 2001). Relevant impairments include depression, psychosis and more. Relevant disabilities may include a lack of sufficient work skills, social skills and more. Relevant disruption in participation includes unemployment, social isolation and more. Impairment is necessary but is insufficient for disability, and disability is necessary but is insufficient for disrupted participation. Other factors in addition to impairment lead to disability, primarily personal factors such as personal history and coping, and other factors in addition to disability lead to disrupted participation, primarily environmental factors such as negative societal attitudes towards the disabled person and opportunities (or rather lack of them) to succeed in spite of a disability. In relation to serious mental illness, which primarily refers to schizophrenia and major mood disorders (major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder), impairments are typically moderate to severe, such as major depression, mania and psychosis; disability is considerable, for instance, poor hygiene and deficient social interaction; and disrupted participation are often the case, such as persistent or recurrent unemployment and social isolation. An additional factor
that may impede participation is a reaction to internalised stigma, as opposed to public or environmental stigma, which are referred to as the ‘why try’ effect (Corrigan, Larson and Rüsch 2009). Internalised stigma include an awareness of public stereotypes, agreeing with them, and subsequently applying them to oneself.

It is sometimes considered difficult, if not impossible, for people with serious mental illness, such as schizophrenia, to fully or even partially participate in dialogue, both in general and, more specifically, in relation to their mental (and other) health care. This is because they often have persistent cognitive and other mental impairments that make it difficult for them to clearly experience, process and express what is relevant to the dialogue at hand. It is also because they have sometimes had inadequate or unsuccessful experience with dialogue, due to a lack of sufficient social skills, of social isolation, discrimination, or self-stigma. Yet people with serious mental illness are provided with mental and other health care that requires their input and, often, their decisions, which presumably involve dialogue. How can such dialogue occur with them, if it can at all?

A fairly recent development in mental health care is support for the recovery of people with serious and other mental illness. Recovery means different things to different people (Author 2012a), possibly so much so that there is a risk that the notion of recovery may be deemed meaningless (Roe, Rudnick and Gill 2007). Recently, however, two general and distinct, yet arguably complementary, notions of such recovery have been discussed: recovery as a set of outcomes, which is also termed clinical recovery; and recovery as a set of processes, which is also termed personal recovery (Slade 2009). Clinical recovery relates to outcomes such as alleviated symptoms, more independent functioning and an improved quality of life. Personal recovery relates to processes such as finding personal meaning in life and getting and keeping valued social roles. Personal recovery arguably involves interaction, including communication, primarily with the social environment (Author 2008) – as well as interaction, i.e., (psychological) processing, within the recovering person (Roe, Chopra and Rudnick 2004). Recovery may thus require, or at least benefit from, dialogue between the recovering person and people who can contribute to his or her recovery. Indeed, person-centred care for people with serious mental illness assumes such dialogue across its various components (Rudnick and Roe 2011), and although there is not yet full consensus on it (O’Reilly 2011), it is emerging as best practice in mental health care (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2011). It is also grounded in the more general and widely accepted bioethics principle of respect for persons, which guides contemporary health care (Beauchamp and Childress 2013).
**Dialogue and Bioethics**

Perhaps the most widely established principles of contemporary bioethics are respect for persons, which upholds autonomy, and hence the choice(s) of the person; beneficence, which upholds the good of the person (including his/her best interests when that person is incapable of determining his/her own good), and hence the needs of the person; non-maleficence, which upholds doing the least/no harm, *primum non nocere* (although this is no longer considered more important than any of the other principles), to the person; and justice, which upholds fairness to the person and to all other relevant, involved and impacted individuals, as well as groups (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). A standard approach to bioethical decision making is the contextual consideration of these principles on balance, eventually prioritising the principle that appears to have most weight in a particular situation (Ibid). In spite of the importance of the respect for autonomy in this approach (Gillon 2003), it may still be paternalistic, if not authoritarian, as it assumes that the contextual consideration and prioritising may be done to the person rather than with and/or by him or her. Dialogue is therefore not a necessary part of this standard bioethics approach. This is even more important in regard to people with mental health challenges, who are sometimes viewed as being insufficiently autonomous to make important choices such as those in relation to their health care.

An alternative, although perhaps complementary approach to the principles-based approach in bioethics is found in dialogical bioethics (Author 2001; Author 2002a; Author 2007a). Dialogical bioethics uses a structured, staged, approach to facilitate relevant types of dialogue around ethical issues in health care, based in part on argumentation theory/informal logic (Walton 1998). Such dialogue proceeds with setting the conditions for dialogue (including what would count as success for the dialogue which, based on dialogue principles, cannot be pre-determined as it must be agreed by those involved in the dialogue, yet such involvement implies that success has to include the satisfaction of all involved – at least satisfaction with the process, if not always with the outcome); continues with the formal opening of the dialogue; then follows with argumentation; and ends with the closing of the dialogue (including resolution where possible) (Author 2007a). This dialogical approach addresses the above-noted principles of bioethics, as it facilitates their prioritisation, based in part on the person’s informed choice. For instance, using such dialogue, a person with a terminal condition can choose whether to be informed of the diagnosis or not (Author 2002b). This would be more difficult, if not impossible, if principles were prioritised paternalistically by the health care providers. For example, if autonomy is prioritised, the person may be informed of the diagnosis in order that s/he can decide on his or her care, whether he or she wants that or not, and if beneficence or non-maleficence are prioritised, the person may not be informed of the diagnosis in order to prevent the psychological
suffering that might result from his/her knowledge of impending death. Such non-disclosure is termed “therapeutic privilege” and is less and less commonly practised, at least in Western jurisdictions. Other bioethics approaches that have recently been commonly used or reused are, respectively, feminist bioethics, which focuses on power dynamics; and virtue bioethics, which focuses on moral intent rather than on moral duty or consequence. Interestingly, care ethics, which combines both feminist-like bioethics and virtue-like bioethics, may lead to paternalism or authoritarianism in bioethics and hence may be more problematic than dialogical bioethics (Author 2001).

In the case of people with serious and other mental illness, there is concern about whether some of them are capable of making decisions, particularly regarding their health care, when they have severe mental impairments, such as major depression (Author 2002c). Admittedly, there are many variants of ‘capable’ decision making, some of which involve mental challenges, such as limited meta-cognition (Author 2004), which is the ability to mentally represent mental representations, or, more specifically, to think about one’s own and others’ thinking, yet it is not standard to abrogate personal choice due to limited meta-cognition. That being said, more severe mental challenges may pose difficulties to full dialogue, both due to the mental impairments involved and to others’ negative or over-paternalistic attitudes toward people with serious and other mental illness. How can dialogue occur, if at all, with people who have severe mental health challenges?

**Dialogue with People Who Have Severe Mental Health Challenges**

It is important to distinguish the various aims of dialogue. If the aim of dialogue is to decide on specific treatment for mental illness, such as medication, some people with severe mental health challenges may not be capable of deciding on such treatment (Author 2004), in which case dialogue with them about that would aim only to inform and support them in relation to the decision made by others for them, rather than by or with them. This assumes that dialogue preferably, but not necessarily, allows mutual decision making, but necessitates, at the very least, reciprocal information sharing. Yet much of mental health care is about other matters, such as housing and work, and although some people with severe mental health challenges may not even be capable of deciding on these life-plan related matters, in most cases such decisions are best left to the person with mental illness to make, partly as such matters are determined by personal preferences that usually do not have much if anything to do with mental illness (Author 2002d). Indeed, paternalism regarding life plans rather than treatment is arguably coercive and ethically, if not logically, suspect (Author 2007b; Author 2013).
In order to conduct dialogue with people who have severe mental health challenges, both in relation to their mental health care and more generally, specific education may be needed, both for people with serious mental illness and for others who may be involved, such as their families and mental health care providers. Based on an adult education framework (Knowles, Holton and Swanson 2011), knowledge, skills and attitudes can be addressed in such education. For example, people with serious mental illness and the relevant service providers (as well as relevant trainees and policy makers) can be educated to better communicate with each other about service users’ wants and needs (Forchuk 2011; Karnieli-Miller and Salyers 2011; Roe, T elem, Baloush-Klienman, Gelkopf and Rudnick 2010; Author 2011; Rudnick and Eastwood 2013). New – electronic, particularly mobile – technology can assist with such enhancement of dialogue between people with mental illness and others who are involved in their lives (Rudnick and Roe 2012). Additional tools for empowering decision making by people who have serious mental illness, with their families and others, can include an advance planning tool such as the Wellness Recovery Action Plan®, which was developed by a person with lived experience of serious mental illness (Cook et al. 2012).

For illustration of dialogue between people with serious mental illness and their service providers as well as others involved in their lives, we will describe here an imaginary but reality-informed clinical vignette, with two scenarios – firstly, one with little if any dialogue, and secondly, one with effective dialogue. Although the lack and existence of dialogue is not the only difference between these two scenarios, we think it is important to highlight this difference in relation to dialogue here.

**Lack of or Insufficient Dialogue with a Person Who Has Serious Mental Illness**

Mr. B is a 38-year-old single man, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia when he was 23 years old, and has a history of alcohol use. He lives with his widowed, retired mother and will not help with household chores unless specifically and repeatedly asked. He has been unemployed for the past 8 years, ever since he returned to Canada from Afghanistan after a 7 year stint (most of it outside Canada) of being successful in both his professional and personal life. He was employed as a salesman at a successful business firm and was married, but both job and marriage were lost a few months before his return to Canada. He receives a disability allowance from the government, part of which his mother uses for his rent and groceries, and the rest of which he mostly spends on cigarettes and alcohol. Mr. B attends a local college to gain a new skill set in car mechanics but as he was struggling to keep up with the courses he dropped his course load part way through the school year. He has recently begun socialising with a much younger man he met at college. He has two brothers who live in a different province and do not have much
contact with him. He does not associate with other mentally ill people, as he does not feel he has a mental illness. Mr. B sees his outpatient psychiatrist every 6 weeks for follow-up, and his outpatient psychiatric nurse every two weeks for injectable medication administration. The outpatient social worker from the mental health services is available to meet Mr. B and his mother, as well as his brothers, on an as-needed basis, and the outpatient occupational therapist and psychologist are not involved in his care. When he was 30 years old, Mr. B was assessed as being incapable of making decisions about his psychiatric treatment, due to having insufficient insight into his illness. His mother is his appointed substitute decision maker (which is legally possible in various jurisdictions) with regard to psychiatric treatment, and takes him to his hospital appointments. He is administered a long-acting antipsychotic injection and has some residual symptoms despite standard-dose treatment. Mr. B was previously put on a Community Treatment Order (CTO), i.e., involuntary outpatient treatment (which is a legal option in various jurisdictions), because he has stopped taking his injections on two occasions, relapsing quickly into severe self-neglect, disorganisation and a resultant hospital admission. For the last 8 months, Mr. B has repeatedly requested a discontinuation of his medication. He has connected with bloggers on the Internet who have written about antipsychotics being toxic chemicals with many side effects, including sexual problems and Tardive Dyskinesia, a relatively rare but disruptive movement disorder that may be induced by antipsychotic medications. Mr. B feels there is no reason for him to be given such dangerous medications when, in his opinion, he does not even have a mental illness. He expressed the seriousness of his concerns to one of his college professors, who sent a letter to the psychiatrist advocating on his behalf. After failing to convince his mother (who thinks the side effects are related to his alcohol use) to withdraw consent for his treatment, he stopped attending his medication administration appointments. After two missed appointments, his mother notified his psychiatrist, who contacted him by phone and urged him to attend an urgent injection appointment with his nurse and to meet him soon after. When Mr. B refused both requests, his psychiatrist used the CTO and with the assistance of the police compelled him to come to hospital, where he was admitted as an involuntary patient to restart the medication under observation. He became severely catatonic (immobile) during the first few days of his hospitalisation, and his psychiatrist then started him on electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to try to induce a quick remission of these symptoms. After six sessions of ECT, his catatonia subsided, and after a few more days of adjustment to the doses of his medications, Mr. B was discharged back home on the CTO with some short-term memory loss, which was probably a side effect of the ECT. Mr. B quickly resumed his regular routine in the community. His short term memory returned to baseline levels after 3 months. He continued to be distressed about the different side effects he experienced, but no longer talked about this, except indirectly by writing essays on social justice. The
psychiatrist and the psychiatric nurse periodically reminded Mr. B to reduce his alcohol and smoking consumption, which he agreed to do.

**Effective Dialogue with a Person Who Has Serious Mental Illness**

Ms. A is a 38-year-old single woman, who was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, when she was 25 years old, and has a history of one suicide attempt by mild overdosing with acetaminophen when she was 26 years old. She lives in subsidised housing near her widowed, retired father, and they help each other with some of the household chores, based on their preference for particular chores (e.g., he prefers vacuuming and she prefers grocery shopping). Ms. A is employed part-time as a clerk. She socialises regularly with her colleagues from work, as well as occasionally with peers whom she met in the hospital. Ms. A sees her outpatient psychiatrist every 3 months, and her outpatient psychiatric nurse monthly. The outpatient social worker from the mental health services sees her and her father at least every 6 months for support and ad-hoc counselling about their joint activities and concerns, and is available on an as-needed basis for family psycho-education for Ms. A’s older brother and younger sister. The outpatient occupational therapist and psychologist each conducted weekly sessions with Ms. A six years ago for a few months both before and after she moved out of her father’s home into her own housing, when they focused on the enhancement of independent living skills and on improving self-esteem, respectively. The occupational therapist also coached her in job interviewing and in the development of social skills in the workplace when she was searching for work. Both the occupational therapist and the psychologist are available to meet her for booster sessions and for other purposes on an as-needed basis. When she was 27 years old, Ms. A was assessed as being incapable of making decisions about her psychiatric treatment, due to having insufficient insight into her illness. Her father was then appointed as her substitute decision maker with regard to psychiatric treatment, and started to remind her daily to take her medications. Soon after this, her psychiatric nurse commenced psycho-education and motivational interviewing for adherence. Ms. A had been on a community treatment order because she had previously twice stopped taking her mood-stabilising and antipsychotic medications since she was concerned about the weight gain that they caused. On each of those occasions she relapsed with suicidal ideas and was hospitalised. During her second relapse, her medication was changed to medication that induces less weight gain, and she received health education about healthy diet and exercise. She also was exposed to the option of developing her own self management plan (WRAP®) and determined that she would attend the peer led group, providing her with personal tools to better address illness management and recovery and with exposure to positive role models. Two years later, and with continued psycho-education, motivational interviewing, health education by the psychiatric nurse, and community based self-help support groups, she was assessed as being capable of making decisions about her psychiatric
treatment, and the community treatment order was discontinued. Ms. A has now once again stopped her psychiatric medications due to weight gain, and refuse to take them, despite her father’s repeated requests that she should do so. Her father notified her psychiatrist, who phoned her and asked her to meet him with the psychiatric nurse at her apartment as soon as possible to address her father’s concerns. She agreed, but requested that her father not attend. During the meeting, they all reviewed and reconfirmed her crisis plan, which included psychiatric hospitalisation, as required by law, if her condition worsened to the point of suicidal or aggressive plans or behaviour or severe self-neglect, such as starvation or other severe self-harm (including considerable overspending and unsafe sexual promiscuity during a manic episode). After obtaining voluntary informed consent from Ms. A, the psychiatrist initiated a medication change to further reduce the risk of weight gain, and Ms. A agreed to meet him every 2 weeks at his office for the next couple of months, to allow the psychiatric nurse to visit her at home weekly during that period, and to call them or the crisis line urgently if her condition worsens. She also agreed that her father should call the psychiatric team if he is concerned, but requested that she rather than they inform him of the new care plan. Her father was encouraged to attend a community-based support group for family members. After a couple of months, Ms. A was still in remission and the medication change was completed. She was still assessed as being capable of making decisions about her psychiatric treatment, and she continued with her regular routine in the community throughout this period. She is now planning a holiday trip with her family, and was referred back to counselling with the psychologist to address her lack of self confidence in relation to her felt need to find a partner. (Author 2012b, 311-2).

An important difference between these two scenarios is that in the first scenario neither the family nor the service providers engaged in much dialogue with the service user, but rather assumed about, and decided for, the service user. As a consequence, the service user did not engage in much dialogue with them, resulting in poorer outcomes. In contrast, in the second scenario, all the people involved engaged in more dialogue and the outcome for the service user was better, e.g., participation in peer-led groups, such as WRAP® and similar interventions, can facilitate the learning of adaptive coping from others with similar experiences (Pallaveshi, Balachandra, Subramanian and Rudnick 2014). We suggest that the outcome for all others involved was also better, e.g., for the father, who benefited from more help than he wanted and needed from Ms. A (Scenario 2). Admittedly, aiming at treatment adherence may not be considered as being fully supportive of self-determination (Corrigan, Angell, Davidson, Marcus, Salzer, Kottsieper et al 2012), which is important for dialogue; yet motivational interviewing that was conducted explores the pros and cons of adherence, with the hope, but not the presumption, that adherence will favour positive outcomes. Other factors that differ
across these two scenarios may also have influenced the outcomes; physical, mental and/or social background differences may explain the better outcome of scenario two, e.g., the relationship with the involved parent may have been better for Ms. A than for Mr. B from early on. Still, the differences in the process and outcome suggests that dialogue benefits all who are involved, particularly when the relevant people have a long term relationship that requires ongoing interaction. In addition, actions were taken towards reducing stereotypes in order to reduce internal and public stigmatisation. The questioning of whether one-time interactions benefit much from dialogue is beyond the scope of our paper, but we suggest that, even in such situations, all involved benefit from dialogue, including very disadvantaged people, such as people with serious mental illness.

Based on these scenarios and on published literature, as well as on our clinical and administrative experience, what may further facilitate dialogue with people who have mental illness, particularly between people with serious mental illness and their health care providers? A promising approach that uses dialogue to determine mental health care is shared decision making (Deegan, Rapp, Holter and Riefer 2008). Shared decision making is a structured approach that involves mutual learning between a person with serious mental illness and his or her health care providers about his or her health care goals and ways to achieve them (by means of evidence-informed interventions as well as lived experience of personal coping strategies), e.g., using a person’s advance preparation of a list of goals for discussion. There are some positive outcomes for shared decision making, such as service user satisfaction, emerging and it has been shown to be safe (Duncan, Best and Hagen 2010). Another promising approach addresses future concerns by discussing and establishing contingency planning in case the service user becomes incapable of deciding on his or her mental health care. This approach uses Psychiatric Advance Directives, which facilitates communication and decision making between service users and their providers about the service users’ recovery and related goals (Scheyett and Kim 2007). Other approaches, such as reduction of health care providers’ and trainees’ stigma towards people with serious mental illness, especially in traditionally authoritarian institutions such as hospitals (Linden and Kavanagh 2012), may also be helpful.

**Other Very Disadvantaged People**

How does this learning about people with serious mental illness apply, if at all, to people who are very disadvantaged in other ways? The social disadvantage of people with serious mental illness is similar to that of other people who are very disadvantaged, as discrimination is similar across populations, at least in its key characteristic of excluding people from access to a full life. The main difference may be in relation to the mental health challenges that some people with serious
mental illness have, but others do not. Still, other people, such as first generation poor immigrants, may have a language barrier, which people with serious mental illness may not have. Hence, although very disadvantaged groups (and individuals) may differ in some of their specific disadvantages, their situations may not be that different from each other, it may thus be possible to apply the learning from people with serious mental illness to other very disadvantaged people.

Conclusion

We have argued and illustrated here that dialogue between service providers, people who have serious mental illness, and other relevant participants is both possible and helpful, in relation to mental health care as well as to other matters, and that it is grounded in sound (dialogical) bioethics. We have also suggested that relevant education for people with serious mental illness, as well as for their service providers and others who are involved in their lives, can effectively facilitate dialogue by accommodating mental health challenges that may disrupt dialogue and by improving societal attitudes that may also disrupt dialogue. Although our paper is limited in that it focuses primarily on one very disadvantaged population, i.e., on people with serious mental illness, and in that it reviews only part of the relevant literature and describes two individuals rather than a larger sample, we suggest that it supports a recommendation to facilitate dialogue with very disadvantaged people, such as some people with serious mental illness. We also suggest that dialogue with other very disadvantaged people may benefit by learning from dialogue with people who have serious mental illness. Further research is needed in relation to dialogue with such very disadvantaged people.
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‘Stir It Up’: Contestation and the Dialogue in the Artistic Practice of the Twin of Twins

Abdoulaye Gaye

It is widely accepted in Caribbean studies that there is an ongoing resistance culture in Jamaica’s dancehalls. However, the notion of resistance has remained confined to the terrain of what Carolyn Cooper calls ‘border clashes’ – local versus global, culture versus slackness, uptown versus downtown, and popular culture versus high culture. This article underlines the distinctive creativity of dancehall artistes such as the Twin of Twins, whose artistic practice generates a textual arena where different discourses can interact dialectically in various forms. It primarily explores the Twins’ treatment of resistance culture in their represented spaces. It subsequently discusses the dialogic dynamics involved in the relationship between the dominant and dominated classes. These analyses reveal the relational ethos of dancehall DJs’ counter-narratives and the Twin of Twins’ ability to produce a dialogic relation to social reality.

Key Words: Jamaican dancehall, discourse, contestation, dialogue, distinction, dialogism

I don’t believe in art for art’s sake. I think art is mediated by social reality…. As an artist you are in constant dialogue with your society, and when you are pushing them, you become revolutionary, you are pushing them in areas where you think they ought to go. And you use your art so to do. And then, they will respond negatively or positively or halfway. That’s the dialogue. Any artist who doesn’t understand the dynamic of continuing dialogue with himself or herself and society doesn’t deserve the name artist. - Rex Nettleford

Introduction

Jamaican dancehall culture is a multifaceted site of contestation that carries underlying dialectical practice across the border of the distinctions within Jamaican social reality. The actors and participants in the mainly urban spaces of dancehall culture design a politics of resistance that entails dialogue (Stanley-Niaah 2004; Hope 2006). The artistes, particularly DJs, who are at the forefront of what may be termed a ‘stir-it-up’ approach to dancehall culture, illustrate Professor Rex Nettleford’s compelling assertion in the epigraph above regarding the ‘dialectical nature of the creative artistic process’ (Scott 2006, 234-235). Interestingly, the notion of resistance through border clashes has been used by Carolyn Cooper (2004) to characterise the lyrics of the DJs, who confront middle-class respectability and
the rigid structures, norms and standards of Jamaican society. However, in so doing, the lyrics of the DJs alone, though relevant to an interpretative framework, cannot fully *stir up* the dialogic potential of Jamaican dancehall music. For these lyrics are the product of discourses in which, as Dominique Maingueneau – from the French school of discourse analysis – notes in his work, ‘statements are articulated in a particular situation of enunciation’ (Maingueneau 1996, 82). Accordingly, rather than remaining a matter of simple phraseology, the lyrics should be comprehended as all-encompassing texts in order to reflect the structure of social reality. When taken as a whole, the lyrics will thus only *stir up* both contestation and dialogue if they are interpreted as articulations of texts and social reality.

The historiography of music in Jamaican society has proved the necessity for researchers to avoid the limitations of the song lyrics by considering them as part of other informative primary sources – other texts reflecting a social reality that can give the discourse its unity or its totality. Can we study Bob Marley’s music thoroughly without considering the various interviews he made with journalists from around the world, putting reggae, and hence Jamaican culture, on the international map? Even if, as far as we can tell, little has been written about its implications, how can we forget Peter Tosh’s so-called *Red X Tapes*, which were disclosed a couple of years after his untimely death and were utilised as material for the 1992 biographical film directed by Nicholas Campbell?¹ From these examples, it is clear that reggae artistes do not fully espouse the principle of art for art’s sake. Beyond its aesthetic purpose, their music serves as an instrument for social transformation. Dancehall DJs like the Twin of Twins delve into the experience of these seminal reggae icons to legitimise the transformative mechanism of their dancehall contemporaries. It is not by chance that they named their *gangsta comedy* series after Bob Marley’s famous 1967 love song, ‘Stir It Up.’ Notwithstanding these parallels, the Twin of Twins, Patrick ‘Curly Loxx’ Gaynor and Paul ‘Tu-Loxx’ Gaynor, reinforce the *authoritative discourse* of such reggae figureheads as Bob Marley and Peter Tosh with an *internally persuasive discourse* of their own, thereby partly attenuating the limitations of song lyrics.² In other words, alongside a monologic discourse (an *authoritative discourse* that adopts a unilateral perspective on issues), the Twin of Twins *stir up* the other’s voice and incorporate it into a textual arena where contending discourses engage in interaction, exchange viewpoints, and discuss issues. The Twins and their Kingston 13 crew epitomise dancehall’s politics of resistance and its paradoxical dialogic

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² For a discussion on the opposition and correlation between an *authoritative discourse* and an *internally persuasive discourse*, see Michael Holquist’s translation of Bakhtin’s theoretical vocabulary in *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006).
discourse which, in a process of creation, blurs the boundaries and crosses the borders of gender, class and racial identity.

This article seeks to continue the growing body of scholarship on cultural dialogue in order to highlight the relational ethos in dancehall counter-narratives. It thus deals with the Twin of Twins’ ability, in the context of the traditional – slackness/culture, downtown/uptown, and local/global – distinctions, to produce a dialogic relation to social reality. Correspondingly, Mikhail Bakhtin and his dialogism may serve to analyse the artistic practice inherent in dancehall music. Since, in Bakhtinian critical theory, the notion of dialogue implies that all discourse, whatever its nature, is consciously or unconsciously repeated and modified according to ‘other preceding utterances’ (Bakhtin 1984a, 287). In a text it is therefore important to identify the other’s voice, with which the speaker engages in vivid conversation. These intertextual and inter-discursive relations become strategies that both challenge and reproduce dominant language ideologies within the context of social reality. Furthermore, beyond Bakhtin’s dialogism, which offers a general framework for studying Jamaican popular culture at large, it is significant to underscore that the contemporary dancehall sphere draws upon African and Caribbean traditions of ‘call and response’ patterns, exemplifying what Mervyn Alleyne refers to as the ‘extension of the collectivist principle to communication’ in modern Jamaican culture (Alleyne 1988, 159). Dancehall’s distinctive creativity generates a hybridised textual arena where different discourses can interact dialectically in various forms, which constitutes a paradigm for both contestation and dialogue.

This paradigm will be examined in terms of its implications for Jamaica’s social reality. Using a corpus of lyrics, interviews and voice impersonations to illustrate the role of the dancehall artiste, this article primarily explores the Twin of Twins’ treatment of resistance culture in their represented spaces. Then, subsequently, drawing on the ‘resurrection’ of the communicational function of language within the national community, it discusses the dialogic dynamics involved in the relationship between the dominant and dominated classes. This discussion refers to Bakhtin’s understanding of dialogue as a process that entails polyphony, that is, the co-existence of many independent voices that interact with each other. In the Jamaican context, as Bakhtin (1984b) would assert, one social class alone cannot bring about positive change, which we may consider to be the truth. In fact, only people of different classes, races, genders and backgrounds can know the truth, and hence bring about positive change, if their individual voices interact with each other. ‘Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person,’ argues Bakhtin, ‘it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction’ (Bakhtin 1984b, 110). Using the polyphonic work of the Twin of Twins, our objective is to outline the results of the permanent
dialogue that they create between the dominant and dominated classes. The main question that we ask here is the following: how do the dominant and dominated classes interact in order to produce positive change in Jamaica?

An analysis of two volumes (5 and 6) of the Twin of Twins’ ‘Stir It Up’ series may help us to respond to the aforementioned question. These two volumes respectively date back to 2005 and 2006. Five other, no less important, volumes have been released since 2005. Volume 10, the most recent album, was released in April, 2013. All the albums feature the Twins imitating popular figures and performing some well-crafted songs based on social commentary. Our focus will be on Volumes 5 and 6 since they were produced when the two artistes were being recognised locally for their mastery of the craft (that is, of dancehall or gangsta comedy). They were being recognised as voices of the Jamaican ghetto who strive for dialogue and positive change during five decades of the postcolonial social exclusion of the poor. It was during this period, especially from 2006 onwards, that we conducted several interviews with the two artistes. They insisted that, as their first officially-released albums, Volumes 5 and 6 were important in enabling underground types of dancehall comedy to gain acceptance in the mainstream population.3 Both albums are still relevant insofar as they portray the tradition of resistance that dancehall inherited from reggae. The notion of ‘tradition’ itself implies what Colette Maximin (2008) calls ‘the permanence of connections, the loyalty to common roots.’ As a social movement, a religious cult, and a youth subculture, which originated in the ghettos of Kingston, Rastafari represents the permanent connection between the generations of Jamaican popular music. It therefore plays an important role in the work of the Twin of Twins, who celebrate and validate the Rastafarian worldview in Volumes 5 and 6 through one of their main characters (Mista Muta).

**Link It Up: Traversing the Frontiers of Resistance Culture**

Despite the strong defence of Rastafarian culture, the Twin of Twins’ ‘Stir It Up’ series bears testimony to their understanding of the notion of resistance as an ideologically flexible and ambivalent category. They develop their awareness of Jamaica’s sociocultural distinctions as they endeavour to make the connection between the existing oppositional forces. Beginning with Volume 5, which is allegorically entitled *The Crucifixion* of the Ghetto, Curly Loxx and Tu Loxx specifically invent an extended line-up of impersonated characters (or fictitious guest hosts) comprising, among others, Ian Llyad (journalist Ian Boyne), Mista

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3 For instance, in August, 2005, the Twin of Twins’ CD *Stir It Up, Vol. 5: The Crucifixion of the Ghetto* spent three weeks at number one in the Jamaican X-News and Hot 102 album charts. Earlier, in July 2005, the Twins were billed to perform at the famous Reggae Sumfest in Montego Bay, where they met the middle-class audience that would give their career a tremendous boost.
Muta (dub poet and radio personality Mutabaruka), Bob, ‘The King of Reggae’, and Dear Pastor (Reverend Aaron Dumas). The noted presence of the outspoken Rastafarian dub poet, Mutabaruka, and the famous newspaper columnist and talk show host, Dear Pastor, who comment upon national and transnational issues, in particular reveals their willingness to grapple with controversial themes, such as gender relations and sexual orientations, in a context heavily influenced by the Rastafarian, Christian and ghetto (and gangsta) moralities. Before opening up possibilities for dialogic discourse that may enable them to link up the different segments of society, the gangsta comedians therefore indulge in what the late Edward Said called the period of ‘primary resistance’: they are ‘literally fighting outside intrusion’ (Said 1994, 252-253). As with any Jamaican resident who feels that the cultural boundaries of his community are being threatened, the Twins symbolically reassert these boundaries. Addressing remarks to Michael Jackson and R. Kelly respectively, Mista Muta’s vibrant voice conveys a politics of resistance that is akin to a politics of difference:

You [Michael Jackson] a talk to a Jamaican. In Jamaica, we have gunshot fi replace sticks and stone…. No, no nigger right here, no nigger, Rastafarian right here. ‘Nigger’ is the word and the down to the slave by the slave master, then black people still a perpetuate this kind of foolishness, you [R. Kelly] know. I am no nigger, Rasta; we emancipate and pass dem level yah long time. We not no nigger, you understand, Rasta. Don’t offend me no before we start dis bloodclaat ting, you know…. No, you a cat we a Lion.

Bolstered up by Bob, ‘The King of Reggae’, and Ian Llyad, the ‘respectable’ middle-class citizen, Mista Muta emphasises the specificity of Jamaican identity and insists upon its difference from aspects of the African-American lifestyle personified by Michael Jackson and R. Kelly. Although highly acclaimed for their excellence in music, both artistes are seen as threatening the social order of Jamaica, which is mainly dependent on stable norms. For instance, R. Kelly is interviewed about the details of his so-called ‘sex video’ scandal. Then Mista Muta and Ian Llyad express their open condemnation of oral sex, admitting, in unison, that it is a ‘disgraceful thing to the black race.’ Moreover, it is the issue of American cultural penetration, through the mass media and the internet, of the prevailing notions of normality that becomes of paramount concern. With his uncompromising Rastafarian stance, Mista Muta offers a strong indictment of the mass media, particularly television. Using the universal remote control as a metonymic reference to the American television programmes that have invaded the Jamaican household, he makes clear to R. Kelly:

Your God is universal, yes – the universal remote control that you use to turn on the TV and watch blue movie…. The TV destroy your life and dat, mi a try fi tell you, destroy the black race because we don’t have our own mind, we’re influenced by how we see pon TV too much, you understand.

As far as the internet is concerned, Mista Muta reiterates his refusal to be caught up in the web of globalisation. From the very start of ‘Stir It Up,’ Volume 5, the Twin of Twins radically redefine resistance culture through a series of measures that aim to mobilise and assist local forces in the campaign against global cultural penetration. None the less, they purportedly succeed in overcoming the tragic pitfalls of primary resistance by paving the way towards more ideological resistance.

The process of resistance that The Crucifiction of the Ghetto dramatises is ambivalent, insofar as it generates a narrative that is endowed with a dual polarity. On the one hand, this narrative discloses a local alliance against outside intrusion, as Mista Muta, referring to R. Kelly’s attitude, signifies to Ian Llyad the final purpose of the conversation: ‘Him fi stay a farin [foreign] with him fuckery, you understand, with him whole heap a sucking.’ On the other hand, by authoring alternative intertextual readings of resistance culture, this narrative stirs up a mediatory framework in which a divided national community may be reconciled through dialectical initiatives, linking up all segments of Jamaican society, including the dominant and dominated classes, who may also engage in an ideological confrontation. In such a context, the Twin of Twins first reaffirm their belonging to the national community in a polemical and subversive way. In fact, they appropriate Jamaica’s national anthem and transform it into the ‘sufferah’s national anthem’ to integrate economically active but socially excluded citizens. Mista Muta ‘livicates’ the antepenultimate section of Volume 5 to the so-called ‘downtrodden’ as he declares that he talks ‘fi the teacher dem who haffi demonstrate for better pay […], fi the little taximan who a try a hustling […], fi the youth dem who are juggle something just fi no go out rob and kill…’ Even more importantly, however, the symbolic use of Jamaica’s national anthem should be scrutinised because it opens up the ruptures in the nation’s collective memory itself:

Eternal Father we no have no land,
Who fi sing the part deh ya Matalon,
No, we no free from dem evil powers,
Police a kill di innocent youth after hours.
Burn our leaders dem a no defend us,
Di fucker dem have no love.5

These first lines of the Twin of Twins’ own version of the national anthem, in

5 Twin of Twins, ‘Sufferah’s National Anthem.’
comparison to the official ones, expose an alternative conception of collective memory, which rethinks the prevailing (legitimate) political construction of national identity. The Twin of Twins interrogate the reality of independence and its consequence for the lower strata of Jamaican society. The issues of land ownership and police brutality are at stake to unveil the perennial inequalities beneath the official proclamations of equality: ‘Out of Many, One People’ from the national motto, ‘Jamaica, land we love’ from the national anthem. Hence the conclusion: ‘No we no free from dem evil powers.’ The reference to Matalon, one of Jamaica’s biggest financiers and ‘landlords,’ exemplifies the process of post independence disillusionment as far as economic opportunity for the underprivileged is concerned. Additionally, these lines deconstruct the myth of the benevolent middle-class leaders that had hitherto dominated Jamaica’s history, thereby developing an alternative way to conceive Jamaican history. Yet, this deconstruction is meant to integrate 

\[\text{Dem seh teach us true respect for all,} \\
\text{But dem nah hear the ghetto youth a bawl,} \\
\text{Dem taking up in vanity dem money dem cherish,} \\
\text{Lef we all we hungry belly pickney dem fi perish.} \]

Arguably, the Twin of Twins go far beyond the indictment of corrupt officials and emphasise the relevance of common aspirations in a class-ridden society. According to the sufferer’s anthem, the 

\[\text{ghetto}\]

youth have a stake in the system because they are liable to undergo, as are their fellow Jamaicans, education within the framework of ‘true respect for all.’ The sufferers are not simply asking for a helping hand, but are demanding equal rights and social justice, which may be achieved through allowing them a greater share of national resources. Besides appealing to the same educational framework of ‘true respect for all,’ the Twins make the conscious effort to remove the barriers between uptown and downtown and to counteract the social prejudices or misconceptions about the relation between uptown and 

\[\text{ghetto}\]

people. Curly Loxx eagerly confesses, along with Tu Loxx:

\[\text{We believe that you learn from every culture, whether you are from it or not, you don’t shun it, you learn from it, you don’t put it down. We were kicked out of high school in the tenth grade. Our evolution, in terms of learning and where it’s coming now, it’s self-taught; we couldn’t say we taught ourselves, but we’ve learnt a lot from these people, not from our culture…. We didn’t go to school uptown, but every ghetto deh near a residential community. As a matter of fact, most residential community have a ghetto somewhere near…. You find seh that really cause the interaction between ghetto and uptown. That’s why when time uptown kids start rebel and rail, ghetto get the blame.} \]

6 Twin of Twins, interview with author, Kingston, Jamaica (November, 2006).
While sustaining or enhancing the idea that linking up with a larger community through education can help to challenge economic domination, the Twins therefore acknowledge that it cannot cover up the persistence of lines of cultural conflict in a hierarchically-based society. Indeed, economic domination goes hand in hand with cultural domination. While accepting a measure of social interaction with uptown, the *ghetto* is entitled to receive norms, values and attitudes from the holders of legitimate culture. Hence there is a symbolic domination, which the Twin of Twins define as a ‘strategic manipulation of [their] positions on the social calendar, so that [they] can accept minimum wages.’

Nonetheless, the shift from primary resistance to ideological resistance in the Twin of Twins’ *Crucifixion of the Ghetto* indicates the inclination of dancehall artistes to traverse the frontiers of resistance culture, to move beyond fixed identities, and to dwell in dialogue with Jamaica’s social reality. However, this raises many issues that pertain to the perennial differentiation within Jamaican society. To what extent can oppositional forces be united in a class-divided society? What are the conciliatory factors and the underrated tensions, the contradictions, and the conflicts? Does the ‘Twin of Twins’ understanding of resistance suggest an acceptance of the symbolic domination (based on educational capital, respectability and prestige) of the upper classes, as Pierre Bourdieu (1984) would argue? What kind of dialogue do the lower classes have to establish in order to counteract the upper-class hegemonic mindset? The social spaces that have been contextualised and represented by the Twin of Twins in their ‘Stir It Up’ series engage with these questions. The responses to all these questions cannot be developed extensively here, but they can be articulated in an analysis of the dialogic dynamics involved in the relationship between the dominant and dominated classes.

**Gangsta Comedy: The Dialogic Discourse of the Twin of Twins**

As a creative communicational activity, language involves dialogic dynamics that can deconstruct, challenge, and reproduce the hierarchically fixed discourse of symbolic domination. With its dialectical approach to social distinctions and differences, the artistic practice of the Twin of Twins allows for the resurgence of the dialogue in the midst of dominant language ideologies. Their strategy strives earnestly towards the perpetuation of a politics of relation that articulates and binds the dominant discourse with the discourse of artistic creation which is connected to social reality. Arguably, the fact that they refer to their work as *gangsta comedy* reasserts the unity and the intentionality (they are not true comedians and ‘ask that their messages be taken very seriously’) of the dialogic discourse of the Twin of Twins, which is produced through the language of ironic satire, so that it can sarcastically repeat a
contested discourse. In his theory of dialogue, Bakhtin explores the interaction of languages, which he considers to be philosophies, as they are endowed with value systems and ideologies of their own. This interaction of languages implies conflicts, as the dominant class will use its power to impose a definition of legitimate culture. In the Jamaican context, the key bone of contention is over issues of crime and violence. When the language of social control from state authorities meets the language of social commentary from dancehall practitioners, class conflict goes hand in hand with constructive dialogue.

Dancehall music has often been blamed by state institutions and the dominant social stratum for inciting violence, without proper consideration of its dialogic input into the debate on gun violence that is spearheaded by civil society. For instance, before being officially (and theatrically) disarmed on stage by the Senior Superintendent of Police Renato Adams during his appearance at Jamaica's best-known annual concert, Sting, in 2002, Ninjaman, the controversial DJ, another gangsta comedian, the champion of musical 'badmanship,' had already satirically espoused the dominant discourse of pacification in a previous artistic experience. For example, his 1994 'Disarm them' recounts the irony of his participative response to arms control proposals, with the following remarkable sentence: 'Me disarm them and take back me gun deh.' Like Ninjaman, whose approach questions the effectiveness of the dominant discourse on violence and calls upon all stakeholders (first and foremost on his fellow DJs, Capleton and Cobra) to dialectically resolve the apparent contradiction in the sentence above, the gangsta comedy of the Twin of Twins intertwines serious issues with humorous irony so as to 'disarm' the tensions between the social groups.

**Disarming Them: The Mediation of Difference**

In the context of an unequal society, the Twin of Twins conjure up a dialogue that provides an effective mediation between the dominant and dominated classes. As a matter of fact, to address the issue of violence, Curly Loxx and Tu Loxx take measures that transcend the dominant and dominated classes. They 'disarm' class-based approaches to violence and crime and 'take back' their dialogic discourse in order to promote an inter-discursive exchange on this particular issue. In this way, extending Bakhtin's concepts of dialogism and the 'carnivalesque,' Northrop Frye underscores the importance of irony in satire, when he states that 'the chief distinction between irony and satire is that satire is militant irony.' That is to say, the discourse of the satirist draws its intentionality and militancy from irony, which enables access to dominant assumptions behind a contested discourse. See Northrop Frye, *The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 223-224.

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7 Extending Bakhtin's concepts of dialogism and the 'carnivalesque,' Northrop Frye underscores the importance of irony in satire, when he states that 'the chief distinction between irony and satire is that satire is militant irony.' That is to say, the discourse of the satirist draws its intentionality and militancy from irony, which enables access to dominant assumptions behind a contested discourse. See Northrop Frye, *The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 223-224.

they blend ironic satire with the textual polyphony of voice impersonations, the Twins remind both the ‘irate caller’ from the residential community of Norbrook and the gangsta from the ghetto of Chisholm Avenue that they are all victims of gun violence as a national ‘predicament’ that transcends race, class and gender boundaries.\(^9\) In the ultimate mock talk show of Volume 5, Mista Muta echoes Ian Llyad’s emotional denunciation of the brutal killing of one of his ‘respectable’ friends by appealing to reason and, paradoxically, to what appears to be popular or community justice:

> The youth dem who have the guns a fire, Rasta. If the one dem must fight, let it be the oppressor. You see the next time a guy goon a gun, turn it back pon him; any body weh goon with the gun, dem fi get shot! Yeh, don’t kill no babymother with innocent children and all them sup’m deh; you want a drive, ask the man, no badda kill the taximan, him is just as suffering as the I, Rasta….\(^{10}\)

Throughout their mediation efforts, the Twin of Twins not only interrogate the often-neglected loss of confidence in the legal and judicial systems, but they also challenge the violent practices for which some ghetto youth are responsible. Indeed, the Twins do not condone these violent behaviour patterns; they urge the ghetto youth to leave behind their position as passive victims and to take active control over their own lives. As he reaches the climax of his demonstration, Mista Muta makes it clear: ‘No matter how it hard, the one dem can make it, Rasta; no matter what, sidestep the system and deal with self-reliance; everything is mind over matter…. Don’t make nobody say you’re doom fi live so furiously your life, go for it!’ Even more significantly, Mista Muta, the Rasta elder, manages to transform Ian Llyad’s (very common) dominant discourse of both indignation and commiseration into a subversive counter-narrative to the mainstream treatment of violence in Jamaican society. He underlines the inequality of treatment of which the ghetto people are victims, when it comes to the wholesale condemnation of violence and

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9 The word ‘gangsta’ or ‘gangster’ does not necessarily mean ‘a member of an organised gang of violent criminals,’ as the word is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary*. In the context of dancehall music, it also refers to a true product of the harsh Jamaican ghetto, whose consciousness is shaped by the collective experiences of his community in diverse ways. Curly Loxx’s definition allows a distinctive axiological reconception of the notion: ‘When we say gangsta, we don’t mean like guns and violence or whatever alone. There is a culture to gangsta, it has evolved past just violence, as what they try to portray. Gangsta is how we act, gangsta is how we talk, gangsta is our linguistic skills we deh pon corner…. Relating to the ghetto, that’s what we call gangsta, our behaviour, things that we take, things that we don’t take, mannerisms, characteristics, beliefs, valuation, belief system, self-awareness. The culture itself is not just about violence.’

10 Twin of Twins, ‘Irate Callers Vs. Muta.’
crime. Responding to Ian Llyad’s attack on ‘ghetto murderers and barbarians,’ the collective voice of Mista Muta elaborates on the unfairness of a situation which tends to ignore ghetto people’s sufferings:

It’s only when it reach high society is a crime, you understand; because I never see crime stop, when I watch crime stop, oh Mr. John Lee of a Cherry Gardens address was brutally killed at his gate, if you know who committed such an awful and heinous crime, the number to call is 1-800, informer dead! And pon the other hand, I never see crime stop seh oh Mr. Carl Brown, of a Rema, of a Jungle, of a Tivoli, of a Brooke Valley, of a Sherlock, of a Mountain View, of a Payne Land, of Chisholm Avenue, of a Maxfield, of a Sunlight Street address, was brutally killed; we never see nothing like that yet, Rasta, what kind of injustice, and I never see an ambulance come fi a body inna di ghetto yet….

The character of Mista Muta is embedded in a far vaster dialogue with the class structure of Jamaican society. His response is all the more noteworthy as it reveals that, through the character of Ian Llyad, the Twin of Twins satirise the ideologically dominant media apparatus, which traditionally tends to convey certain principles and the upper class worldview as a counterpoint to the experience of violence-prone communities. In general, as far as the official treatment of violence and crime is concerned, Mista Muta wants the values of respectability and decency to be equally applied to all citizens, regardless of their social origin or status. He therefore criticises the ascription of an ‘informer’ role to poor inner-city dwellers, who are to be caught ‘inna di crossfire’ of the perennial ‘gang feuds.’ Likewise, he contests the little attention paid to lower-class citizens in terms of the provision of public infrastructure and services. For Mista Muta, these constant impasses do not help to establish the concerted action of ‘high society’ people and ghetto citizens against violence, which could give inner-city communities a sense of responsibility in terms of crime prevention. However, despite the obstacles that may not help ‘disarm’ the class-based approaches to violence and crime, the Twin of Twins believe in a humorous ‘resurrection’ of the ghetto, which will perpetuate (at least discursively) the relational ethos of dancehall music.

11 See Imani Tafari-Ama, Blood, Bullets and Bodies: Sexual Politics Below Jamaica’s Poverty Line (Kingston: Multi Media Communications, 2006). The first chapter, entitled ‘Caught in a Trap’, deals with the multidimensional factors that are linked to the spiral of violence that has taken thousands of lives among the disadvantaged dwellers of the inner-city ‘enclaves’ of Kingston, like Southside. Then it announces the long-term effects of this endemic violence: ‘Gang feuds have been reinforced by feelings of ‘blood for blood’ revenge arising out of the human losses that families have suffered during the years of conflict…. In addition, the legal system is so corrupt that many injured parties do not perceive that this is a viable avenue through which to achieve justice, and as a popular international slogan points out: ‘No justice – no peace!’ Thus, gun-fire, gushing blood and bullet-riddled bodies abound’ (Tafari-Ama 2006, 27).
‘The Resurrection of the Ghetto’

The gangsta comedy of the Twin of Twins re-establishes the transformative force of the dialogue between the dominant and dominated classes in many other ways, through the palatable humour of their artistic practice. In Volume 6, *The Resurrection of the Ghetto*, by taking an unrestrained pleasure in counteracting (often satirically) the slackness/culture hierarchical classification, the Twins are able to offer a powerful reassessment of what appears to be a false dichotomy. Curly Loxx and Tu Loxx, in particular, intentionally undertake a process of the re-contextualisation of the notion of slackness. This enterprise clearly begins in the midst of another mock talk show that is hosted by Ian Llyad and Mista Muta, when Ms. Mcloud, ‘an irate caller from Upper St. Andrew,’ initiates the dialogue by commenting on what she calls the ‘irreverent’ attitude of ghetto defenders like Mista Muta. Some of the criticisms made by Ms. Mcloud are all the more important as they rely on self-righteous Christian values that are combined with a dose of social conservatism:

How in God’s name could you talk about Jesus having sex. I mean, really, the verbal diarrhoea that comes out of your mouths, you know, but you must understand that children are listening…. Look, look, I don’t have to put up with this, I’m a decent upstanding citizen from a residential area…. Yes, and I’m proud.12

Ms. Mcloud’s reaction is a crucial contribution to the comprehension of the context that structures the notion of slackness. The Twin of Twins situate this practice or performance in relation to Ms. Mcloud’s mainstream religious discourse, which is based on Roman Catholic ethics. Mista Muta thus argues:

Dem bring in this priest and this pope and this nun; yo dem call the woman nun because cocky [penis] out deh and she not gettin’ none; this abstinence and man no fi mix with woman ting, dat no logical to me…. Weh you say you come from residential area, alright we gwan do a definition, we gwan find out a Webster Collins how fi say bout the word a name ’residential’: a home or a community, place where one reside, in other words, where you fuck, where you cook, where you sleep, you understand, where a person essentially live is residential. So weh you a try make me understand is that ghetto is not a residential area….

In the way that it satirises Ms. Mcloud’s ‘respectable’ motives ironically, it can be assumed that the Twin of Twins’ gangsta comedy authorises a slackness that is primarily informed by a rigid Christian morality. This slackness then finds its raison d’être in the core of a hierarchically fixed discourse of symbolic domination, thereby

delegitimising the slackness/culture dichotomy – the very distinction that the Twins seek to counteract. Eventually, the process of re-contextualisation culminates in the re-positioning of slackness as the visible part of the iceberg – the iceberg here represents the competing artistic practices of dancehall music. In referring to the history of dancehall, Ian Llyad invites Yellowman, the ‘king of slackness’, as he has often been stigmatised since the early 1980s when he emerged onto the Jamaican musical scene, to give his contribution to this endeavour. The latter provides a definition that demystifies the popularity of slackness, while presenting it as one ‘up-front’ discourse among others: ‘I and I no like call it slackness; still, I call it reality. It’s only that some reality more up-front than some, but the radda up-front coming now go back. Inna my days much different from now….’

The dialogic discourse of the Twin of Twins, even when it comes to dealing with issues that are not as serious as violence and crime, manages to reassert the autonomy of dancehall music as a distinctive field – with its own rules of artistic practice – without neglecting the crucial input of other identities with which it is, in one way or another, in relationship. In the Twin of Twins’ gangsta comedy, the symbolic domination of the dominant class is perpetuated and transformed into talk shows where the distinctions (like the slackness/culture classification) are disarmed and destabilised, and the humorous ‘resurrection’ of the ghetto is performed. This humorous ‘resurrection’ of the ghetto not only confirms the establishment of a distinctive artistic practice, but it highlights the Twin of Twin’s control over the parameters and the functions of their art, which is mediated by social reality, or by the real and fictitious characters whose voices are impersonated.

The Jamaican social space is made up of multiple voices that need to engage in dialogue in order to co-exist peacefully. In Volume 6, The Resurrection of the Ghetto, Bob, ‘The King of Reggae’, responds to Ian Llyad’s question about how to achieve peace in Jamaica. He declares: ‘Until the philosophy that hold one class superior and another inferior is finally and permanently discredited, this ting will be war. But you a go ask one and all fi just make war drizzle and let peace rain.’ In such a context, Bakhtin’s philosophy thus reminds us that dialogue must not come to an end, because it plays a key role in the production of positive change (and hence peace). Through what Bakhtin calls ‘open-ended dialogue,’ the Twin of Twins, ‘Yellow and Beenie.’

‘The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium’ (Bakhtin 1984, 293).

13 Twin of Twins, ‘Yellow and Beenie.’
14 Twin of Twins, ‘Biggie and Pac 2.’
15 ‘The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium’ (Bakhtin 1984, 293).
Twins have not only been able to transform dominant language ideologies, but have also changed everything in the perspective of the dominated class. The latter is empowered through the use of a dialogic discourse articulated from within the dominant language ideology itself. For example, Ian Llyad, a representative of the middle class, opens the mock talk show with the following remark: ‘With so much things going on in society today, we see where people are fastly moving away from traditional values, giving up what is right for what has now become socially acceptable.’ 16 Ian Llyad’s conservatism is debunked when open-minded journalist Michael Pryce tackles the issue of homosexuality in Jamaican society. Yet, the dialogue between Ian Llyad, Mista Muta, Michael Pryce and the dancehall DJ Buju Banton reveals that heterosexuality is definitely the cultural norm in Jamaica, while homosexuality is violently outlawed. In fact, the dominant discourse about homosexuality revolves around a view that Jamaican culture should be dependent on stable norms. Beyond positive change, which appears to be completely overshadowed, there may thus be instances in which the dominant and dominated classes may feel that their interaction is primarily justified by cultural resistance.

Conclusion

In the study of Jamaican popular music, lyrics-based analyses (both condemnatory and commendatory ones) can limit the scope of an artistic practice that is in accordance with social reality. Arguably, Bob Marley’s lyrics alone would not have shown the whole alchemy involved in the composition of his works of art from his early days with the Wailers in Trench Town to his rise to international stardom. His lyrics alone may not demonstrate a further engagement with the notion of dialogue as part of what Bakhtin calls the authoritative discourse. In the internally persuasive discourse of dancehall music, the artistes have been able to carry out texts that encompass the interrelationship between contestation and dialogue as a common denominator of a creative artistic practice. With its own imaginative representation, the Twin of Twins’ gangsta comedy enhances the already existing – but utterly ignored – dialogic discourse of dancehall music. By adopting a dialectical approach to difference, the Twins’ creative imagination strives to refashion the resistance culture of the national community, which would legitimise the relational ethos of the dancehall artiste. Curly Loxx and Tu Loxx have justified such a strategy in these terms:

Jamaica don’t want to identify themselves with their culture, which is Rasta, to me, because 75 to 80 per cent of Jamaica suffer; and 75 to 80 per cent of Jamaica is predominantly Rasta, whether they believe it or not, you understand weh we a deal with. The way we act, the way we talk, our ghetto is Rasta…. We are Rastas, Jamaicans are Rastafarians; I’m sorry cause I’m

16 Twin of Twins, ‘Welcoming Comments.’
not saying Jamaicans worship Haile Selassie, but the culture of Rasta is Jamaican.17

This reveals the extent to which the Twin of Twins believe in the reconciliation of the national community around the acceptance of a shared vision of the national identity, which would give Rastafarian philosophy a major cultural role to play in shaping the poetics and the politics of the nation. In being aware of the oppositions that will be raised against their aspiration, however, they manage to consolidate an artistic practice that reflects a dialogic relation to social reality. Hence, the practice of the dancehall artiste can represent a significant challenge to a concept of resistance that is confined to the terrain of ‘border clashes’ or perennial distinctions.

Far from being just a pretext for entertaining their fans with palatable humour, the Twin of Twin’s gangsta comedy embodies the hybridised worldview of a new generation of dancehall artistes, who can naturally stir up in their work the various influences that they have interiorised. Like the griots in traditional West African societies, part of whose role is to record and to transmit the oral history of very important persons, the Twin of Twins provide their listeners with the knowledge of the achievements and the failures of Jamaican VIPs. Bob Marley, Mutabaruka, Dear Pastor (Reverend Aaron Dumas) and Ian Boyne are therefore equally important in the various stages of the Twins’ dialogic discourse, from The Crucifiction of the Ghetto, Volume 5, to The Resurrection of the Ghetto, Volume 6. Such people, who have become impersonated characters in the Twins’ ‘Stir It Up’ series, remind us that Jamaican society, although it is segmented, has an awareness of its unity as a nation. However, unlike the traditional West African griots, Curly Loxx and Tu Loxx promote a subversive hybridisation that aims to disorganise the rigid hierarchical relations within the national community. Consequently, they reaffirm the currency of a paradigm for both contestation and dialogue in the study of Jamaican dancehall culture.

17 Interview with author, Kingston, Jamaica (November 2006).
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Dialogue 2.0: A Call for Interfaith Service and Action

Turan Kayaoglu


The Geneva meeting was the third meeting of the Istanbul Process, an international effort to implement Resolution 16/18 and to promote religious tolerance. The Istanbul Process was initiated by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s Secretary General, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu; former U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton; and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. Two previous meetings were held at the US State Department in Washington, DC (12th-24th December 2011), and at Wilton Park, an agency of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in London (3rd-5th December, 2012). These earlier meetings also explored ways to combat religious intolerance, including engaging religious minorities, training government officials in religious and cultural awareness, and building networks with civil society to promote religious freedom.

The Geneva meeting was organised by the OIC and focused on interfaith dialogue and the criminalisation of hate speech (Kayaoglu and Petersen 2013). While there was broad and heartfelt disagreement among United Nations member states on

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1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the “3rd International Expert Meeting on the Follow-up of Implementation of HRC Resolution 16/18 at the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, on June 20, 2014.”
the criminalisation of hate speech, member states agreed on the importance of
interfaith and intercultural dialogue in combatting religious hatred, incitement to
violence, and violence against religious persons. Despite broad agreement around
the utility of dialogue, several delegates raised concerns regarding the efficacy of
dialogue and the exclusion of various stakeholder groups from the dialogue process.

I also had the opportunity to address the delegates in Geneva. I told them that for
dialogue to be an effective tool in combatting religious intolerance and hatred, e.g.
Islamophobia, it should be grounded in grassroots interfaith projects and cooperative
actions that focus on the solution of shared problems. I call this Dialogue 2.0. First,
however, let us examine the benefits and shortcomings of Dialogue 1.0.

**Muslims and Dialogue 1.0**

Muslims have been active participants in interfaith and intercultural dialogue at
local, national, and international levels since the late 1990s. They have promoted or
participated in a series of initiatives and institutions under various names: dialogue
of civilisations, alliance of civilisations, interfaith dialogue, interreligious dialogue,
and intercultural dialogue (Dallmayr and Manoochehri 2007, Michael and Petito
2009, Boase 2010)

The governments of Iran, Qatar, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan and Indonesia
have all initiated interfaith meetings and established interfaith organisations. For
example, Saudi Arabia established the King Abdulaziz Inter-Religious and Inter-
Cultural Dialogue Centre in Vienna in 2012. Moreover, Muslim civil-society
groups, like the Asian Muslim Action Network, are present in eighteen Asian
countries, and the 30 million-strong Muhammadiyah, who are from Indonesia
and are active throughout South East Asia, have integrated interfaith dialogue and
collaboration into their socio-political and religious engagement (Kayaoglu 2012).

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and its various agencies have been
advancing a dialogue agenda since the mid-1990s. In 2008, the OIC revised its
Charter, elevating interfaith and intercultural dialogue to become one of the goals
of the organisation.

Muslims have been active in dialogue in the United States, too. A 2011 report
on American mosques by Ihsan Bagby found that over 79% of all mosques have
been involved in an interfaith programme (Bagby 2011). Muslims affiliated with
the Gülen Movement (Hizmet) have opened over fifty dialogue-related centres
throughout the United States (Kayaoglu 2012).

These face-to-face exchanges amount to Dialogue 1.0. Several forms of this model
exist: In some cases, participants have used the pretence of dialogue as a means to convert the other party. In other cases, participants have exchanged theological viewpoints in order to identify the points of agreement and disagreement, aiming to improve mutual understanding. Other instances of dialogue have focused on finding a common ethical basis in order to foster a spirit of coexistence and cooperation. Still other dialogue activities have even included interfaith spirituality and mediations, such as the reading of scripture and praying together.

**Dialogue 1.0 Produces Modest Results**

Dialogue 1.0 challenges peoples’ comfort zones. It brings them into an unfamiliar space — usually religious — and encourages them to socialise with others whose religious and cultural backgrounds differ. This face-to-face interaction model has the potential to produce modest results in combating religious intolerance and hatred. According to an ABC/Washington Post Survey in 2009, overall, those who feel they understand Islam or have a Muslim friend are 22 points more apt to view Islam and Muslims favourably if compared with those who lack a basic understanding or a Muslim friend.

These types of dialogue activities allow participants to become familiar with the other. Beyond this, however, these interactions assume a circular quality, with participants revisiting familiar issues and talking points tend to veer between exchanging pleasantries and platitudes. Moreover, as talking-the-talk does not always mean walking-the-walk, such interfaith and intercultural exchanges do not necessarily eliminate mutual suspicions or build meaningful trust. Moreover, Dialogue 1.0 is not very inclusive of certain traditionally marginalised groups, such as women and youth. This model also has difficulty accommodating those who follow non-Abrahamic faith traditions or who are secular humanists (Smith 2007).

**Dialogue 2.0**

There is a better way to conduct dialogue: interfaith and intercultural service. This model relies on social psychological insights garnered from an experiment that was conducted by the Turkish-American social psychologist Muzafffer Sherif (1906-1988). This experiment established the basis of Realistic Conflict Theory, offering an explanation for how group identities and inter-group hostilities form. The experiment, known as “The Robber’s Cave,” is retold by Rabbi Jonathan Sacks in *The Home We Build Together* and I summarise it below:

*Forming group identity:* For this experiment, Muzafffer Sherif recruited 22 boys. All of them were white 11 year olds and they did not know each other. Divided into two groups, the boys settled into two cabins at Robber’s Cave State Park in
Oklahoma. Neither group knew of the existence of the other group. Living together in their respective cabins, the boys quickly formed collective identities and norms. In a week, they had their group flags and group names — Eagles and Rattlers — posted on their cabin doors.

*Encounter:* Once each of the newly formed groups realised the presence of the other group, they immediately developed a sense of animosity towards the other. After being formally introduced, the groups moved into the same campsite and engaged in a series of competitions to earn prizes. Sticking to their group identities, they refused to socialise with members of the other group, called the other group members derogatory names, and raided each other’s cabins.

*Integration:* To see if the groups would stop treating each other with hostility, Muzaffer Sherif introduced several new elements as the experiment progressed. Two of them are particularly relevant to how and when dialogue can effectively combat intolerance and hatred. In one situation, the boys met in order to watch and discuss a movie together. This face-to-face meeting and the subsequent dialogue about the movie did not diffuse the tension between the groups. In fact, some of these meetings ended with the groups throwing food at each other and engaging in verbal harassment.

Another version included an interesting twist: the boys were told that there was a problem with the camp’s water supply and that neither group could fix it alone. They laboured together and solved the problem. Following this shoulder-to-shoulder work, the boys stopped using derogatory terms against each other, socialised together, and showed signs of care for the other group.

**What does Robber’s Cave tell us about Dialogue?**

The experiment yields one piece of good news — and one piece of bad news. The bad news first: some form of animosity towards and hatred of the other is built into the human condition. We have the tendency to bind with a group, to create a group identity, to treat individuals within our group favourably, and to treat outsiders unfavourably and even with suspicion and hostility in some cases.

The good news is that certain experiences are helpful in breaking down stereotypes and fostering collective identities. Structured dialogue around an issue is not very helpful in eliminating conflict. Working to solve a shared problem that neither party can solve alone is a more effective means for diffusing conflict and building empathy towards the other group. In effect, ‘side-by-side’ or ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ works better than ‘face-to-face’.
Examples of Dialogue 2.0

Dialogue 2.0 is natural for faith communities who have embraced the responsibility of helping others as a God-pleasing act. Scriptural sources across faith traditions provide a strong basis for encouraging the faithful to cooperate for the well-being of their societies. There are many examples of faith communities reaching out to other communities of faith and conscience (Patel and Brodeur 2006). They establish coalitions and engage in interfaith projects to combat poverty, discrimination, environmental degradation, and domestic violence, among other areas.

For example, US President Obama initiated the President’s Interfaith and Community Service Campus Challenge in 2012. This initiative aims to bring together people from different backgrounds — both religious and non-religious — and to challenge them to tackle a specific problem in their communities. In 2012, more than 250 institutions participated in the challenge. Some of these initiatives included: building a Habitat for Humanity house, helping homeless people, and mentoring children in inner-city schools.

Dialogue 2.0 has global reach. Around the same time as Turkey’s 2013 Taksim Square protests took place against the government, 200,000 Turks were in the Istanbul Olympic Stadium for the finale of Turkish Language Olympiads. This event brings together about 2,000 students from schools affiliated with the Gülen movement (Hizmet) to show their Turkish language skills and to recite poetry and sing in their primary languages. In 2013, the students hailed from 140 countries. The Gülen movement’s educational initiatives, in which mostly Turkish Muslim volunteers cooperate with non-Muslims for educational purposes, can be considered as an interfaith and intercultural action. In fact, rather than the explicitly interfaith-focused centres and activities of the Gülen movement, which follow a face-to-face dialogue model, these educational activities are far more likely to combat intolerance and hatred against Muslims (Barton, Weller and Yılmaz 2013). One can consider the size of the Turkish audience during such fraught national political events as proof of the reach and appeal of such Dialogue 2.0 activities.

The environment is a common concern and thus, not surprisingly, many interfaith action coalitions focus on it, including: the Interreligious Eco-Justice Network, Interfaith Power & Light, the Interfaith Coalition on Energy, the Interfaith Coalition for the Environment, the Regeneration Project, and the Partnership for Earth Spirituality. The Earth Ministry is a good example of this kind of activism. Although grounded in the Christian tradition, this non-profit organisation has built a powerful interfaith coalition for environmental advocacy, both in Washington State and throughout the United States. It cooperates with over 60 organisations with a variety of religious and secular orientations. This interfaith action network
provides environmental education materials to religious organisations, engages in public campaigns to increase environmental awareness, and lobbies state legislatures on issues such as clean energy.

The Center for Interfaith Action on Global Poverty points out that not only is action the best way for the participants to shed their biases and intolerance, but that such action is also the best way to tackle global problems. “Faith leaders have a key role to play in addressing major public health, education and other development challenges through two closely associated activities, behaviour change and demand creation for development commodities and services. With a unique, stable and trusted presence in difficult environments, faith communities are well-positioned to provide leadership and deliver results with measurable impact on human well-being” (Religions for Peace 2014)

All these efforts indicate that many faith communities have moved from Dialogue 1.0 to Dialogue 2.0 and are ready to act in solidarity with other communities of faith and conscience. Muslims should be at the forefront of this movement.

**Additional Benefits of Dialogue 2.0 over Dialogue 1.0**

In addition to being more effective in helping groups engage with each other, Dialogue 2.0 is more inclusive; it accommodates and empowers groups that Dialogue 1.0 excludes and marginalises.

**Women:** Dialogue 1.0 has struggled with involving women. Many Muslim women have difficulty in speaking up about theological issues when men are present. Often, men also have difficulties accepting women as equal partners in dialogue meetings. When Muslim women are present at dialogue meetings, often, to the distaste of the Muslim women, these meetings disproportionately focus on women in Islam — specifically, on issues relating to headscarves. It is essential to bring women into dialogue, and Dialogue 1.0 does not help.

In *Muslims, Christians and the Challenge of Interfaith Dialogue*, the religious studies scholar Jane Smith recounts her conversation with a Muslim woman in Ghana. When Smith asked whether women were involved in Christian-Muslim dialogue, a woman replied: “Look at the men just sitting in the square . . . They can talk about such things all day and nothing happens. Meanwhile, the Muslim and Christian women of the village figured out how to cooperate to bring running water directly to our homes” (Smith 2007, 146).

As this anecdote illustrates, building dialogue on collective action that aims to solve shared problems will empower women. Women and men are similarly concerned
with the problems in their communities, but women have a unique perspective and may be more willing to engage in collaborative activities that help their communities than are men.

**Youth:** Most youth avoid structured interfaith or intercultural dialogue. Dialogue about the subtleties of theological differences or the potential for peaceful coexistence is unlikely to draw the attention of children and teens. This is unfortunate, because these early years are when one’s personality, identity, and views about others are formed.

As the Robber’s Cave example illustrates, youth are more likely to have successful encounters when they roll their sleeves up together, rather than when they sit around a table and exchange ideas. This reality calls for collaborative projects to help one’s community or those in distress abroad. Dialogue 2.0 has been successful in getting younger people to interact. In the United States, many youth and university students carry out activities such as building houses for Habitat for Humanity.

**Believers:** Dialogue 1.0 assumes that people are interested in exchanging views about theological, ethical, or spiritual issues. It empowers those who are well-versed in their own religion or culture and have some familiarity with other religions and cultures. This may be true for some individuals, but not for all, as many may not have clear ideas underpinning their religious or cultural traditions, or they may be unfamiliar with other religions and cultures.

In *Finding Mecca in America*, the sociologist Mucahit Bilici noted that in Detroit, one of the places in the United States with a high concentration of Muslims, only six Muslims were active in interfaith dialogue meetings. Dialogue 1.0 leads to the engagement of a select few (Bilici 2012). This is understandable when dialogue is restricted to verbal exchanges. However, faith and culture are more emotional attachments whose value has emerged through practices — rather than mere cerebral convictions whose value has emerged through talking. Few can retell the stories of Abraham in “English”, but everyone can do something to feed the poor.

**Secular humanists and believers from non-Abrahamic faiths:** Finally, Dialogue 1.0 assumes that participants share a baseline framework, or shared terminology or cosmology. Many others, including Hindus, Buddhists, and secular humanists, are likely to have little interest in participating in a dialogue that is shaped by an Abrahamic framework. These people, however, will probably share community concerns about environment, crime, health, poverty, and education.

Shifting the focus to interfaith and intercultural collaborative actions for the common good as a means to enable people to understand and care for each other
will tremendously expand the reach and efficacy of interfaith dialogue.

**A Call for Dialogue 2.0**

There is no magic bullet in combating religious and cultural intolerance and hatred. However, dialogue is an essential proactive measure to this end. It is compatible with universal human rights as it is based on freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of association.

The face-to-face dialogue model is useful, but it is a limited and flawed means to utilize in moving towards coexistence and tolerance. If we are serious about using dialogue to combat religious hatred and violence, such dialogue should focus on grassroots mobilisation for collaborative experiences in the service of solving shared problems in education, employment, health, and the environment. This type of project-focused intercultural and interfaith exchange will stimulate genuine engagement, without the concerns of manipulation or dissimulation.

Designers of these activities and projects should pay special attention to the inclusion of women, youth, and people from diverse backgrounds, regardless of their faith. Only after the experience of working together for a common cause will people from different religious and cultural backgrounds have the self-empowerment and necessary appreciation of each other to counter religious hatred and violence in their communities.
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Reflections on Dialogue

Fred Dallmayr

My name is Fred Dallmayr. I am a Professor at the University of Notre Dame in the United States, but I am also the Co-Chair of the World Public Forum, ‘Dialogue of Civilizations. It is in that capacity that I am asked to talk a bit about dialogue, because in our title we have this notion of Dialogue of Civilisations. But before I go on, I want to say that we have to take ‘dialogue’ not in a very literal sense, but in a very broad sense where it includes all kinds of communication. So it’s not just dialogue in the sense of verbal interaction, but it extends to such things as dance, music, storytelling, and the like. But perhaps the most important form of dialogue in the history of almost all cultures is sharing a meal together, breaking bread together. That kind of dialogue is much more fundamental, much more meaningful than empty chattering among people. So I would like to take the notion of dialogue in that broad sense as including all kinds of communication.

What I would like to do here today is three things. First of all, I would like to talk about the historical background, the cultural and intellectual background of dialogue. Why has dialogue become so relevant today? Secondly, what is the role of dialogue today in the context of what we call ‘globalisation’? Then, finally, I would like to say a few words about the purpose or the goal of dialogue, the meaning of dialogue.

First of all, some words about the historical and intellectual background of dialogue. Why has dialogue become important in recent times? Of course, dialogue is not a modern invention; we have had dialogues throughout history. Students of philosophy are surely familiar with the Great Dialogues of Plato; all college students have to study at least some of the Dialogues of Plato, like the *Meno*, the *Phaedo* and others. And of course there were also many dialogues held during the Middle Ages, theological dialogues (often called ‘disputations’). There is a rich history of that.

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Interview with Fred Dallmayr for the WPF ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’
However in modern times — and by modern times I mean roughly the time from the Renaissance (1500s) and onwards — dialogue has fallen, one might say, on bad days. It has gained a bad reputation for two main reasons. First of all, there is the upsurge of modern science and, secondly, the upsurge of modern individualism. With the works of people like Francis Bacon, Galileo, Kepler and others, science has come into its own. Now, modern science is distinguished by the fact that it relies mainly on experiment, on scientific testing and not on dialogue. Scientific inquiry follows a method, a rigorous method which we called the ‘experimental method’ and in this experimental method the scientist does not dialogue with the target of analysis but analyses it. So, in a way, science may be called a form of monologue rather than a dialogue. In any case, scientific method has not been very hospitable to dialogical interaction and for this reason dialogue has receded into the background during the modern era.

The second main reason for the decline of dialogue is modern individualism. The emphasis on the individual, on individual mind, has also contributed to the retreat of dialogical interaction. The leading modern philosopher who is familiar to all students of Western culture is, of course, René Descartes. Every freshman in college is familiar with at least one sentence of René Descartes: ‘Ego cogito, ergo sum’ (‘I think, therefore I am’). Here everything is placed in the individual mind, in the ego, the mind of the ego. He did not say ‘we think’, or ‘I think with somebody else’. It is his emphasis on the individual mind which, in a way, makes dialogue irrelevant. So this modern emphasis on the ego, on individualism, has also contributed to a certain decline in interaction and has placed the emphasis on the cogito and its rational analysis. The method of cogito is rational argumentation, which does not depend on or is not hospitable to dialogue where one finds truth in the slow form of interaction or interrogation. Now, this rational analysis became sort of triumphant during the heyday of what we call the ‘Enlightenment’ in the West. It was an enlightenment of the mind but, again, the mind taken as the individual mind, as the mind of the individual researcher, the individual philosopher who, in his or her mind, can know everything. That was the Enlightenment’s ‘universalism,’ the search for universal knowledge, and such universal knowledge was thought possible because we all have the same mind — which again does not encourage dialogue or mutual questioning.

I now turn to my second topic. Something has happened in the last two centuries or so, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which has changed the situation by placing a question mark behind these modern assumptions, especially the assumptions of science and individualism. There are two main developments which have come to challenge the modern mindset or worldview. First of all, the upsurge of language or the greater attention being placed on language; and, secondly, the
rise of globalisation, the upsurge of close intercultural interaction. First: language. In the framework that I presented before, the framework of Descartes who said ‘I think, therefore I am’, there is no awareness of language. In what language do I think, which language do I use when I think? But as soon as I realise that I think in a language, it is no longer my own language, my individual language, because I have to share language with other people. A great recent philosopher by the name of Ludwig Wittgenstein said (correctly in my view) that there is no such thing as a ‘private language’. Now, if there is no private language, then there can also not be a private mind, a private ego. So this led to the discovery of language as something we always share. We all speak a language, though not the same language. We all speak a language, or languages. And if this is so, then there has to be a form of translation between languages and this translation is a form of interpretation, which relies on dialogue. So I have to dialogue with other languages in order to find the meaning of what is being said, to interpret what is being said. This is why some people say we live ‘after Babel’. We live after the famous tower of Babel which, at the end, led to the dispersal of humankind in a multitude of languages. We have to take that into account.

The second factor that I mentioned is the process of globalisation with which we are all familiar. This of course means many things, but it certainly means one thing above all: that people are pushed together closer and closer around the globe. The great distances that separated people and cultures in the past are vanishing. We live on one ship, often called ‘spaceship earth’, and we have to communicate with each other in that vessel. This is a very concrete political, social, cultural realisation that we are no longer alien to each other, that we are no longer separate peoples or communities which can cultivate just their own culture, their own language. We have to intercommunicate and this leads to an emphasis on cross-cultural learning, cross-cultural communication which, in turn, requires the capacity for translation, interpretation and dialogue. Today, we communicate through the internet, through the media, and we do it on a global level. So there seems to be the promise of universalism, of a universal communication where we ultimately come to understand, or to know, everything.

At the same time, however, we have the objection that actually we communicate less and less and understand less and less, because the languages are ultimately not translatable. This is what has been called ‘incommensurability’: the incommensurable status of languages. It is between these positions of absolute universalism and absolute difference that dialogue charts a moderate middle path. Dialogue does not claim that everything can be translated, but it maintains that some things can be translated. It does not say that we are all the same, that all human beings are the same; it says that in certain respects we are the same, or we are comparable. We have
similar needs, we have similar aspirations, but the way we pursue these needs, the way we articulate these aspirations may be extremely different. So dialogue pursues the path between these extremes.

To illustrate this point, let me give the example of poetry. Everybody realises that poetry is almost untranslatable. Good poetry speaks in one language and the sound, the idiom, is in that language and you cannot translate that. If you put it in different language, you have lost some of the essence of the poetry. This is true, but at the same time, you can translate some of it. We may try to understand some of the language of Dante’s poetry, even though we may not speak Italian. The same, of course, is true with Russian poetry, say Pushkin; or German poetry, say Goethe. One cannot translate everything, but one can translate something, and this is how it is with human beings. We can understand each other up to a certain point, but we should not delude ourselves that we understand each other completely. In many ways we remain a mystery to ourselves, we cannot even translate ourselves totally. We just have to go on dialoguing, with ourselves and with others, and try to learn more about each other and ourselves. So dialogue is a middle path, a prudent, not too optimistic, but not too pessimistic, middle path that humankind can travel, a middle way where we understand each other without being uniform, without having uniformity, but also without having total isolation.

By way of conclusion, let me address the third topic: the purpose or goal of dialogue. For some people dialogue is just a means to an end, a means to something else. You dialogue in order to gain something else. For instance, business partners dialogue with each other in order to have better business relations, to make more money, in order to promote profit; or politicians may dialogue in order to have greater political or geopolitical advantages. This is dialogue as a means to an end. By contrast, I would claim that dialogue has an end in itself, is worthwhile in itself — and not in the sense that we dialogue about dialogue. Some people say that all you do is just talk, you dialogue about dialogue; but that’s mistaken. We dialogue about real things, real concerns, real problems, real issues, sometimes life and death issues. But there is something intrinsic in dialogue, and by this I mean that there is something transformative and educational in dialogue. If we seriously dialogue with somebody else, not just chit-chat, not chattering about the weather, but if we seriously engage with somebody in dialogue, something happens to the participants of dialogue. In a certain way, we are changed. To put it more sharply: we are being humanised, we become more human in dialoguing. The intrinsic goal of dialogue has something to do with goodness. Our goodness is increased, we are no longer selfish, enclosed in our selfishness, but we are sort of elevated to a higher level which one might call the level of humaneness.

Aristotle said that we play the flute not to achieve something else, but that flute-
Reflections

Playing is intrinsically valuable. In the same way, I would say that dialogue has an intrinsic ethical value by transforming us into a more educated and humane beings, and to that extent dialogue also has a political value. If we are able to transform political antagonists or contestants into people who are more aware of each other and of each other’s aspirations and limitations, then there is the possibility to promote things like justice and peace through dialogue. This is how we use dialogue in that organisation to which I belong, the World Public Forum ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’. We believe that, through dialogue, we can resolve some of the festering problems and issues in the world and elevate the participants to a higher level of ethical awareness and humaneness.

We live today in a world which is not very hospitable to that kind of dialogue. In many ways, we live in a very grim context, full of disputes and festering hostilities. If we just think of the present scenario in Syria, the problems of the Middle East, Iran. In all these areas there is a great potential for conflict and, ultimately, for warfare. I am of the generation who still experienced some of the last Great War, World War II. I was a little boy, but I did experience devastated cities, destruction all around me and, of course, in every family, the losses of parents, brothers, and sisters. So my biggest ambition is to reduce the likelihood of a repetition. The dangers of catastrophes are all around us: environmental catastrophes, but especially nuclear catastrophes. Whatever I can do to combat these dangers, I want to do, and dialogue is a good and promising path. Dialogue does not seek to dominate others, does not inflict a certain ideology or worldview on others, but it tries to promote mutual understanding. And through this mutual understanding some way of living together might be possible, some peace with justice. This is what the World Public Forum ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’ stands for. That’s what it means.
Ronald C. Arnett’s rich and wide-ranging book fleshes out Hannah Arendt’s relationship with modernity across fifteen of her major books, to each of which Arnett devotes one chapter. Following Arendt, Arnett considers modernity to be a ‘failed social project’ (2) and instead proposes ‘communicative ethics’ as a frame of analysis for Arendt’s work. According to Arnett, communicative ethics is: ‘resistant to modernity’s undue confidence in progress, its excessive hope in the unlimited potential of the communicative agent/individual, and the amalgamation effort that collapses public and private life into a common social sphere’ (2), which were the main issues that Arendt had with modernity.

As Arnett succinctly notes, Arendt’s major critique of modernity was its focus on progress, which ‘keeps us too attentive to the not yet, missing the existential demands of today’ (262). This forward-looking drive happens at the expense of the past, and tradition, a concept which Arendt reclaims in her thinking. She rejects a notion of tradition that is exclusively linked to the past, along with romanticised views of this past and, instead, as Arnett observes, she ‘offers a rhetorical demand – attend to existence; it is the bridge to understanding the past, learning from the past, and making sense of an unknown future’ (250). Modernity’s focus on the future and progress also led, according to Arndt, to a neglect of contemplation which, in turn, resulted in a ‘banality of unreflective routine’ (4). Banality was, of course, a term that Arendt famously used in her criticism of Adolf Eichmann, whose trial she documented in her work *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963). Arnett’s discussion of Arendt’s book on Eichmann allows him to analyse ideas of belonging in modern society, and Arendt’s distinction between the parvenu – the person who strives to belong to society by any means – and the pariah – who embraces his/her position as an outsider in order to challenge the system. These concerns are also brought to the fore in Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann as a cog within the Nazi machine, whose actions she explains through a ‘modern
vulgar temptation to belong at any cost’ (91). Moreover, as Arnett convincingly demonstrates, this example illustrates Arendt’s critique of modernity more widely, since ‘a banality of evil grows when one thoughtlessly ignores the needs of the Other’ (97), linking thoughtlessness to the neglect of the ethical demands of the Other.

Arendt’s criticism of progress is not only directed at its focus on the future at the expense of the past, but equally at its privileging of action over thinking. However, thinking, or contemplation, as Arendt reminds us, is necessary for ethical encounters with others: ‘Our responsibility rests with the demand to think first, during, and after reflection, not just to follow and act’ (104). This reflective engagement with one’s environment also plays a key role in the political realm. Arendt advocates active participation in the public domain, without which freedom would be impossible, since one of the dangers of the political is the desire to control ideas. It is exactly this act of participation that is denied to the Other in totalitarian societies by using exclusionary discourses such as racism, anti-Semitism and imperialism, which obliterate difference. As Arnett sums up Arendt’s position: ‘communication ethics in dark times requires (...) a recognition that ethical life needs care for a public domain of diversity of ideas’ (130-1).

Speech, as a means to address the pitfalls of progress, is taken a step further in Arendt’s discussion of the role of judgment and imagination: ‘Judgment and imagination were necessary weapons in countering unsophisticated assumptions about the inevitability of progress’ (106). In order to judge, one needs to be committed to contemplation, as Arnett stresses in his analysis of Arendt, and responsibility, in turn, requires the ability to judge in order to avoid becoming ‘a follower of convention’ (170). In Arendt’s conception, the will works as a ‘form of rhetorical interruption that acts upon human desire and thinking itself’ (108). However, as Arnett illustrates, in her posthumous work The Life of the Mind (1978), Arendt proposes the notion of ‘natality’ instead of will. Natality is seen as ‘the faculty of beginning that invites a freedom found in foundations fought for with others, giving meaning not in individualisation but in a “We” that has public purpose’ (240), stressing the need to move beyond individual action and reflection in order to interact with Others.

Arnett’s perceptive and original book makes an important contribution to the field of Hannah Arendt studies, as well as to communication ethics and rhetoric, astutely crystallising her relationship with modernity and linking it to major strands of her thinking, concluding that:

Arendt’s counter to modernity is a demanding rhetoric – think before, during, and after the doing. A reflective life is our only hope of freedom and
our best shot at change as we meet an existence that calls forth responsibility in response to that which we would not expect or desire. (263)

This statement, as well as Arnett’s book as a whole, confirm that Hannah Arendt’s work continues to be relevant in today’s world, a world that is increasingly dominated by technology and an unthinking championing of progress at the expense of ethical engagements with the Other.
BOOK REVIEW

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Virtue in Dialogue: Belief, Religious Diversity, and Women’s Interreligious Encounter
By Mara Brecht

It is almost two decades since Professor Ursula King declared that the missing voice in Interreligious Dialogue was that of women. Since then, while – almost inevitably given the patriarchal hierarchy of most traditions – men’s voices still dominate there has been a growing tide of discussion about women’s place and roles. Mara Brecht’s volume adds to that discussion and is a welcome contribution, even if I cannot wholeheartedly defend all of her claims on an academic basis.

In brief, the central thrust of Brecht’s argument, addressed to church institutions, is that there is no reason to be afraid of Interreligious Dialogue as an activity that will weaken or relativise people’s faith; rather it strengthens and deepens their commitment to their own tradition. There are two main aspects to her study, the first of which is fieldwork amongst a grassroots women’s Interreligious Dialogue group in Philadelphia, which gives her an evidence base and which she categorises as a “bottom-up” approach. Notably this is work she did alongside Jeannine Hill-Fletcher. The second aspect is using epistemology as a philosophical tool for a “top-down” approach to interpret the data and attempt to reconfigure debates in the field.

I’ll begin by noting some key strengths of the book. First, it helps bring women’s voices into the discussion which is especially important as at a grassroots level women probably make up the majority of those involved in dialogue. Second, while there is quite a strong philosophical element to Christian discussion of religious Others and dialogue, Brecht explicitly brings epistemology more clearly into this, especially around what she terms “virtue in dialogue” and “epistemic virtue” (69). Third, and here I may suggest the book is alongside Dialogue Studies (and the related field of Interreligious Studies), it does not simply discuss data at an abstract scholarly level but makes connections between academic discussions and those of practitioner communities. Fourth, I think Brecht is right to claim that Interreligious Dialogue is not a threat to religious traditions and institutions, but a positive element they can gain from.
Turning to the book’s weaknesses a number of points can be raised. First, I would suggest that Brecht tries to make her argument do too much by suggesting that her specific field study can be extrapolated as a general model which is almost universally applicable. The second point relates to the way she uses her material and the conclusions drawn from it. Her concluding chapter speaks of three transformations: “the transformation of returning home”, “the transformation of hybridity”, and “the transformation of conversion” (215). I cannot hope to do justice to her arguments in that chapter and will not attempt to, but drawing on the previous chapters she employs especially Ricoeur and Habermas as theorists, as well as – both positively and negatively – theological work from Perry Schmidt-Leukel, the current reviewer, and Hill-Fletcher. Speaking of “virtuous doxastic practices” (VDP), she suggests that those involved in dialogue do not engage in casual hybridity, that is personally picking and choosing elements of traditions they like (emphasising the communal rather than individual nature of religious commitments), nor do they tend to convert to another tradition, but rather become more embedded in their home tradition. Drawing upon Vatican and WCC documents promulgating dialogue she concludes on this: “on the VDP model, the church’s intuition that dialogue is an adventure that will lead to the deepening of Christian faith and, often, to the transformation of returning home must be commended” (246). However, I think that to some degree Brecht’s desire to send a church-friendly message means that she downplays the way that this “transformation of returning home” is often a more radical transformation. Where people have questioned the absoluteness (as alone the only way) of their tradition, and drunk from other traditions, the traditions become hybrid but she steps back from stating what she terms being “profoundly affected” (242) may actually mean. (Although, as Brecht notes, following Hill-Fletcher and myself, all religions have always been hybrid). In this regard I am not sure she is entirely true to the stories of her informants, for instance in downplaying what trying out others’ religious practices may mean, when she rejects the often used “crossing over” language (77-8); without this in what sense does she mean “home coming” if she insists people only stay and grow within their tradition? Third, while I think Brecht is correct to challenge much traditional epistemology in this area and open up new debates, especially using feminist epistemology (though I am a bit wary of some of the possibly essentialist sounding terms, which I think in justice she does not buy into herself, about men’s and women’s ways of knowing, see 116), I think she too readily rejects certain “conventional” models as wrong. For instance, she (for some good reasons) dismisses Robert McKim’s and Richard Feldman’s T-Principle and S-Principle – that in the light of religious diversity people can continue practising but with tentative belief (T) or with suspended belief (S) (53). It strikes me that when she discusses one group member’s “willingness to admit the partialness and inadequacy with which we understand even our most dearly held religious beliefs” as a case against the T and S Principles (71), she is neglecting that this is, I would
argue, a case for modifying rather than rejecting them, so we have a T+ Principle, where the beliefs remain “tentative” and “partial”. Academia encourages a tendency to dismiss other’s ideas and assert your own, which helps position your work as new and original rather than simply building upon existing ideas. Nevertheless, without wanting to sound overly harsh, I suggest that Brecht’s dismissive approach here is not in accord with the feminist principles she wishes to uphold, nor with what I would see as good practice in Dialogue Studies or Interreligious Studies, all of which may ideally strive for a collaborative building of knowledge. I think she has good reasons for dismissing at least the way McKim and Feldman developed their ideas, but it may be a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

In conclusion, while Brecht’s book is certainly a welcome addition to the academic literature in this area, and one whose virtues outweigh its vices, I cannot give it my full commendation. Nevertheless, it should certainly be on the reading list for such areas as women in dialogue, epistemology as a tool to approach dialogue and interreligious encounters, and the question of ethics and virtue in the meeting of religions. She makes many insightful and excellent points in the book which exceed the scope of what I’ve been able to outline here, and I certainly believe students and seasoned scholars alike will benefit from reading it.
The Journal of Dialogue Studies is a multidisciplinary, peer reviewed academic journal published twice a year. Its aim is to study the theory and practice of dialogue, understood provisionally as: meaningful interaction and exchange between people (often of different social, cultural, political, religious or professional groups) who come together through various kinds of conversations or activities with a view to increased understanding. The Editors welcome vigorous discussion of this provisional description, of dialogue’s effectiveness as a means of increasing understanding, and of other fundamental questions.

The Journal brings together a body of original scholarship on the theory and practice of dialogue that can be critically appraised and discussed. It publishes conceptual, research, and/or case-based works on both theory and practice, and papers that discuss wider social, cultural or political issues as these relate to the evaluation of dialogue. In this way, the Journal aims to contribute towards establishing ‘dialogue studies’ as a distinct academic field (or perhaps even emerging discipline).

The particular focus of this third issue is ‘dialogue ethics’ though with recourse to the critical examination of key dialogue theories, as examined in the previous issue. Ideas explored incorporate the following:

- Dialogic ethics as conceived by dialogue theorists such as Buber, Gadamer, Freire (and developed by others).
- Ethics espoused and/or enacted by both leaders of and participants in dialogue.
- Dialogue as a process of ethics formation/refinement.
- What kind of interaction is seen valid or as meaningful? What are the criteria? Who decides?
- Ethical pitfalls in the practice of dialogue.

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